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One of the primary mechanisms thought to underlie action selection in the brain is
Reinforcement Learning (RL). Recently, the use of Deep Neural Networks in models
of RL (Deep RL) has led to human-level performance on complex reward-driven
perceptual-motor tasks. However, Deep RL is persistently criticised for being data
inefficient compared to human learning because it lacks the ability to: (1) rapidly
learn from new information and (2) transfer knowledge from past experiences. The
purpose of this thesis is to form an analogy between the brain and Deep RL to
understand how the brain performs these two processes.
To investigate the internal computations supporting rapid learning and transfer
we use Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory. This allows us to focus
on the computational properties of key learning systems in the brain and their
interactions. We review recent advances in Deep RL and how they relate to the
CLS framework. This results in the presentation of two novel Deep RL algorithms,
which highlight key properties of the brain that support rapid learning and transfer:
the fast learning of pattern-separated representations in the hippocampus, and the
selective attention mechanisms of the pre-frontal cortex.
External factors in the environment can also impact upon rapid learning and
transfer in the brain. We therefore conduct behavioural experiments that investi-
gate how the degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences affects
people’s ability to perform transfer. To do this we use naturalistic 2D video games
that vary in perceptual features but rely on the same underlying rules. We discuss
the results of these experiments with respect to Deep RL, analogical reasoning and
category learning. We hope that the analogy formed over the course of this the-
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This chapter outlines the general goal of the thesis and sets the stage for subse-
quent chapters. We start by proposing that efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL)
in the brain is supported by two key processes: rapid learning and the transfer of
past knowledge (Section 1.1). We then review several behavioural examples of how
humans are able to use these two process to learn which actions to take in a new
situation based on limited feedback (Section 1.2). This feedback is typically in the
form of sparse rewards and is thought to engage the brain’s RL machinery. We
therefore follow these examples with a brief review of RL from both an Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and a cognitive science perspective (Section 1.3). In particular,
Deep RL has emerged as a promising candidate for exploring how the brain trans-
forms high-dimensional perceptual input into actions based on reward. We therefore
discuss recent advancements in Deep RL (Section 1.4) and highlight how it lacks
the efficiency displayed by human RL in new situations (Section 1.5). This chapter
concludes with a general outline of how we plan to use an analogy between Deep RL
and the brain, along with a combination of computational and empirical approaches,
to understand the processes that support efficient RL (Section 1.6).
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1.1 Efficient Learning Relies Upon Rapid learn-
ing and Transfer
Throughout our daily lives we are often presented with situations we have never
experienced before. From an evolutionary stand-point, slow learners are naturally at
a disadvantage in new situations because they are more likely to repeat detrimental
actions. Our ability to quickly identify the best actions in a new situation depends
on two key process: (1) the ability to rapidly learn from information provided by the
new situation and (2) the ability to transfer past knowledge to the new situation.
These two processes are fundamental to human cognition and interact with each
other to help guide us through the world when data is limited or expensive. Indeed,
it is unlikely that any two experiences in our lifetime are truly the same and so we
are constantly recruiting these two processes to some degree. As the philosopher
Heraclitus once said, “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the
same river and he’s not the same man” (Robinson, 1987). It is for these reasons
that life is often framed as a continual learning process whereby past experiences
constantly interact with the learning of new information.
When it comes to investigating these two processes, it is often difficult to distin-
guish between them as they operate in a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand,
learning in a new situation can be influenced by our past knowledge, and on the
other, the past knowledge that we transfer can be influenced by learning in the new
situation. The one exemption to this is the case of ‘zero-shot’ transfer whereby peo-
ple use past experiences to infer the best action in a new situation without using any
feedback. No learning occurs in the new situation and so action selection is made
purely based on transfer and the current perceptual input. From an experimental
point of view, transfer can make it hard to compare humans to computational mod-
els because people do not start tasks tabula rasa and so models have to be imbued
with similar prior knowledge. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to try to understand
the internal computations underlying rapid learning and transfer and how external
factors may affect them.
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1.2 Behavioural Evidence of Rapid Learning and
Transfer in Humans
Before exploring how the brain might perform rapid learning and transfer, we will
first explore some canonical examples of these processes and demonstrate their vital
role in human cognition. These processes occur early on in development and stay
with us throughout adult life. As we shall see, this means that a range of examples
exist both in children and adults.
1.2.1 Children and Development
Children often represent good subjects for studying rapid learning and transfer be-
cause they are still in the process of learning relatively simple skills and concepts
that are amenable to experimental manipulation. In comparison, adults enter ex-
periments with a wealth of prior knowledge that can be readily transferred to any
given task, which can be difficult to control for. From a developmental perspective
the ability to learn from very few experiences and infer optimal actions rapidly in
new situations is critical for making sense of the world, obtaining reward and avoid-
ing danger. Imagine a child that could not quickly acquire the concept of object
permanence and transfer it to new situations. This would make playing a simple
game such as hide and seek or retrieving a biscuit from a jar highly challenging.
One of the fundamental challenges facing young children is learning language.
Interestingly, it has been repeatedly shown that children can quickly learn new
words after very few examples (Carey and Bartlett, 1978). These fast associations
are crucial as the human vocabulary can be large and so the presentation of repeated
labelled examples is unlikely. Not only can children learn word associations quickly,
but they can also apply newly acquired words to novel exemplars that they have
never seen before (Brown, 1957; Waxman, 1998; Waxman and Booth, 2000; Childers
and Tomasello, 2003). This is important because without the ability to transfer
meaning, the utility of a word would be drastically reduced and further learning
would be slow. For example, when a child first learns the word ‘dog’, they may
only be given a few word-image pairings and they need to able to quickly acquire
its meaning and transfer it to a wide-array of other breeds or situational contexts.
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This in turn helps to bootstrap the learning of further knowledge.
This rapid and transferable learning is not limited to just language. For example,
it has also been demonstrated when learning how to use tools. In a study by Casler
and Kelemen (2005), they presented children with an array of appropriate novel
tools that could be used to obtain a desired goal. An adult then demonstrated
how one of the tools could be used to obtain the goal. As a result, the children
consistently used the same tool after just a single demonstration by the adult. This
demonstrates how children can rapidly use a single observation to associate a tool
with its ability to acquire a goal.
Children learning to use tools do not only demonstrate highly efficient learning
but also the ability to perform transfer without the need for feedback. In a series
of experiments, Brown (1990) provided children aged 24-42 months with a set of
‘tools’ that could be used to retrieve a toy that was beyond their reach (Set 1 in
Figure 1.1). Some of these tools, such as a long rake and a long hook, were sufficient
to pull the toy towards them as they were both long, rigid and had a useful end.
Other tools lacked these necessary attributes and were therefore insufficient to pull
the toy.
13
Figure 1.1: Example tool sets used by Brown (1990) to explore transfer in young
children. Children were first given set 1 and learnt that either the long, rigid hook
or the long, rigid rake were appropriate for reaching a toy that was out of their reach.
They were then given one of the other sets (2-6) to test their ability to transfer their
knowledge of an appropriate pulling tool to a novel set of tools. The other sets in
this figure are for children that showed an initial preference for the hook. Those that
showed a preference for the rake were given similar sets but with the rake manipulated
in the same was as the hook. As an example, set 2 tested children’s ability to switch
to a non-preferred perceptually novel tool in order to reach the toy. Figure adapted
from Brown (1990).
After the child had successfully learned to pull the toy towards them using an
appropriate tool (with help from the mother if needed) they were given a second set
of tools. There were five different options for this second set of tools and each one
tested a different aspect of the knowledge transferred by the child. For example Set 2
in Figure 1.1 required the child to select the long rake, which was painted differently
to the rake in the training set. This corresponds to selecting a perceptually novel and
non-preferred tool that is appropriate for reaching the toy. Impressively, children
performed extremely well when presented with the second set of tools, for example
14
92% of children made the switch to the perceptually novel rake in Set 2. Interestingly
when the second tool set had an appropriate hook or rake only 62% of children
showed preference for the tool they used in the training set. The conclusion of
such experiments was that children were able to transfer the knowledge of what
made a good tool (long, rigid and a useful end) to novel tool sets and thus act
optimally to reach the toy. This represents one of the first clear demonstrations of
transfer in young children. More recent work has since shown that the transfer of
tool knowledge is even possible in young children when the original task is a video
demonstration and the target task is a perceptually different real-world problem
(Chen and Siegler, 2013).
In addition to learning words and how to use tools, more recent work by Lucas
et al. (2014) has shown that 4 and 5 year old children are also able to transfer
causal relationships to perceptually novel problems. In the study by Lucas et al.
(2014) the authors investigated whether children and adults could learn disjunctive
or conjunctive causal principles and transfer them to a novel problem. A disjunctive
causal principle means that each individual cause has an independent probability of
causing an event. In comparison, a conjunctive causal principle means that causes
need to occur in conjunction to cause an effect and are not causal on their own. The
basic paradigm to explore the learning of these two principles and their subsequent
transfer can be seen in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Behavioural paradigm used by Lucas et al. (2014) to explore the transfer
of disjunctive and conjunctive causal principles in both children and adults. Partic-
ipants were given either the conjunctive or disjunctive condition as a training set
and then tested on the same test set. In the conjunctive condition, the combination
of A and C objects was required to turn on the ‘blinket’ machine. In comparison,
in the disjunctive condition only the presence of object A or C was required to turn
on the ‘blinket’ machine. The test set was designed to be ambiguous so that F could
be interpreted as the sole cause for turning on the ‘blinket’ machine or the combi-
nation of D and F could be interpreted as the cause. If transfer is successful then
the interpretation chosen should match whether the participant was trained on the
conjunctive or disjunctive condition. Figure adapted from Lucas et al. (2014).
The paradigm consisted of two phases; a training phase and a test phase. In
the training phase, participants saw pairs of objects on top of square bases (termed
‘blinket machines’), with the objects representing potential causal factors that could
turn on the blinket machines (light up the square). The general goal for the partici-
pants was to identify which of the objects were blinkets i.e. which objects caused the
blinket machine to turn on. One group of participants received a conjunctive set of
objects, where a combination of objects was required to activate the blinket machine,
while another group received a disjunctive set, where individual objects could turn
on the blinket machine (Figure 1.2). The training phase was then followed by a test
phase, which was the same for all participants regardless of which training set they
were given. This test phase had perceptually novel objects and was designed to be
ambiguous so that either a conjunctive or disjunctive principle could be correct. If
transfer occurred then the participants should interpret either a combination of ob-
jects or individual objects as activating the blinket machines, depending on whether
they had the conjunctive or disjunctive training set respectively.
For example, if a participant had received the disjunctive training set then they
should infer that object D in the test set is not a blinket (Figure 1.2) because they
have transferred over the disjunctive causal principle and inferred that object F is
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the sole cause for the activation of a blinket machine. In comparison if a participant
had received the conjunctive training set then they should infer that object D is a
blinket because it activates the blinket machine in combination with blinket F, as
per the conjunctive causal principle.
Interestingly, Lucas et al. (2014) found that both children and adults demon-
strated the ability to transfer the disjunctive causal principle. However, children
were better than adults at transferring the conjunctive causal principle, with adults
tending to favour a disjunctive causal principle even after conjunctive training.
While this provides another demonstration that young people are able to perform
transfer in perceptually novel problems, these findings also raise some interesting
questions about the discrepancies between children and adults. The authors suggest
a Bayesian account for these differences. They suggest that children have weaker
more diffuse priors, which mean that they are able to update their beliefs more
readily. In other words, because children have received less real-world training than
adults they are more flexible in their learning and weight new information more
highly. This is interesting in terms of transfer because it is the development of these
strong priors that provides the substrate required for transfer. Having strong, reli-
able abstract beliefs or ‘priors’ about the world allows one to select beneficial actions
in perceptually novel environments with minimal feedback. In the case where an
adult has to learn an abstract concept that violates their prior, they will do worse
than a child because they are more likely to transfer their real-world prior. In con-
trast, children will readily update their prior beliefs based on the information in the
psychological study and transfer the new abstract concept more readily. In the case
of Lucas et al. (2014), this lead to better performance by children on their task.
1.2.2 Adult Behaviour
Many examples of adults performing rapid learning and transfer in new situations
exist. The aforementioned work by Lucas et al. (2014) actually demonstrates an
instance where adult transfer can hinder the efficiency of learning in a new situation.
However, often rapid learning and transfer can be beneficial tools for adults. For
example, Lake et al. (2015) have proposed that when adults see an image of a novel
two-wheeled vehicle they only need one example to parse it into its constituent parts
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and learn the new visual concept. It is likely that this efficiency of learning is due
to the transfer of knowledge from past experience with the constituent parts. Aside
from concept learning, rapid learning can even occur in adults during perceptual
learning, which involves consistent changes to perception. For instance, Poggio et al.
(1992) have shown that people participating in a novel perceptual discrimination
task can significantly improve performance after only a few trials.
To demonstrate how pervasive rapid learning and transfer is in adult cognition,
Dubey et al. (2018) investigated the strategies used by adults when playing 2D
video games for the first time. Throughout this thesis we shall use the domain
of video games to explore rapid learning and transfer. Video games represent a
useful medium for studying transfer because the perceptual features and underlying
rules of the world can be easily manipulated. In addition to this tight control of
the environment, video games also involve sequential decision-making, basic physics
and fine motor control, which are all hallmarks of naturalistic behaviour in the real
world.
In the study, Dubey et al. (2018) performed a range of game manipulations
that targeted different forms of prior knowledge (Figure 1.3). The types of prior
knowledge included: semantics, object identity, affordances, visual similarity, ob-
ject interaction and physical laws (gravity). All of the manipulations significantly
affected performance in terms of the time taken to complete a level, the number
of deaths and the number of states explored. This indicates that adults transfer a
variety of prior knowledge from past experiences in order to solve video games. For
example, if the objects in the 2D game, such as keys and spikes, were changed to
coloured squares people were unable to use past semantic knowledge to infer which
objects to avoid and which objects to pursue.
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Figure 1.3: 2D platform game used by Dubey et al. (2018) to explore the effect of hu-
man prior knowledge on video game performance. In order to complete the original
game (a), players had to move the avatar to the key and then to the door. The trial
ended when the avatar died, which could happen either by falling to the bottom of the
screen or by colliding with either the pink blob or the spikes. Different game manip-
ulations were performed in order to inhibit the transfer of different forms of prior
knowledge to the game. The manipulations were as follows: (b) Masked Semantics
- Object identities were masked by changing them to coloured squares. (c) Reverse
Semantics - Object identities were changed so that their semantics were reversed
i.e. the pink blob became a coin. (d) Masked Identity of Objects - Coloured squares
were placed on all platform areas including the objects. (e) Masked Affordances -
Free space was filled with different textures and platforms were changed to a similar
texture. (f) Masked Visual Similarity - Platforms and ladders were given different
visual appearances. (g) Changed Ladder Interaction - Instead of pressing up to climb
the ladder, participants had to alternate between pressing left and right. (h) Changed
Gravity Direction - The original game was rotated 90 degrees. Figure adapted from
Dubey et al. (2018).
Another interesting finding reported by Dubey et al. (2018) involved the relative
effect sizes of the different manipulations. The manipulations with the largest impact
upon performance, such as masking objects and perceptual similarities, were also
those that disrupted priors thought to form earliest in human development. It
therefore seems that knowledge formed early on development is highly relied upon in
novel environments to guide decisions and action selection. Whether this knowledge
is learnt early on in life because it is more useful in guiding actions or because it is
more prevalent in the statistics of the environment remains to be elucidated.
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1.3 Reinforcement Learning as a Basic Mecha-
nism for Learning
With the aforementioned examples in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to explore
the internal computations and external factors that support rapid learning from new
experiences and the transfer of knowledge from past experiences. This is a broad
topic and so we require a method of constraining the problem and grounding it in a
theoretical framework. Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a predominant
framework for describing how people map perceptual input to action based on re-
ward, and is thought to be a fundamental mechanism for learning in the brain (Niv,
2009; O’Doherty et al., 2015). Crucially, RL also has strong mathematical founda-
tions, which allows us to explore the computational properties needed to perform
rapid learning and transfer. In addition, RL provides us with a natural measure
of efficiency; the fewer actions needed to achieve a certain amount of reward the
more efficient an agent is. We can therefore investigate how mechanisms of rapid
learning and transfer directly affect the efficiency of RL based on the number of
actions needed to obtain reward in a new situation. The remainder of this section
describes the basic principles behind RL and how they manifest themselves in the
brain.
1.3.1 Operant and Classical Conditioning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) describes how agents can use perceptual observations
and reward signals to select actions that subsequently maximise future reward. The
birth of RL can be traced back to seminal work carried out on how animals associate
motor actions with sensory stimuli and rewards. In particular the work by Thorndike
(1911) and Skinner (1935) on operant conditioning provided the first descriptions
of how animals select actions to increase the probability of favourable events and
reduce the probability of adverse events. This ability to select actions in order to
alter the environment in one’s favour is seen as one of the hallmarks of intelligent
behaviour and is central to RL.
Work on Pavlovian conditioning also had an impact upon the development of
RL as it was concerned with learning the predictive relationships between sensory
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stimuli (Yerkes and Morgulis, 1909). This Work gave rise to one of the earliest
computational accounts of what is now considered RL; the Rescorla-Wagner model
(Rescorla, 1972). In the Rescorla-Wagner model two crucial assumptions were made:
(1) learning occurred when there was a mismatch between the predicted value of
an event and the actual value, and (2) the value of each stimuli was summed to
obtain the predicted value of an event. These simple assumptions were able to
explain a multitude of phenomenon in the Pavlovian learning literature including
blocking (Kamin, 1967), overshadowing (Reynolds, 1961) and inhibitory condition-
ing (Rescorla and Lolordo, 1965).
1.3.2 AI and Reinforcement Learning
While this early work in ‘computational psychology’ highlighted some of the key
principles for learning from reward, it was the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
that provided the first rigorous mathematical description that we now refer to as
RL. Proposed by Sutton and Barto (1998), RL built on the assumptions of the
Rescorla-Wagner model by also taking into account the timing of stimuli and relating
learning to actions. More specifically, RL uses a scalar reward signal to learn which
actions to select in order to maximise future rewards based on the consequences
of those actions. RL describes this learning problem as an interaction between an
agent and its environment. The agent observes the state of the environment (st) at
a given time point (t) and selects an action (at). This action then leads to a change
in state (st+1) and an associated reward (rt+1). This interaction is repeated over
and over as the agent learns the best mapping from states to actions in order to
maximise reward. Importantly, the reward can often be 0 meaning that the teaching
signal is sparse and actions made many time-steps before the reward may have been
responsible for generating the reward. This highlights the crux of the RL problem
and is often referred to as the credit assignment problem; which actions in which
states are responsible for generating reward?
With only three main signals between the agent and its environment (s, a and r),
RL appears on the surface to be a very simple framework for exploring reward-driven
learning. However, with just these three signals a plethora of methods have been
proposed to solve the credit assignment problem (see Section 2.1.2 for a detailed
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discussion of these methods) and ultimately learn the best policy (a mapping from
states to actions) for a given task. The majority of these solution methods rely
on learning a value function, much in the same way the Rescorla-Wagner model
updates value estimates of conditioned stimuli using errors between predicted and
actual values. These value functions often denoted V (st) for state evaluation, or
Q(st, at) for state-action evaluation, are an estimate of the expected future reward
from a given state or state-action pairing. In mathematical terms, the expected
future reward is usually calculated as an arbitrary function of the sequence of rewards
experienced after time t from a state or state-action pairing. In practice this function
is usually a discounted sum of the rewards so that rewards nearer in time are given
more weighting in the value computation. Crucially these values store information
about future consequences of actions, which is needed to solve the credit assignment
problem.
1.3.3 Reinforcement Learning in the Brain
Despite modern RL starting out as predominantly an AI framework, it shares many
similarities with the problem faced by biological agents; using reward to select ac-
tions based on the state of the environment in order to obtain more reward. As a
result, neuroscience has taken many of the predictions made by algorithms attempt-
ing to solve the RL problem and looked for neural correlates in the brain. Most
famously, Schultz et al. (1997) found midbrain dopaminergic neurons appear to en-
code Reward-Prediction Errors (RPEs), which are a key component of Temporal
Difference (TD) learning algorithms. TD learning algorithms express the value of
a state or state-action pair as the reward received after that state or state-action
pair plus the value of the subsequent state or state-action pair. This bootstrapping
of value estimates allows TD learning to occur at every time step and propagates
reward information backwards in time. Crucially TD learning relies on RPEs to
drive learning; the difference between the predicted and actual values are used to
update the value estimate.
TD learning makes specific predictions about how RPEs should change during
learning. For example, at the start of learning there should be a large positive
RPE when the reward is presented because it is unexpected and so the difference
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between the expected and actual value is large and positive. Subsequently this
large positive RPE should occur earlier and earlier in learning until it is centered
on the earliest reliable predictor of reward i.e. the conditioned stimulus. There
should no longer be a positive RPE near the reward because it has already been
predicted by the conditioned stimulus. In comparison, there is always a positive RPE
when the conditioned stimulus is presented because the agent cannot know when
the conditioned stimulus will occur. Subsequently if the reward is removed then
the positive RPE will remain when the conditioned stimulus is presented but there
will be a negative RPE when the agent expected to receive the reward because the
predicted value is now larger than the actual value. Strikingly, this distinct learning
profile of RPEs was found to occur in the firing of phasic midbrain dopaminergic
neurons of monkeys as they were trained to associate a stimulus with a juice reward
(Schultz et al., 1997). This led to a theory known as the reward prediction error
hypothesis of dopamine, which has subsequently been validated by a host of other
studies (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Tobler et al., 2003; Bayer and Glimcher,
2005). The theory represents a prime example of how the interaction between AI
and neuroscience can be beneficial, and shows the power of using RL as a framework
for trying to understand computations occurring in the brain.
1.4 Into the 21st century: Deep Reinforcement
Learning
While simple computational models of Reinforcement Learning (RL) are able to de-
scribe a wealth of behavioural and neurological findings, substantial obstacles still
prevent it from being a complete account of human reward-driven behaviour. Until
recently, one of the greatest problems RL models faced was mapping complex, natu-
ralistic stimuli to actions. The perceptual input that the brain receives is extremely
rich, from the activation of rods and cones in the retina to the movement of hair
cells in the ear. This represents a significantly difficult learning problem as these
high-dimensional inputs lead to the curse of dimensionality. The curse of dimen-
sionality refers to the fact that as the number of dimensions increases so does the
volume of space being represented. This causes data to become increasingly sparse
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and so more data is required to provide the same coverage of space. Until recently,
classic RL models had to rely on hand-crafted state representations that manually
solved the curse of dimensionality.
Fortunately, advances in the field of machine learning have started to provide
solutions to this problem. In particular, the combination of both Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) and RL, often referred to as Deep RL, has led to the development
of algorithms that can achieve human-level performance on complex perceptual-
motor tasks such as playing video games from raw pixel images (Mnih et al., 2015).
This represents an exciting advance for cognitive scientists because it provides a
computational framework that can be used as a reference point to explore how the
brain might use RL to process raw perceptual input into action based on reward. The
rest of this section explores how Deep Learning and Deep RL relate to computations
occurring in the brain.
1.4.1 Deep learning
Deep Learning refers to Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) that typically contain
many hidden layers (Schmidhuber, 2015). This property allows them to learn com-
plex hierarchical representations of high-dimensional input. While largely considered
a machine learning approach, Deep Learning’s origins can be traced back to clas-
sic connectionist or parallel distributed processing approaches in cognitive science
(McClelland et al., 1986). Connectionist approaches in cognitive science aim to use
ANNs to describe cognition using learning mechanisms inspired by the brain. ANNs
represent information as a network of connected units, where both the units and the
connections can take on numerical values. The value of each unit represents its level
of activation and the value of each connection represents the strength of that con-
nection. Unit values are computed using an activation function, which is commonly
a non-linear function that is applied to to a linear summation of a unit’s inputs.
Interestingly, evidence from neuroscience has suggested that this linear summation
of inputs may exist at the neuronal level in the brain (Morel et al., 2018; Cash and
Yuste, 1999). Typically input will be presented to the network by setting a selection
of the units to the value of the input and the output of the network will be read
from another subset of units. Crucially learning is implemented in ANNs by altering
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the strength of the connections between units in order to achieve the desired input-
output mapping. ANNs can vary in terms of activation functions, architecture and
training rules.
The central contribution of the connectionist approach is the idea that informa-
tion can be processed in parallel and represented across many units, with distributed
representations being an emergent property of learning. Connectionists argue that
this central principle is a vital computational property of the brain and hence cog-
nition, whether it be via interconnected brain regions or neurons. Several studies
have found a close correspondence between the distributed representations learnt
by Deep neural Networks and those found in sensory areas of the human brain.
In particular, Deep Neural Networks with similar processing constraints to the hu-
man visual system known as Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs) appear
to produce hierarchical representations similar to the ventral visual stream when
trained to categorize natural images (Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015; Yamins and Di-
Carlo, 2016). The way connectionist approaches learn distributed representations
has been particularly influential in developmental psychology, where they have been
proposed to model how children learn representations of the world based on the sta-
tistical properties of their environment (Plunkett et al., 1997; Quartz and Sejnowski,
1997; Mareschal, 2010). More specifically they have offered explanations for non-
linear development profiles, specialization of specific brain regions and behavioural
dissociation’s (Munakata and McClelland, 2003).
Despite the success of connectionist approaches in cognitive science their biolog-
ical plausibility is still a topic of debate. This is particularly true of Deep Learning,
which typically relies upon backpropagation to propagate prediction errors from the
output layers to the input layers in order to update connections between layers.
This has been declared biologically implausible because it does not rely on locally
available values for learning but instead requires information to be passed sequen-
tially through each of the layers. However, a growing body of research is suggesting
that this criticism may be ill founded and that the brain could well be implementing
solutions that approximate backpropagation (Sacramento et al., 2018; Guerguiev
et al., 2017; Mazzoni et al., 1991; O’Reilly, 1996; Scellier and Bengio, 2017; Whit-
tington and Bogacz, 2017; Lillicrap et al., 2016). In general, these approaches aim
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to re-create the success of backpropagation in training Deep Neural Networks while
maintaining biologically plausibility. It is also worth mentioning that Deep Learn-
ing and its core properties are not tied to backpropagation. For example, Deep
Belief Networks (DBNs) rely upon a local biologically plausible learning rule known
as Hebbian Learning (Testolin et al., 2017). DBNs also use unsupervised learning,
which is thought to be a critical component of learning in the brain as it is unlikely
to have access to a teaching signal for each learning event. Unsupervised methods
are therefore required to make the most of the data that the brain is exposed to
(Testolin and Zorzi, 2016).
In summary, Deep learning has a rich history in cognitive science through its
relationship to connectionist approaches. One of its most appealing properties is its
ability to learn representations in a distributed and hierarchical fashion that appears
to mimic the representations learnt by the brain. While Deep Learning often receives
criticism for the biological implausibility of backpropagation, it is not dependent on
it and a variety of other training rules may be bale to achieve a similar outcome.
1.4.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Deep Reinforcement Learning (Deep RL) takes Deep learning one step further by
combining it with RL principles. In technical terms, it relies on using Deep Learning
to approximate value functions and policies in order to solve the RL problem. The
previous sections have highlighted how the computations used in RL and Deep
Learning may be similar to those used by the brain. This section now focuses on
evidence that both of them may be used in combination by the brain.
The use of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in Deep RL allows an agent to deal
with high-dimensional state representations by learning non-linear continuous func-
tions of their input. Given enough units, DNNs are able to represent any continuous
non-linear function. This means that DNNs are prone to over-fitting and are highly
sensitive to noise in the input, particularly when the number of data points is small.
This problem is amplified in Deep RL because the reward value is sparse and there
are many potentially actions that could be attributed to a particular reward out-
come. This introduces a large source of noise or variance, which can be the culprit
of over-fitting. In order to overcome this problem and help to reduce variance, Deep
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RL approaches typically learn the value of actions relative to the overall value of
the current state. This is often referred to as the ‘advantage’ of an action. For
example, if the value of a state is the same regardless of which action is taken then
the advantage will be zero and the Deep RL algorithm will not update its policy
because the reward outcomes are not attributable to that particular action. This
greatly helps to reduce the variance of the Deep RL policy updates by reducing
sources of noise. The use of advantages in Deep RL is of interest from a biological
perspective because it has been proposed that such quantities are also encoded in
the brain (FitzGerald et al., 2009; Philiastides et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2014). Deep
RL therefore provides a computational reason for why the brain should encode these
relative action values.
Aside from over-fitting and the bias-variance trade-off, another common problem
in RL is the balance between exploration and exploitation. Without some degree
of exploration RL agents are likely to settle on sub-optimal policies as they have
not sampled potentially better actions. This is particularly problematic in Deep RL
because the state is typically high-dimensional and so it is not possible to just keep
a record of which states still need to be visited. Interestingly, Plappert et al. (2017)
have shown that adding noise to the parameters of the DNNs used in Deep RL can
promote useful exploratory behaviour. The fact that this approach works from a
Deep RL perspective is interesting because the brain is also known to have several
sources of noise in its connections between neurons. This biological noise can act on
short time-scales e.g. probabilistic synapses (Llera-Montero et al., 2019), or longer
timescales e.g. fluctuations in the size of dendritic spines (Yasumatsu et al., 2008).
It is therefore possible that the brain and Deep RL are utilising similar strategies to
solve the exploration-exploitation trade-off, lending further support to an analogy
between the two (Gershman and Ölveczky, 2020).
1.5 The Problem of Efficiency in Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning
The previous sections have highlighted how Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) can
serve as an attractive analogy for how the brain achieves a mapping from high-
27
dimensional perception to action, based on reward. For example, the emergence of
distributed hierarchical representations in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) appears
to share similarities with the representations learnt by the brain. Equally, key error
signals utilised by RL algorithms appear to be encoded by dopaminergic midbrain
neurons. Finally, solutions to the problems of over-fitting and exploration, which
are particularly pertinent to Deep RL, appear to mirror mechanisms that can also
be found in the brain such as advantage values and weight perturbations.
Despite this apparent harmony between Deep RL and computations in the brain,
there are several striking differences. Most importantly for the purpose of this thesis,
Deep RL algorithms have been heavily criticised for being extremely inefficient and
requiring vast amounts of training data (Lake et al., 2017). For example, one of the
first demonstrations of Deep RL came in the form of the Deep Q-Network (DQN) by
Mnih et al. (2015). DQN was able to learn to play Atari 2600 video games at or above
human-level performance without the hand-coding of any game-specific knowledge.
However despite this impressive feat, DQN required 50 million game frames for
training which equates to approximately 38 days of game-play. In contrast, the
human participants used to form the baseline only had 2 hours of training before
evaluation and brought with them vast amounts of prior knowledge (Dubey et al.,
2018). This serves to demonstrate the significant lack of efficient learning in Deep
RL models.
This gulf in efficiency between human RL and Deep RL suggests that Deep RL
lacks the two processes that are the focus of this thesis; (1) the ability to rapidly learn
from new information and (2) the ability to transfer past knowledge to the current
task. One could argue that one of the reasons for lack of efficiency displayed by DQN
is its lack of prior knowledge. Human participants entered the training process with
a wealth of prior knowledge and experience that was relevant for playing the Atari
games. In comparison DQN started off with no prior knowledge that it could utilise.
However, simply training DQN on other games beforehand to imbue them with prior
knowledge is unlikely to address the differences in efficiency. This is because Deep
RL algorithms have a tendency to catastrophically fail when some aspect of the
current task changes (Lake et al., 2017). For this reason the weights of DQN had
to be reset for each game so that it could learn anew. This highlights how Deep RL
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approaches, such as DQN, are unable to transfer knowledge between environments
and that they can actually exhibit negative transfer whereby prior learning has a
negative impact upon performance.
1.6 Outline of the Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the brain’s internal computations and the
external environmental factors that contribute to rapid learning and transfer in Re-
inforcement Learning (RL). Throughout the thesis we shall use Deep RL as analogy
to the brain to help guide our thinking. This will allow us to explore what funda-
mental computations Deep RL is missing in order to replicate the efficiency shown
by human RL. Indeed, this comparison is a two-way street in that both cognitive
science and Artificial Intelligence (AI) may benefit in the process. Advances in Deep
RL algorithms can provide testable predictions about underlying computations in
the brain, while properties of the brain can be utilised in Deep RL algorithms to
improve their data efficiency.
The research presented in this thesis follows two main streams. Firstly, we
explore how the computational properties of different learning systems in the brain
support efficient RL and how they can be used to improve the efficiency of Deep RL
algorithms. This research utilises Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory as
a guiding framework for how the brain is organised and allows parallels with Deep RL
algorithms to be drawn. In its original form, CLS theory describes how the neocortex
and hippocampus have complementary properties that support learning and complex
behaviour. Importantly, CLS theory highlights how the brain has several learning
systems with different computational properties. This is in contrast to classic Deep
RL algorithms that tend to rely on a single network for learning. This suggests that
combining multiple systems with fundamentally different computational properties,
may be a fruitful approach to improving the capabilities of Deep RL algorithms.
We begin this line of thinking in Chapter 3 by using a CLS framework to review
computational work that attempts to address the efficiency problems of Deep RL
(see Section 1.5). This review helps to motivate the proposal of a new Deep RL algo-
rithm in Chapter 4, termed Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL).
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Importantly, CTDL exploits the benefits of both a neocortical and a hippocampal
learning system to improve the efficiency of Deep RL and makes predictions about
how the two systems interact in the brain. In Chapter 5 we build upon this work
and argue that CLS theory should be extended to include the dissociation between
the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and sensory cortices. We support this argument by
reviewing further computational modelling that improves the efficiency of Deep RL
and that captures cognitive phenomenon associated with the PFC. As a result of
this review, we propose another novel algorithm called Selective Particle Attention
(SPA) in Chapter 6. Crucially, SPA mimics interactions between the PFC and sen-
sory cortices in order to implement visual feature-based attention and improve the
efficiency of current Deep RL approaches. Both CTDL and SPA highlight the im-
portance of considering the brain as a network of complementary learning systems
and describe how their interactions can supprt efficient RL in the brain.
The second stream of research in this thesis focuses on how the degree of percep-
tual similarity between consecutive experiences affects people’s ability to transfer
knowledge. Several theories from domains such as analogical reasoning and concept
learning make conflicting predictions about how the degree of perceptual similar-
ity between tasks affects transfer ability. Equally many Deep RL algorithms rely
on interleaved training to remove spurious similarities between consecutive expe-
riences. To help address these conflicting predictions, Chapter 7 presents a series
of behavioural experiments that investigate how the degree of perceptual similar-
ity between consecutive experiences affects transfer. The majority of this work is
conducted within the domain of video games because they involve sequential deci-
sion making based on reward and represent a more naturalistic setting compared to
classical experimental paradigms. The results of this work suggest that the degree
of perceptual similarity between experiences may have little impact upon transfer
performance. However, the empirical studies do highlight an interaction between
perceptual similarity and the ability of people to utilise explicit rules for transfer.
We use the results of these empirical studies to discuss the implications for the anal-
ogy between the brain and Deep RL algorithms. Our hope is that these results can
help to constrain theories of transfer in humans and the assumptions made by Deep
RL models.
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In the next chapter we begin by covering the background material required to
understand the other chapters of this thesis. This chapter particularly focuses on
the mathematical foundations of RL and Deep RL, which are important for the





In this chapter we provide the necessary background material to understand Deep
Reinforcement Learning (RL). We start by outlining the mathematical foundations
of RL as described by Sutton and Barto (2018) (Section 2.1). We then provide
a brief overview of the basic principles of Deep Learning and some common net-
work architectures that will appear throughout this thesis (Section 2.2). Finally we
demonstrate how the two methods can be combined to produce Deep RL (Section
2.3).
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
The following description of Reinforcement Learning (RL) draws from the work of
Sutton and Barto (2018).
2.1.1 The Reinforcement Learning Problem
RL is a computational framework that attempts to explain how an agent can act
in its environment in order to maximise reward. According to RL theory, the inter-
action between the agent and its environment can be characterised by three main
signals:
1. st → The state of the environment at time t (st ∈ S)
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2. at → The action chosen by the agent at time t (at ∈ A)
3. rt+1 → The reward obtained by the agent at time t+ 1 (rt+1 ∈ R)
Where S is the set of all possible states, A is the set of all possible actions and
R is the set of all possible reward values. The contributions of these three signals
are commonly depicted by the diagram shown in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: The Reinforcement Learning (RL) loop. The agent observes the state of
the environment at time t (st) and selects an action (at). The environment responds
to this action and produces a new state (st+1) and a scalar reward value (rt+1).
As the diagram shows, the interaction between the agent and its environment
can be described as a constant loop. The agent chooses an action (at) based on the
current environmental state (st) and the environment responds to this action re-
turning the next state (st+1) and associated reward (rt+1). This process can proceed
indefinitely as the agent sequentially chooses actions in response to the environment.
The central goal in RL is to maximise the amount of reward obtained by the agent.
This is often referred to as maximising the expected return, where the return Rt is
an arbitrary function of the reward sequence experienced by the agent from time t








The discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1) is applied at each time step so that immediate
rewards are worth more than distant rewards. γ is required for non-episodic envi-
ronments i.e. environments where there is no clear end state, because it ensures
that the sum will converge to a finite value as k approaches ∞.
Since the primary goal of the agent is to maximise reward, the reward signal
serves as the primary feedback signal for evaluating actions. This evaluation process
can be challenging because reward signals may be sparse and delayed with respect
to the action(s) that caused them. This is often referred to as the credit assignment
problem; deciding which actions are responsible for a given outcome, and is central
to the Reinforcement Learning Problem.
2.1.1.1 Markov Decision Processes
In RL the state at any given time point (st) is commonly treated as a Markov state.
This means that the state satisfies the Markov property: the probability of future
states given past and present states only depends on the current state. In other
words, future outcomes are only a function of the current state and not of previous
states. Mathematically we can write the Markov property as follows:
P (st+1 = s
′, rt+1 = r | st, at, rt, st−1, at−1, rt−1, ...) =
P (st+1 = s
′, rt+1 = r | st, at)∀s′, r, st, at
(2.2)
That is the probability of the next state being equal to s′ and the next reward
being equal to r given all previous states and actions is equal to the probability
of the next state being equal to s′ and the next reward being equal to r given the
current state and action. This basic assumption greatly simplifies the RL problem
because now the agent only needs to consider it’s current state in order to select an
action and maximise the expected return.
In the real-world biological agents are often faced with problems where the
Markov property does not hold and past states do have an impact upon the proba-
bility of future states. Many RL algorithms will perform well even when the states
it encounters are not strictly Markov. However the closer the states are to satisfying
the Markov property the better the RL algorithm will perform. While this may seem
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highly prohibitive, often the representation of the state signal can decide whether a
state satisfies the Markov property or not. For example, to train an agent to play
a video game using RL one could provide an agent with the last four game frames
as the state signal. This provides the agent with enough information to infer what
objects are present on the screen, what direction they are moving in and how fast
they are moving. These key variables should provide enough information for the
agent to choose optimal actions, therefore satisfying the Markov property.
Assuming the states in our RL problem satisfy the Markov property, we can frame
the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). There are five main components
of a MDP:
1. S - The set of all possible states (st ∈ S)
2. A - The set of all possible actions (at ∈ A)
3. P ass′ - The transition function
4. Rass′ - The reward function
5. γ - The discount factor (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1)
P ass′ is called the transition function and it defines the probability distribution
over the next state given the current state and action. Mathematically we can define
this as:
P ass′ = P (st+1 = s
′ | st = s, at = a) (2.3)
Rass′ specifies the expected reward value for transitioning from state s to state s
′
via action a. Mathematically we can define this as:
Rass′ = E[rt+1 | st = s, at = a, st+1 = s′] (2.4)
Importantly, P ass′ and R
a
ss′ provide all the information needed to describe the
dynamics of the environment and to make decisions that maximise the expected
return. Both P ass′ and R
a
ss′ rely on the Markov property of the state signal in order
to simplify the probability distribution.
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2.1.1.2 Value Functions and Policies
At the heart of most solution methods in RL you will find either a value function
and/or a policy. In simple terms, value functions estimate the expected return from
a given state with respect to a particular policy. Policies, commonly denoted π, are
mappings from states to actions and therefore specify the action to be taken by the
agent for any given state:
π : s 7→ a (2.5)
π may be a deterministic or stochastic mapping. Value functions are dependent
on the policy π because the expected return from a given state will be highly de-
pendent on the action taken by the agent both in that state and also future states.
Typically we can define two different types of value function, either a state-value
function V π(s) or an action-value function Qπ(s, a). A state-value function estimates
the expected return of a given state s, whereas an action-value function estimates
the expected return of an action a given state s. Using the discounted sum of future
rewards as our return we can define these value functions as follows:




γkrt+k+1 | st = s] (2.7)




γkrt+k+1 | st = s, at = a] (2.9)
Using the components of an MDP (see section 2.1.1.1), one can show that these
value functions satisfy particular recursive relationships. Using the state-value func-




V π(s) = Eπ[
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1 | st = s] (2.10)
= Eπ[rt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0























The value of any given state is simply the reward obtained immediately from that
state plus the value (expected return) of the next state, averaged over the policy
and one-step dynamics of the environment. A similar recursive relationship for the
action-value function can be defined as follows:
Qπ(s, a) = Eπ[
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1 | st = s, at = a] (2.14)
= Eπ[rt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0


















π(s′, a′)Qπ(s′, a′)] (2.17)
Here the action-value function is defined as the immediate reward given a specific
action in the current state, averaged over the environment dynamics, plus the value
of actions in the successor state, averaged over the environment dynamics and the
agents policy. These two recursive equations are known as the Bellman equations
and form the basis of many RL solution methods including dynamic programming




















π(s′, a′)Qπ(s′, a′)] (2.19)
2.1.2 Solution Methods
2.1.2.1 Optimal Policies
In general, solving the RL problem equates to finding a policy π (a mapping from
states to actions) that achieves the maximum amount of reward over time. An
optimal policy, denoted π∗, is one that achieves an expected return that is greater
than or equal to all other policies for all states (and actions):
V ∗(s) = max
π
V π(s) for all s ∈ S (2.20)
Q∗(s, a) = max
π
Qπ(s, a) for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A(s) (2.21)
Finding the optimal policy (there may be more than one) is equivalent to achiev-
ing the largest expected return and therefore solving the RL problem. There are
four primary methods for finding the optimal policy:
1. Value-Based Methods → Learn value functions to infer the optimal policy
2. Policy-Based Methods → Learn the optimal policy directly
3. Actor-Critic Methods → Learn both a value function and a policy
4. Model-Based Methods → Use knowledge of the environment’s dynamics to
infer the optimal policy
The next section describes each one of these methods in more detail and covers
some of the canonical algorithms for solving the RL problem.
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2.1.2.2 Value-Based Solution Methods
Value-based methods rely on value functions to infer the optimal policy. Since value
functions are dependent on a particular policy, there exists an optimal state value
function V ∗(s) and action value function Q∗(s, a), which define the expected return
of a state or state-action pair given the agent follows the optimal policy:
V ∗(s) = max
π
V π(s) for all s ∈ S (2.22)
Q∗(s, a) = max
π
Qπ(s, a) for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A(s) (2.23)
As in Section 2.1.1.2, these value functions can be written as recursive equations,
which are known as the Bellman optimality equations. The Bellman optimality
equations are written without reference to a specific policy because they rely on
the fact that the value of a state with respect to the optimal policy is the same as
the expected return for the best action from that state. The Bellman optimality
equations for V ∗(s) and Q∗(s, a) are therefore as follows:













γkrt+k+1 | st = s, at = a] (2.26)
= max
a
Eπ∗ [rt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2 | st = s, at = a] (2.27)
= max
a











Q∗(s, a) = E[rt+1 + γmax
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Importantly, given the optimal value function (V ∗ or Q∗(s, a)) for an MDP,
the optimal policy π∗ is represented implicitly as the policy that acts greedily with
respect to the optimal value function. In the case of the optimal state value function,
the best action in any given state is the one that maximises the sum of the immediate
reward and the discounted value of the next state:








This is akin to making a one-step lookahead search and then acting greedily.
Taking greedy actions works because the optimal state value function takes into
account the reward consequences of all possible future behaviours. This is powerful
because it means the agent does not need to evaluate lots of future actions in order
to make an optimal decision. For the action-value function, the best action is simply
the one that has the largest value from the current state:
π∗(s) = arg max
a
Q∗(s, a) (2.35)
In the case of the optimal action value function there is no need to perform a one-
step lookahead search. Q∗(s, a) stores the results of all one-step lookahead searches
and provides the optimal expected long-term return as a locally and immediately
available value. So by representing the value function as a function of states and
actions, rather than just states, optimal actions can be chosen without having to
know anything about the environment’s dynamics.
The central goal of value-based methods is to learn the optimal value function
and therefore obtain the optimal policy. Given the Bellman optimality equations
above, one can in fact solve for the optimal value function as a series of N nonlinear




are known. Unfortunately, this exhaustive search approach is rarely possible due to
three main reasons:
1. The environment’s dynamics are often unknown i.e. P ass′ and R
a
ss′
2. The amount of computational resources required becomes infeasible as N grows
3. The Markov property is often not satisfied
For any given RL problem it is usually the case that one, or a combination, of
these problems arises. We therefore need other methods to solve for the optimal
value function.
2.1.2.3 Temporal Difference Learning and Q-Learning
Temporal Difference (TD) learning refers to a group of value-based solution methods
that circumvent the problems mentioned above. Most importantly TD learning is
model-free, meaning that it does not require knowledge of the environments dynam-
ics (P ass′ and R
a
ss′). It can also be applied at every time step meaning that it does
not require episodic environments with a clear terminal state.
At its core TD learning samples from the environment and utilises the recursive
nature of the Bellman equations to solve for the optimal value function. TD learn-
ing involves two key steps in order to solve for the optimal value function; policy
evaluation and policy improvement. Policy evaluation involves calculating the value
function for a given policy whereas policy improvement involves changing the cur-
rent policy to obtain more reward given the current value function. TD learning
alternates between these two steps in order to converge to the optimal policy.



















π(s′, a′)Qπ(s′, a′)] (2.37)
These can be re-written as expectations with respect to the environment’s dy-
namics and the agent’s policy to produce:
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V π(s) = E[rt+1 + γV π(st+1) | st = s] (2.38)
Qπ(s, a) = E[rt+1 + γQπ(st+1, a′) | st = s, at = a] (2.39)
(2.40)
TD learning exploits the facts that these are expectations by sampling one step
of the environment many times in order to obtain an average of the above expres-
sion and evaluate the current policy. The only quantities needed are the rewards
experienced by the agent and the value estimate of the resulting state or state-
action pair. One possibility would be to keep a true average of rt+1 + γV
π(st+1)
or rt+1 + γQ
π(st+1, a
′) for each state or state-action pair. However in practice this
is a poor approximation because the agents policy is changing during learning and
so the value estimates will also change. Instead TD learning relies on taking an
exponentially weighted average, so that more recent values carry higher weights in
the average calculation. If Vk is our estimate at time point k and Rk is our observed
value at time k then the exponentially weighted average can be derived as follows:
Vk = Vk−1 + α[Rk − Vk−1] (2.41)
= αRk + (1− α)Vk−1 (2.42)
= αRk + (1− α)αRk−1 + (1− α)2Vk−2 (2.43)
= αRk + (1− α)αRk−1 + (1− α)2Rk−2 + ...+ (1− α)k−1R1 + (1− α)kV0
(2.44)




The TD learning update rules to evaluate the current policy therefore become:
V (st) = V (st) + α[rt+1 + γV (st+1)− V (st)] (2.46)
Q(st, at) = Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQ(st+1, at+1)−Q(st, at)] (2.47)
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This allows for evaluation of the current policy after just a single step of the envi-
ronment by observing outcomes and bootstrapping value estimates via the bellman
equations.
Since TD learning is a value-based method, the policy is not represented directly.
Instead policy improvement is typically achieved by taking actions that are chosen
using an ε-greedy approach. The agent selects actions that are greedy with respect
to the current value function but also takes a random action with probability ε in
order to explore other options.
Using the update rule in Equation 2.47 to perform policy evaluation and an
ε-greedy action selection method for policy improvement is commonly referred to
as the SARSA algorithm. This method gets its name from the fact that it uses
the tuple (st, at, rt+1, st+1, at+1) to drive learning. The full algorithm can be seen in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SARSA
Initialize Q(s, a) at random
for each episode do
Initialise starting state s1
Choose a1 from s1 using policy based on Q e.g. ε-greedy
for t = 1 to T − 1 do
Take action at, observe rt+1 and st+1
Choose at+1 from st+1 using policy based on Q e.g. ε-greedy
Q(st, at) = Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQ(st+1, at+1)−Q(st, at)]
end for
end for
Another popular TD learning method is Q-learning, which only differs from
SARSA by a single term in the policy evaluation step. Instead of using the action
chosen by the agent at+1 for the target value Q(st+1, at+1), Q-learning uses the best
possible action maxaQ(st+1, a). The full update rule therefore becomes:
Q(st, at) = Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γmax
a
Q(st+1, a)−Q(st, at)] (2.48)
This update equation directly turns the equation for the optimal action-value
function (Equation 2.31) into an update rule. Q-learning is known as an ‘off-policy’
learning method because the policy used by the agent to select actions (e.g. ε-
greedy) is different from the one being evaluated (greedy). In comparison, SARSA
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is an ‘on-policy’ method because both policies are the same (ε-greedy).
It is worth noting that Temporal Difference methods do not have to exclusively
rely on sampling from a single step of the environment before updating their value
estimates. The approach can be extended to sample many steps of the environment
before the value estimate is bootstrapped and the update rule applied. How many
steps to take is usually a bias-variance trade-off. Fewer steps introduces bias from
the regular bootstrapping of values but many steps introduces variance from the
wide range of outcomes experienced.
2.1.2.4 Policy-Based Methods
Policy-based methods focus on learning the optimal policy directly without repre-
senting a value function. Typically this requires that the policy is parameterised by
some learn-able parameters θ. One major advantage of this approach is that the
agent can learn policies that are stochastic and/or involve continuous action spaces.
In order to update the parameters θ and learn the optimal value function, policy-
based methods require an objective function that describes how good a given policy
πθ is i.e. how much reward it achieves. Depending on whether the environment
is episodic or continuous there are several options for such an objective function.
For example, in an episodic environment the objective function may be the aver-
age reward achieved from the starting state to the end of the episode. In contrast,
in continuous environments the objective function may be the average value of all
states or the average reward obtained per time-step. Armed with an appropriate ob-
jective function, finding the optimal policy is a standard optimisation problem that
is amenable to both gradient-based (e.g. gradient descent) and non-gradient-based
(e.g. genetic algorithms) approaches.
2.1.2.5 Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient
Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient, otherwise known as REINFORCE, is an example of
a policy-based method that relies upon stochastic gradient descent to find the best
policy. Stochastic gradient descent calculates the partial derivative of the objective
function (J(θ)) with respect to each of the parameters θ of the parameterised policy
πθ. It then moves each of the parameters a small amount in the direction of the
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θ = θ + α∇θJ(θ) (2.50)
Where α is know as the step-size parameter or learning rate and dictates the mag-
nitude of the parameter update. This process of calculating the partial derivatives
and updating the policy parameters is repeated until a local maximum is reached.
As mentioned previously, the goal of RL is to maximise the expected return Rt for
all possible states. We can therefore write our objective function as the average











πθ(a | s)Qπ(s, a) (2.52)
Where dπ(s) is known as a stationary distribution of the MDP given our policy
π. One way to intuitively think about this stationary distribution is if you were to
travel through the MDP forever using the policy π then eventually the probability
of ending up in a given state becomes unchanged.
The key component of a policy-gradient method (i.e. a method that uses the
gradient to optimise J(θ)) is calculating the vector of partial derivatives of the
objective function with respect to the policy’s parameters (∇θJ(θ)). At first look








Qπ(s, a)πθ(a | s) (2.53)









Qπ(s, a)∇θπθ(a | s) (2.54)
This simplification allows the update to be expressed as an expectation and
means that we can take samples from the environment in order to gain an approxi-






















= Eπ[Qπ(s, a)∇θ ln πθ(a | s)] (2.58)
Our final parameter update therefore becomes:
θ = θ + α∇θJ(θ) (2.59)
= θ + αEπ[Qπ(s, a)∇θ ln πθ(a | s)] (2.60)
Intuitively this update rule can be seen as changing the policy’s parameters so
that actions with a higher value become more likely than those with a lower value.
The ln πθ(a | s) term is important because sub-optimal actions may be more likely
given the current policy and so we need to control for the fact that they will be
updated more often than other actions.
The Monte-Carlo component of Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient comes from the
fact that Qπ(s, a) can be estimated using Monte-Carlo methods. More specifically
Monte-Carlo methods only work in episodic environments and rely on sampling a
whole episode to obtain an estimate of the return and an unbiased sample of the
value of each action taken. A general outline of the Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient
algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient (REINFORCE)
Initialize parameters of policy θ at random
for each episode s1, a1, r2, ..., sT−1, aT−1, rT sampled using πθ do
for t = 1 to T − 1 do
Calculate return Rt
θ = θ + αRt∇θ ln πθ(at | st)
end for
end for
Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient is just one example of a policy gradient method.
Many different techniques exist for calculating estimates of Qπ(s, a). These other
techniques typically involve learning the value function directly as well so that it can
be used in the policy update. These techniques are known as actor-critic methods
and will be covered in the next section. The main benefit to using actor-critic meth-
ods is that the policy-gradient method can be used in non-episodic environments
were a Monte-Carlo approach is not possible.
2.1.2.6 Actor-Critic Methods
Actor-critic methods combine value-based and policy-based approaches by learning
both a value function and a policy directly. This allows for the benefits of policy-
based approaches, such as stochastic or continuous policies, while using the learnt
value function to reduce the variance of the policy updates. The policy is typically
referred to as the actor because it is used to select actions whereas the value function
is referred to as the critic because it is used to critique the actions taken by the actor.
In Section 2.1.2.5 we saw that the policy could be updated using the following
update rule:
θ = θ + α∇θJ(θ) (2.61)
= θ + αEπ[Qπ(s, a)∇θ ln πθ(a | s)] (2.62)
In the case of Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient or REINFORCE, Qπ(s, a) is calcu-
lated as the full return from state s and action a for a given episode. This estimate
of the value of state s and action a typically has high variance because the results
of different episodes can be wildly different due to the stochastic nature of the MDP
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and potentially the policy. There is also the issue that the full return can only be
sampled when there are clear episodes and longer episodes will lead to higher vari-
ance. Actor-Critic methods circumvent this problem by using the value estimates
from the critic to approximate Qπ(s, a), thereby greatly reducing the variance. It is
often common to parameterise both the value function and the policy in actor-critic
methods. Algorithm 3 provides a general outline of such an approach.
Algorithm 3 Actor-Critic
Initialize parameters of policy θ and value-function w at random
Sample starting state s1 and action a1 ∼ πθ(a | s)
for t = 1 to T − 1 do
Sample reward rt+1 and next state st+1
Sample next action from policy at+1 ∼ πθ(a | st+1)
Update policy parameters
θ = θ + αθQw(st, at)∇θ lnπθ(at | st)
Compute TD error
δt = rt + γQw(st+1, at+1)−Qw(st, at)
Update value function parameters
w = w + αwδt∇wQw(st, at)
end for
While using a value function to estimate Qπ(s, a) can greatly reduce variance in
the parameter update it can also be reduced further. For example all actions from a
given state may lead to a high amount of reward and so the parameter update will be
relatively uninformative. However one action may lead to slightly more reward than
the others and so we want this information to be captured in the weight update.
For this reason it is often better to use the quantity Q(s, a)− V (s) rather than just
Q(s, a) to perform the weight update. Q(s, a) − V (s) tells us how much better an
action is compared to the current policy. This serves to provide greater signal to
noise ratio and captures how good an action is relative to the others. Q(s, a)−V (s)
is often called the advantage function and is represented as A(s, a). Importantly
this still works from a theoretical standpoint because V (s) does not depend on the
action being taken.
2.1.2.7 Model-Based Methods
The solution methods mentioned so far are known as model-free methods because
they do not rely on knowledge of the environments dynamics. More specifically,
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they do not explicitly use knowledge of the transition function P ass′ or the reward
function Rass′ . Model-based methods however, either have access to these functions
or they attempt to learn them in order to solve the RL problem. Parallels are
often drawn between model-based methods and the act of ‘planning’ because the
agent has explicit knowledge of the consequences of its actions and can use this to
select actions. Model-based RL algorithms therefore rely on the fact that they can
simulate experience of the environment. A naive approach to planning would be to
perform an exhaustive search over all possible states and actions from the agents
current state using its model of the environment. This requires no value function
to be stored. However for most interesting RL problems this is infeasible as the
number of possible branches can be vast and no terminal state may exist.
For this reason, model-based RL algorithms generally revolve around using simu-
lated experience to compute value functions, which can then be used to improve the
current policy in an iterative manner. Some of the first model-based RL algorithms
proposed, known as policy and value iteration, relied on dynamic programming to
iteratively solve the MDP based on the recursive nature of the Bellman equations.
By repeatedly sweeping over all the states in the MDP these methods could use
the bellman equations to calculate the value of each state given the current policy.
The estimated value function would then be used to improve the policy in a greedy
manner. This process would be repeated until convergence. However, one problem
with this approach is that it involves iterating over all states, which can be com-
putationally infeasible if the state space is large. One alternative is to just sample
from the agents model of the environment in order to improve the estimate of the
agents current value function. An example of this is the Dyna-Q architecture which
uses real experience in the environment to learn a value function and a model of the
environment. The model of the environment is then sampled from periodically to
produce simulated experience in order to further improve the estimate of the value
function. For example, one way to sample the simulated experience is to use the
current policy to generate trajectories likely to be experienced by the agent and then
update the associated value estimates.
Both dynamic programming and Dyna-Q are referred to as background planning
algorithms because they use a model of the environment to improve value estimates,
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which are then ultimately used to make a decision. In comparison, planning can
also be used directly to choose an action at at the current state st. This is known
as decision-time planning and involves using the model of the environment to per-
form a look-ahead search in order to choose the best action. One example of this
would be a heuristic search to find the best action from a given state. The agent
can perform a heuristic search to some target depth k and then use the resulting
rewards experienced to choose the best action. Importantly background planning
and decision-time planning algorithms do not have to be mutually exclusive. For
example, heuristic search can use the rewards obtained up to k and the approximate
value function at the leaf nodes to select an action. The results of the heuristic search
can then also be used to improve the underlying value function. These examples of
model-based RL demonstrate how knowledge of the environment can be useful for
both learning value functions and for considering the effects of one’s actions based
on the current state.
2.2 Deep Learning
The following description of Deep Learning (DL) draws from the work of Goodfellow
et al. (2016).
2.2.1 Basic Principles of Neural Networks
Neural networks are a computational model for processing information based on a
network of interconnected units. Each unit in the network has a value that repre-
sents its level of activation and a set of values that correspond to the weights of the
connections between itself and other units. The activation value of a unit is calcu-
lated by applying a non-linear function to the dot product between the activation




wjiai + bj) (2.63)
Where aj is the activation value of unit j, h(z) is a non-linear function, wji is
the connection from unit j to unit i and bj is the bias of unit j. The bias represents
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a scalar value that allows for shifts in the activation value which are independent
of the input. importantly, each time this equation is performed the unit applies a
non-linear transformation to the values of the units it is connected to, which allows
the neural network to learn a non-linear mapping between its input and output.
In their simplest form, neural networks are organised into a series of layers,
whereby each unit is only connected to units in the previous layer (Figure 2.2).
Input is presented to the network by setting the values of the first layer to the
values of the input. The activation values of the next layer are then calculated using
Equation 2.63 for each unit in the layer. This process is repeated sequentially until
the activation values of the final layer have been calculated and this is taken as the
output of the network. Such an architecture is referred to as a feed-forward neural
network because information is passed through the network layer-by-layer with no
backwards information flow. Deep Learning (DL) refers to the use of neural networks
that consist of several hidden layers. A hidden layer is defined as a layer of units
that is in between the input and output layers. The term ‘hidden’ is used because
the values of these layers are not used when reading the output of the network.
By using multiple hidden layers, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are able to learn
hierarchical representations that become increasingly abstract. Most importantly,
DNNs are often referred to as universal function approximators because they are
able to learn any continuous function between two Euclidean Spaces. This means
that they can learn smooth non-linear functions, which imbues them with strong
generalization capabilities even for highly non-linear relationships between variables.
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Figure 2.2: Diagram of a feed-forward deep neural network. The network is described
as feed-forward because each unit is only connected to units from the previous layer.
This ensures that information flows from left to right. The network is also described
as deep because it consists of more than one hidden layer.
2.2.2 Learning in Deep Neural Networks
Learning is performed in neural networks by updating the values of the weights
between units. This ultimately leads to a change in the input-output mapping of
the network. A plethora of methods exist for updating the weights of a neural
network. However, by far the most common in the field of Deep Learning (DL) is
an approach known as backpropagation. Backprogagation works by incrementally
updating the weights of a network in order to minimise or maximise an objective
function. The overall effect of this is that the network gradually learns to represent
a desirable input-output mapping. The objective function can be seen as a way of
evaluating how well the neural network is performing on a given task.
2.2.2.1 Objective Functions
The first step in training a Deep Neural Network (DNN) via backpropagation is to
decide on an objective function. As is commonly the case in machine learning, we
want to maximise the likelihood of the data given our model. A common objective
function is therefore the negative log-likelihood, which needs to be minimised in
order to maximise the likelihood of the data. In terms of training a neural network
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to predict an output variable y given an input variable x, the objective function can
be written as follows:
J(θ) = −Ex,y∼p̂data ln pmodel(y | x) (2.64)
Where θ is the network weights, Ex,y∼p̂data is the expectation with respect to the
data distribution p̂data, and pmodel is the distribution defined by our neural network.
From this expression we can see that finding the minimum of the negative log-
likelihood is the same as minimizing the cross entropy between p̂data and pmodel.
Armed with this general expression for the objective function, a more specific form
can be devised depending on how we represent pmodel(y | x), which will be influenced
by the nature of y. For example, for a regression problem, pmodel(y | x) can be
represented as a gaussian distribution with the mean being the output of our network
given x, and the variance being an arbitrary value σ2:
pmodel(y | x) ∼ N (y; f(x, θ), σ2) (2.65)
Given N input (X = {x1, ..., xN}) and output (Y = {y1, ..., yN}) pairs and
assuming all data points are independent and identically distributed, minimisation
of the negative log-likelihood therefore becomes:
































(yi − f(xi, θ))2
(2.66)
The objective function therefore becomes the squared difference between the
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data and the output of the network summed over all data points. Importantly,
for a regression problem the output of the network needs to be able to cover the
sequence of all possible real numbers. For this reason the output units just output
the weighted sum of their inputs without applying a non-linear function. This is
the same as setting the function h(z) in Equation 2.63 to the identify function i.e.
y = x.
The same logic can be applied to other problems such as classification, where
pmodel(y | x) is represented as a Bernoulli distribution and the activation function of
the output units is set to the logistic function ( 1
1+e−x
) to correspond to p(y = 1 | x)).
Ultimately, the nature of the output variable y dictates the form of the objective
function and also the activation function of the output units.
2.2.2.2 Backpropagation
With the objective function identified, backpropagation can update the weights of
the network in order to minimise or maximise it and therefore improve performance.
Backpropagation does this via gradient-based optimisation. Closed form solutions
for the network weights are not possible because neural networks generally produce
non-convex objective functions. This means that there may be several minima,
maxima or saddle points. For example, neural networks can produce equivalent
models by swapping or scaling parameters, meaning a specific input-output mapping
can be represented by multiple sets of network weights.
Due to the non-convex optimisation problem posed by neural networks, there
is no guarantee that backpropagation will find the global minima/maxima. Any
solution will be sensitive to the values that the network weights are initialised to.
In practice this is not a major problem because even a local minima represents
a solution that performs well for a given task. A lot of research has gone into
improving backpropagation in an attempt to overcome the problems associated with
non-convex optimisation. However, for the purposes of this thesis, we shall cover the
standard back propagation algorithm, which provides the main intuition for training
DNNs.
The key quantity for gradient-based optimisation is the partial derivative of the
objective function with respect to a model parameter i.e. ∂J(θ)
θi
. In the case of
54
neural networks we need to calculate the partial derivative of the objective function
with respect to each of the weights in the network. Backpropagation allows us to
sequentially calculate the partial derivatives for each layer of weights, starting from
the output layer and moving back to the input layer.
Lets start by calculating the partial derivative of the object function with respect
to the weights of the output units. We shall assume that we are using the objective
function in Equation 2.66 and we have a three layer neural network. The activation
function of each unit will be a logistic function except from the single output unit,
which uses the identity function. To keep things clean we shall omit the sum over
data points and assume we are using a single training example. We shall use W to
denote all the weights in the network, and w
(3)
ji to denote the weight of the i
th input
to the jth unit in layer 3. Finally we will use net
(3)
j to denote the net input into the
jth unit before the activation function is applied (i.e. the dot product between the



































ji is the i
th input into the jth unit in layer 3, which is equivalent to
the activation value of the ith unit in layer 2. Now we need to evaluate the partial
derivate of our objective function with respect to the net input to the jth unit in
layer 3. Lets call this quantity δ
(3)
























Putting this all together we now have an expression for the partial derivative of



























To perform gradient descent on the weights of the final output layer and incre-























Next we need to calculate the partial derivatives for the earlier layers. Notice
how changing the values of weights in the earlier layers will impact all subsequent
values. Backpropagation accounts for this by propagating the error values back
through the network. To see how this works we shall calculate the partial derivative















































i will be different to δ
(3)
j because it describes how the
objective function changes as a result of changing the net input into the ith unit in
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layer 2 rather than the jth unit in layer 3. To evaluate δ
(2)






















Where downstream(i) is the set of all units that are connected immediately
downstream of the ith unit in layer 2. If layer 2 and layer 3 were fully connected




for all j ∈ downstream(i) because these are just the δ(3)j values from the final output











































































i ) is the derivative of the logistic activation function of unit i.
These equations demonstrate how the δ values can be propagated backwards from
the output layer to the input layer in order to calculate the partial derivatives for



























For the first layer i.e. when n = 1, a
(0)
m is just taken to be the mth entry of our
input variable x. These partial derivatives can then be used, as in Equation 2.70,
to incrementally update all the weights of the network and therefore minimise the
objective function.
2.2.3 Deep Learning Architectures
Within the domain of Deep Learning (DL) a range of different neural network archi-
tectures exist beyond just feed-forward networks. The choice of network architecture
typically depends on the nature of the problem that the neural network is trying to
solve. For the purposes of this thesis we shall briefly cover three main architectures;
deep convolutional neural networks, long short-term memory networks and autoen-
coders. These architectures form the backbone of much of the work in this thesis
and each fulfill a distinct role.
2.2.3.1 Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
The term Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN) is commonly used to refer
to a neural network that uses a number of convolutional layers to process its input,
which is typically in the form of an image (Figure 2.3). Convolutional layers are
loosely modelled on the visual cortex of the brain, in that they rely on spatial
invariance to learn features of images. They achieve this by using feature maps,
where all the units share the same weights but process a different spatial region of
the input.
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Figure 2.3: Depiction of a Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN). The input
is commonly an image, which goes through a series of convolutional layers and sub-
sampling layers (e.g. max-pooling). The output of the network is produced by a final
fully connected layer. Figure adapted from Lawrence et al. (1997)
Figure 2.4 shows a depiction of a single convolutional layer. The layer consists of
N feature maps, with each map being made up of a 2D array of units. Within a single
feature map all the units share the same weight values, which means that all the
units learn to represent the same feature. However, each unit applies these weight
values to a different region of the input, which results in a convolution. The region
that a unit processes corresponds to the unit’s receptive field and the receptive fields
are staggered to produce a tiling of the input. The network can therefore detect a































Figure 2.4: Depiction of a convolutional layer with an input that only has one chan-
nel. Each feature map consists of a 2D array of units that all share the same weight
values (shown as orange, blue or green vectors). Each unit within a feature map has
a different receptive field (two examples are shown in red and purple). Activation
values are calculated by applying a non-linear activation function (e.g. max(0, x))
to the dot product between the unit’s weights and receptive field.
The weights of each unit are 3-dimensional because they have a height, width
and depth. The width and height are hyper-parameters that define the size of the
unit’s receptive field, while the depth matches the number of channels in the input.
If the input to the convolutional layer was an image, then the depth would be 3
because there is a red, green and blue channel. In contrast, if the input was another
convolutional layer, then the depth would be the number of feature maps in the
previous layer. Another important hyper-parameter is the ‘stride’ length, which
determines how finely the input is tiled by the convolutional layer. For instance,
a larger stride length would result in the receptive fields of each unit being farther
apart.
Typically a DCNN while stack many convolutional layers on top of each other
to produce increasingly abstract features of the input while maintaining informa-
tion about spatial location. The results of the last convolutional layer are then
reshaped into a single vector and passed to a standard neural network layer to pro-
duce the overall output of the network. Another common approach is to perform
sub-sampling by sporadically including max-pooling layers between convolutional
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layers (Figure 2.3). Max-pooling layers partition the feature maps of the convolu-
tional layer into non-overlapping regions and then output the maximum value for
each region. This serves to decrease the width and height of the feature maps in the
convolutional layer, which can speed up learning by reducing the dimensionality of
the problem.
In summary, DCNNs represent a powerful approach for learning spatial invariant
features of their input. Each feature map corresponds to a different feature of the
input and they maintain information about where in the input the feature may
be present. By sharing weights across units within a feature map, the number of
learnable weights is greatly reduced, which can greatly improve the speed and quality
of the learnt solution.
2.2.3.2 Long Short-Term Memory Networks
Long Short-Term Memory networks (LSTMs) are a specific form of recurrent neural
network. A recurrent neural network is defined as a network where connections exist
within layers and/or to previous layers. This is important because it provides the
network with a form of memory as values from the previous time step interact with
the input presented on the current time step. As a result the input is processed in
a contextual manner, which can be important for problems that involve temporal
dependencies.
LSTMs are a specific form of recurrent neural network that rely on the gating
of information between successive time steps. The general idea of gating is that a
set of learnable parameters are responsible for whether a unit’s activation value is
maintained or altered at each time step. This allows the recurrent neural network to
remember aspects of the input for long time-scales, which is particularly important
for problems involving long-range dependencies.
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Figure 2.5: Depiction of a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network. Each unit
has a hidden state value (ct) and an activation value (at). The hidden state is updated
based on a weighted sum of the previous hidden state (ct−1) and a new candidate
value (c̃t). The weights (ft and ut) and the new candidate value (c̃t) are produced
by applying sepearate learnable weights to the previous activation values (at−1) and
the current input values (xt). The updated hidden state is used to calculate a new
activation value. The output of this new activation value is gated by another weight
(ot), which is also learnt by applying learnable weights to the previous activation
values (at−1) and the current input values (xt).
Figure 2.5 shows the general architecture of an LSTM. Each unit of the LSTM
has a hidden state value (ct) and an activation value (at). The hidden states of
the LSTM network are updated by taking the weighted sum of the previous hidden
states (ct−1) and a new set of candidate values based on the current input (c̃t):
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + ut ∗ c̃t (2.76)
Where c, f , u and c̃ are all vectors with each entry corresponding to a unit in
the network. The weights ft and ut are seen as gates that control how much of
the previous hidden state value and the new candidate value are used respectively.
The weights ft and ut, as well as the new candidate value c̃t, are all calculated by
applying their own set of learnable weights to the previous steps activation values
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(2.77)
Where the function g(z) is the tanh function and σ(z) is the logistic function.




 is a vector containing the hidden states of the previous
time step and the inputs of the current time step. bc, bu and bf are vectors con-
taining the bias values for each unit. Once the new hidden state values (ct) have
been calculated using Equation 2.76, the new activation values are calculated by
applying a non-linear function to the new hidden state values and multiplying the
result by another set of gating values (ot):
at = ot ∗ g(ct) (2.78)
ot therefore represents an ‘output’ gate, which dictates how much of the new
hidden state is output by the unit. ot is calculated in the same way as the previous




 + bo) (2.79)
By using these equations, an LSTM can learn to use information from many time
steps ago to produce predictions. When it comes to training an LSTM, backprop-
agation can still be used in the normal way. The only difference is that the errors
are backpropagated to the previous time steps and the partial derivatives for each
time step are summed to produce the final weight update. This is often referred to
as backpropagation through time and is usually fixed to a certain number of time
steps if the number of previous time steps is extremely large.
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2.2.3.3 Autoencoders
Autoencoders are different to LSTMs and DCNNs in that they do not correspond to
a particular neural network architecture. Instead an autoencoder refers to a method
of training whereby the neural network is trained to re-create its input. This is a
form of unsupervised learning because no labels are required for the input data. In
the case of an autoencoder, the training objective from Equation 2.64 becomes:
J(θ) = −Ex∼p̂data ln pmodel(x | x) (2.80)
This means that an autoencoder can consist of DCNNs or LSTMs so long as the
input variable is the same as the output variable. Due to this property, autoencoders
are of interest not because of their output predictions, but because of their hidden
layer representations. By re-creating the input data, the activation values of the
hidden layers represent a latent encoding of the input data, which can often be
designed to have desirable properties. Typically the latent representation is read
from the middle hidden layer with the preceding portion of the network referred to








Direction of Information Flow
Encoder Decoder
Figure 2.6: Depiction of an autoencoder. The network is trained to re-create its input
at the output layer. The middle hidden layer is taken as the latent representation of
the input. The first half of the network is referred to as the encoder and the second
half is referred to as the decoder. The number of units in the middle layer is typically
less than the number of input units to enforce dimensionality reduction.
The most common desirable property of the learnt latent representation is to
have less dimensions than the input data. Dimensionality reduction is often desirable
because it helps to alleviate the curse of dimensionality and remove spurious noise.
This is achieved in an autoencoder by setting the number of units in the middle
hidden layer to be less than the number of dimensions of the input data (i.e. the
number of input units) (Figure 2.6). This also helps to prevent the network from
just remembering individual exemplars because there is an information bottleneck
and so the network needs to learn the underlying factors of variation.
2.3 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Originally Reinforcement Learning (RL) solution methods relied upon tabular ap-
proaches i.e. a table of values for each state or state-action pair. More sophisticated
approaches used fixed basis functions or linear functions to approximate the value
function and/or policy. However none of these approaches were able to deal with
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high-dimensional states and the curse of dimensionality. Recently approaches have
started to use Deep Learning (DL) to approximate the key functions required in
RL, a technique known as Deep Reinforcement Learning (Deep RL) (François-Lavet
et al., 2018). Deep RL is particularly powerful because it utilises the universal func-
tion approximation abilities of deep neural networks to either represent the value
function and/or policy. This allows the value function and/or policy to be a com-
plex non-linear function of the states and actions. This non-linear function also
has generalization properties because the deep neural networks are able to interpo-
late between data points in a smooth manner. In addition, Deep neural networks
learn hierarchical representations with increasing levels of abstraction, which helps
to overcome the cure of dimensionality. The fact that deep neural networks learn
these representations is particularly important because it means they can be tailored
to the task at hand without the need for being hand-designed. The deep neural net-
works used in Deep RL are typically trained using the backpropagation algorithm
and often rely on the Temporal Difference (TD) error if learning a value function or
the policy gradient if learning a policy.
2.3.1 Deep Q-Learning
One of the seminal studies demonstrating the capabilities of Deep Reinforcement
Learning (Deep RL) to deal with complex high-dimensional states was conducted by
Mnih et al. (2015). In the study Mnih et al. (2015) applied an approach known as a
Deep Q-Network (DQN) to an array of Atari 2600 video games. Strikingly DQN was
able to reach or exceed human level performance on 29 of the 46 Atari games. DQN
was able to achieve this by combining Q-Learning with deep convolutional neural
networks to convert raw pixel values into meaningful actions. Most importantly,
the same network architecture and hyper-parameter values were used for each video
game demonstrating the the DQN could learn useful state representations on its
own without the need for game-specific information.
Mnih et al. (2015) made several implementation decisions that ensured the suc-
cess of the DQN approach. Firstly each frame of the game was resized to 84 X 84
pixels to reduce computational costs. DQN was then provided the last four frames
as the current state of the environment so that the total input was 84 X 84 X 4.
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This was important because it provided DQN with information about the direction
that objects were moving in and helped to make the state more Markovian. From an
architectural standpoint, DQN used three convolutional layers followed by one fully
connected hidden layer and finally an output layer (Figure 2.7). As DQN relied
upon Q-Learning and therefore the calculation of state-action values, the output
layer consisted of 18 units which corresponded to one unit for each action in the
Atari games. The output of each of these units was taken as the state-action value
or Q-Value for the corresponding action. With the state and action space defined,
the final step was to define the reward function. Fortunately the Atari game envi-
ronment has a relatively natural reward function; the score achieved between two
time-steps. This also allowed the reward signal to be standardised across games.
Figure 2.7: Architecture of the Deep Q-Network (DQN) (Mnih et al., 2015). The
last four game frames were provided as input to the network. The network consisted
of three convolutional layers followed by two fully connected layers. The output layer
contained 18 units, which output the value of each of the possible actions available in
the video games. All units apart from the output units used a Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation function, whereby the input value was set to 0 if it was less than
0. The output units used a linear activation function. Figure adapted from Mnih
et al. (2015).
For training DQN used an ε-greedy approach, with the value of ε decreasing
linearly over the first one million game frames. This helped to encourage exploration
early on and then settle on a policy later. DQN was allowed to interact with each
game for 50 million frame, which equates to around 38 days of continuous game-
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play. Throughout this time DQN would observe the last four frames, select an
action, receive a reward signal and the next game frame, and repeat. The weights of
the deep neural network were updated using backpropagation and the Q-Learning
TD error as the objective function:
wt+1 = wt + α(rt+1 + γmax
a
Q̂(st+1, a;wt)− Q̂(st, at;wt))∇Q̂(st, at;wt) (2.81)
Where wt is the vector of weights of the deep neural network at time t and
∇Q̂(st, at;wt) is the partial derivative as calculated by backpropagation. Rather
than applying these updates after each action Mnih et al. (2015) accumulated a
history of one-step transitions (st, at, rt+1, st+1) and applied the updates intermit-
tently using batches of data randomly sampled from this history. This approach
was known as an experience replay and was beneficial for several reasons. Firstly,
because the updates were applied in a batch they helped to provide a lower-variance
sample of the actual gradients for training. Secondly, the transitions were sampled
randomly, which removed any correlations between the updates. Finally, it made
more efficient use of the transitions experienced by the agent.
Aside from experience replay, Mnih et al. (2015) used one final trick to help
improve the stability of the algorithm. TD methods such as Q-Leanring rely on
bootstrapping value estimates in order to generate target values to be used in the
update rule. This can be seen in Equation 2.81 where the target value is the sum of
the reward experienced (rt+1) and the value of the next state-action pair as predicted
by the deep neural network (maxa Q̂(st+1, a;wt)). The problem with this is that the
target value is a function of the weights being updated, which can lead to instability
and divergence. To solve this problem Mnih et al. (2015) would take a copy of the
deep neural network every C weight updates and freeze the values of the weights in
that network. This ‘target’ network was then used exclusively to calculate the target
value for the Q-Learning weight updates. This approach allowed for bootstrapping
of values while keep the target values relatively stable during training. With Q̃
denoting the target network, the final weight update used by Mnih et al. (2015)
became:
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wt+1 = wt + α(rt+1 + γmax
a
Q̃(st+1, a;wt)− Q̂(st, at;wt))∇Q̂(st, at;wt) (2.82)
With these straight forward modifications Mnih et al. (2015) was able to demon-
strate for the first time the power of combining deep neural networks with reinforce-
ment learning techniques. For the first time, hand-crafted state features were not
required as DQN could learn from scratch useful representations of high-dimensional
inputs. Despite this achievement DQN still required that the weights of the net-
work were reset before learning a new game. This highlights that DQN learns very
task-specific representations and that further work is required to design agents that
can learn a range of tasks simultaneously.
2.3.2 Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C)
Arguably the most popular family of Deep RL algorithms are the advantage actor-
critic (A2C) algorithms (Mnih et al., 2016). As mentioned in Section XXX, these
algorithms learn both a value function and policy, either using two separate Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) or a single one with two output layers. The critic typically
learns the state value function using the Temporal Difference (TD) error:
wt+1 = wt + α(rt+1 + γV (st+1;wt)− V (st;wt))∇wV (st;wt) (2.83)
This approximation is then used to calculate the advantage of an action at from a
given state st. After an action at is taken from state st the resulting reward rt+1 and
state st+1 is observed. These values can then be used to calculate the ‘advantage’
of the action using the following formula:
A(st, at) = Q(st, at)− V (st) (2.84)
= (rt+1 + γV (st+1;wt))− V (st;wt) (2.85)
This advantage value is subsequently used to update the policy network via the
policy gradient:
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θt+1 = θt + αA(st, at)∇θ lnπ(at | st;θt) (2.86)
The main advantage of these methods is that they can be used to learn continuous
and stochastic policies. in comparison approaches such as DQN simply learn action
values for discrete actions. The development of A2C algorithms therefore opened
up the use of Deep RL to more domains and applications.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed the necessary background material to understand
the basic mechanisms underlying Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL). RL provides
a framework for learning how to select actions that maximise reward based on the
state of the environment. Meanwhile Deep Learning (DL) provides a mechanism for
learning hierarchical representations that can support the approximation of contin-
uous non-linear functions. By combining RL with DL, Deep RL agents are able to
learn complex tasks involving high-dimensional inputs, such as playing video games
from raw pixels. In the next chapter we shall explore how Complementary Learning
Systems (CLS) theory from cognitive science can be used to understand efficient RL
in the brain and simultaneously improve the efficiency of Deep RL systems.
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Chapter 3
CLS Theory as the Basis for
Efficient RL
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to review past literature in order to reconcile Deep
Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory
(McClelland et al., 1995). This will allow us to identify the learning systems that
support efficient RL in the brain and that are lacking in Deep RL algorithms. In
particular, we focus on the computational properties of these learning systems and
how they interact with each other to support the rapid learning of new information
and the transfer of past information. We start by using the analogy between Deep RL
and CLS theory to identify three key pathways in the brain that may contribute to its
ability to perform rapid learning and transfer (Section 3.1). These pathways include
connections between (1) the neocortex and the striatum, (2) the hippocampus and
the striatum and (3) the neocortex and the hippocampus. For each pathway we
review recent advancements in Deep RL and computational modelling to highlight
how these pathways may support efficient RL (Sections 3.2 - 3.4). Our hope is
that this chapter demonstrates the utility of an analogy between Deep RL and CLS
theory for understanding rapid learning and transfer in the human brain.
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3.1 CLS Theory and Deep RL
The human brain is a complex network of different learning systems and it is their
interactions that support human level intelligence. One theory that is central to
this thesis is Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory (McClelland et al.,
1995; O’Reilly and Norman, 2002; Kumaran et al., 2016). The premise of CLS
theory is that the brain relies on two different forms of memory to learn and make
decisions (Figure 3.1). The first form of memory, often referred to as semantic
memory, is thought to occur in neocortical areas and relies upon the slow learning
of regularities across multiple experiences. These regularities are thought to be
encoded by overlapping representations, which provides semantic memory with good
generalisation abilities. In comparison, the second form of memory, often referred
to as episodic memory, is thought to reside in the hippocampus and is responsible
for rapidly remembering the specifics of individual experiences. These specifics are
encoded via pattern-separated representations, which ensures that episodic memory
can recall very similar experiences without interference. It has been proposed that
one of the functions of episodic memory in the hippocampus is to replay individual
experiences to the neocortex in an interleaved fashion to facilitate the neocortex’s
gradual semantic learning (McClelland et al., 1995).
These two forms of memory are therefore complementary; the neocortex slowly
learns distributed representations of multiple experiences while the hippocampus
rapidly learns pattern-separated representations of individual experiences. With
respect to Reinforcement Learning (RL), both the neocortex and the hippocampus
send projections to the striatum (Pennartz et al., 2011), which is thought to evaluate
states and/or actions (Schultz, 1998; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002; Maia, 2009;
Setlow et al., 2003). It is therefore plausible that the RL machinery uses both
semantic and episodic memory to inform decisions. With this in mind, we identify
three key pathways within the CLS framework that may support efficient RL in
the brain (Figure 3.1). Pathways 1 and 2 in Figure 3.1 correspond to the direct
projections of the neocortex and hippocampus to the striatum respectively. These
two pathways allow each learning system to directly influence the evaluation of states
and actions. Pathway 3 corresponds to the connections between the neocortex and
the hippocampus. This pathway allows the two learning systems to have an indirect
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effect on RL by influencing the behaviour of the other system. We strongly believe
that it is the interactions between these different pathways that allow for efficient







Figure 3.1: Diagram reconciling Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory
with Reinforcement Learning (RL). Three main pathways are identified; (1) projec-
tions from the neocortex to the striatum, (2) projections from the hippocampus to
the striatum and (3) projections between the neocortex and the hippocampus.
How does Deep RL fit into CLS theory and the pathways outlined in Figure 3.1?
Deep RL (François-Lavet et al., 2018) uses Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to learn
continuous functions of the state space so that predictions can generalise to large
and high-dimensional state spaces. The distributed and overlapping representations
learnt by DNNs are crucial to their ability to generalise. Interestingly this property of
DNNs appears to mimic those of the neocortex, which also relies on the slow learning
of overlapping representations for generalisation. Indeed, the representations learnt
by DNNs have been found to have a close similarity to those learnt by the neocortex
(Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015; Yamins and DiCarlo, 2016). This suggests that
classic Deep RL algorithms may be viewed as analogous to Pathway 1 in Figure
3.1, whereby overlapping distributed representations are used to evaluate states and
actions. This analogy is central to the current thesis and suggests that Deep RL
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algorithms should benefit from the addition of learning systems that correspond to
the other pathways highlighted in Figure 3.1.
The remainder of this chapter will review recent advances in Deep RL and com-
putational modelling that attempt to understand how the brain achieves efficient
RL. These advances will be categorised based on which of the three pathways they
relate to in Figure 3.1. This will help to emphasise the utility of a CLS framework
and how efficient RL is likely to be supported by a plethora of interacting systems.
We will start by exploring advancements that do not suggest the need for additional
learning systems in Deep RL. These approaches can be seen as trying to improve
the ability of Deep RL to replicate the interactions between the neocortex and the
striatum and therefore the contributions of semantic memory to RL (Pathway 1 in
Figure 3.1).
3.2 1. Connections Between the Neocortex and
Striatum
The striatum is thought to be responsible for evaluating states and/or actions during
Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Schultz, 1998; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002;
Maia, 2009; Setlow et al., 2003). Importantly, the striatum receives a multitude of
inputs from the neocortex (Haber, 2016), which is thought to provide overlapping
representations containing semantic knowledge for evaluation (McClelland et al.,
1995). From a Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) perspective, it is logical that
this pathway should be the primary candidate for transfer as it provides knowledge
that is general and abstracted across many experiences. As mentioned in Section
3.1, the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) used in Deep RL appear to share similar
properties with the neocortex in that they slowly learn overlapping representations.
The representations learnt by these DNNs are used to calculate the values of states
or state-action pairs. This therefore seems to mimic the cortical-striatal pathway in
the brain (Pathway 1 in Figure 3.1).
Despite this seemingly natural comparison between the use of DNNs for approx-
imating value-functions and the cortical-striatal pathway in the brain, the resulting
behaviour of the two is strikingly different. Typically Deep RL approaches that
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utilise DNNs, such as DQN (Mnih et al., 2015), lack any ability to transfer or gen-
eralise as soon as the task changes. In comparison semantic knowledge in the cortex
appears to be able to support behaviour in a wealth of different scenarios through-
out life (Quillan, 1966). The question arises then, why are DNNs in Deep RL such
a poor model of semantic memory and how can they be altered in order to better
understand the properties of semantic memory and move closer to the efficiency of
human RL? Ultimately this question reduces to investigating the nature and content
of the representations learnt by DNNs and how they differ from those learnt by the
neocortex.
3.2.1 Catastrophic Forgetting
One obvious difference between the DNNs used in Deep RL and semantic memory
in the neocortex is that humans start a task with a wealth of prior experience.
However, this wealth of past experience alone is not enough to explain the disparity
between the efficiency of Deep RL and human RL. This is because prior experience
is only useful if one has the ability to processes those experiences into a form of
semantic knowledge that can be re-used. One of the problems that stops DNNs
from being able to do this is known as catastrophic forgetting (French, 1999). The
term catastrophic forgetting is used to describe the fact that DNNs suffer from
interference so that the learning of new information can disrupt previously learnt
information. For this reason DNNs have to be repeatedly trained on a mixture of
old and new information so that they do not forget the old information. As a result,
for an approach such as DQN to capitalise on the years of experience that humans
have and form representations that generalise across them, it would need to record
all of the experiences ever encountered, which is computationally infeasible.
With this in mind, a wealth of approaches have been proposed to reduce the
prevalence of catastrophic forgetting in DNNs. One particular group of approaches
rely on applying constraints to the updates of the weights between units. More
specifically, these approaches work by reducing the plasticity of weights i.e. the
magnitude of updates, based on how important they were for previous tasks (Kirk-
patrick et al., 2017; Zenke et al., 2017) (Figure 3.2). These approaches are of interest
because they are inspired by theoretical neuroscience and work on synaptic plasticity
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(Benna and Fusi, 2016), making them potentially biologically plausible candidates
for reducing catastrophic forgetting. Another group of approaches takes inspiration
from Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory to replay past experiences
back to the network during training using generative models (Mocanu et al., 2016;
Shin et al., 2017; van de Ven and Tolias, 2018). We shall cover these approaches in
more detail in Section 3.4.2 as they involve Pathway 3 in Figure 3.1. In summary, by
alleviating catastrophic forgetting, DNNs can be trained on multiple tasks without
over-writing previous knowledge. This can lead to the learning of representations
that are potentially useful across a range of tasks and that generalise well to new
unseen tasks.
Figure 3.2: Depiction of how weights are updated in Elastic Weight Consolidation
(EWC) (Kirkpatrick et al., 2017). Updating the weights based on the gradients
calculated on task B will erase the learning on task A (blue arrow). In contrast,
constraining the updates using a coefficient will potentially degrade performance on
both tasks (green arrow). In comparison, EWC attempts to update weights in a
way that improves performance on task B while maintaining performance on task A.
Figure adapted from Kirkpatrick et al. (2017).
3.2.2 Objective Functions
Even with the elimination of catastrophic forgetting it is still an open question how
well the representations learnt in Deep RL generalise to new scenarios and whether
they mimic the kinds of transfer displayed by humans. Testing such a hypothesis is
difficult for two main reasons. Firstly, the algorithm would need to be exposed to a
stream of multi-sensory data that is similar to the one experienced by a developing
child in order to make a fair comparison. Secondly, and perhaps even more difficult,
the algorithm would need to be trained to optimise similar objectives to that of a
human being. The representations in a DNN are naturally affected by the task that
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is being optimised for and so this has to be taken into account when comparing Deep
RL models to human cognition. For the DNNs used in Deep RL to be a reliable
model of semantic memory we need to understand what the main drivers are for
learning representations in the neocortex.
Research in this area often trains DNNs on a specific objective function and
then compares representations with known brain regions to quantify how likely that
objective function is in the brain (Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014; Cadieu
et al., 2014). Most of the success of this approach has come from training convo-
lutional DNNs to classify natural images and comparing the learnt representations
to those of the visual stream in the neocortex. The fact that there appears to be a
similarity between them demonstrates that the brain may be optimising objective
functions other than just the difference between predicted and actual reward, as is
the case in Deep RL. Indeed recent modelling work in Deep RL has shown that
imbuing a Deep RL agent with additional objective functions, such as learning how
to maximally change pixels in the input, can greatly improve performance on single
video games (Jaderberg et al., 2016).
From a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that if the number of tasks
a person is faced with can potentially be infinite and ever changing, then the best
approach would be for semantic memory to learn general features of the percep-
tual input that are task-agnostic. Indeed, this is the goal of unsupervised learning,
which finds patterns in the input data without the explicit use of labels for a specific
task. This is potentially useful because it allows one to learn the representations
of underlying variations in the environment, which can then be picked and pro-
cessed according to the task at hand (Bengio, 2012), rather than being tuned to
any particular task. Such representations can be re-used across tasks and constitute
transferrable knowledge. In the case of Deep RL, unsupervised learning is able to
learn representations that may appear extraneous to achieving reward for the cur-
rent task but that may be useful for obtaining reward in future tasks without the
need for explicit labels. Interestingly, developmental research suggests that infants
and young children rely largely on unsupervised learning in order to learn represen-
tations of their environment because they experience relatively few labels compared
to the amount of data they are exposed to (Lake et al., 2009; Rosenthal et al., 2001).
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However, we have already seen that representations in the visual stream appear to
resemble the representations learnt by supervised DNNs categorizing natural images
as opposed to unsupervised DNNs (Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014; Cadieu
et al., 2014). In addition, adult perception can change with sufficient training on
a specific task such as the sexing of chicks (Biederman and Shiffrar, 1987; Schyns
et al., 1998), suggesting that our learnt perceptual representations can be altered
by a specific task or goal. Finally, task-specific modulation of activity can be found
in the neocortex during behavioural experiments (Woolgar et al., 2011; Kouider
et al., 2016) as well as choice-related activity (Yang et al., 2016). It therefore seems
unlikely that semantic knowledge is completely driven by unsupervised learning
in a task agnostic manner. In reality semantic knowledge is likely the result of
both supervised and unsupervised learning working in tandem to generate features
that are both useful for the current task and that retain some degree of generality.
However, it remains an open question which objective functions best capture the
representations found in semantic memory and that lead to efficient RL.
As a final point on objective functions, it is worth noting that the problems faced
by the neocortex and semantic memory are not static and consistent throughout
life. A child is not immediately faced with learning to play video games but instead
acquires simple motor, perceptual and language skills in the first few years of life
(Gallahue et al., 2006; Gibson, 1969; Bloom and Lahey, 1978). These simple tasks,
such as learning to segment objects (Spelke, 1990), are likely to serve as the basis for
more complex behaviour and allow for the learning of representations that can be
re-used throughout adult life. This developmental bootstrapping of knowledge is a
powerful demonstration of transfer itself and it is this ability that serves as the basis
for further more powerful transfer later in development. For example, in the field of
analogy a theory known as progressive alignment (Gentner and Hoyos, 2017) states
that children tend to start with relatively simple generalisations and this allows them
to understand increasingly complex generalisations as they grow older. It is therefore
not just the fact that humans encounter multiple tasks that encourage the learning
of general representations but that these tasks are usually encountered in a specific
order based on difficulty. Indeed even Skinner’s seminal studies on animal learning
rely on increasing the difficulty of the learning problem in order to achieve the desired
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performance on a final target task (Peterson, 2004), a process referred to as ‘shaping’.
This concept is particularly pertinent when considering DNNs as a possible model of
semantic memory because they also appear to benefit from shaping during training
(Elman, 1993; Bengio et al., 2009; Krueger and Dayan, 2009). Most importantly the
benefit appears to manifest itself as a form of regularisation, whereby performance
is improved on the test set (Bengio et al., 2009) i.e. it improves transfer in DNNs.
The benefits have also been demonstrated in RL problems, where the phenomenon
is often referred to as ‘curriculum learning’ (Narvekar, 2017; Narvekar et al., 2017;
Narvekar and Stone, 2018). It is therefore important that the correct objective
functions are not only identified, but that they are also presented in the correct
order to faithfully mimic human development.
If the DNNs in Deep RL are to capture the capabilities of semantic memory and
represent the cortical-striatal pathway in the brain it is critical that they attempt
to optimise similar problems to those faced by the brain. This likely involves an
array of supervised and unsupervised learning tasks that lead to representations
that generalise well to a range of tasks. In addition, the ordering of these tasks
must be considered, so that semantic knowledge can be efficiently boot-strapped to
enable increasingly complex behaviour and generalisation.
3.2.3 Disentangled Representations
The question of objective functions aside, the representations learnt by DNNs have
intrinsic properties that can either help or hinder transfer. Work conducted by
Higgins et al. (2016) suggests that representations learnt by DNNs should be ‘dis-
entangled’ in order to promote transfer. The term ‘disentangled’ refers to the idea
that the individual units of a neural network should encode independent factors of
variation. For example one unit may encode the size of an object while another
may encode its colour. Higgins et al. (2016) achieve disentangled representations by
using a slightly modified Variational AutoEncoder (VAE).
An autoencoder is an unsupervised neural network that has to recreate its in-
put at its output via successive layers of units. Typically an autoencoder contains a
bottleneck, where the number of units in the middle layer is smaller than the dimen-
sionality of the input data. This creates a latent representation with lower dimen-
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sionality than the input data. A VAE is an extension of an autoencoder, whereby
the latent representation forms the parameters of multiple gaussian distributions
(Kingma, 2013; Rezende et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2016). The advantage of
this is that the VAE is a generative model, meaning that the parameters of the la-
tent representation can be used to sample from the latent representation in order to
generate examples of the input data. The objective function of a VAE has two main
terms, one represents the marginal log-likelihood of the input data given the latent
distribution and another represents a prior over the latent distribution. This prior is
typically set to be a multivariate isotropic gaussian in order to control the capacity
of the latent information bottleneck and enforce independence between the latent
variables. Interestingly, Higgins et al. (2016) found that increasing the strength of
this prior using a parameter β lead to more disentanglement in the latent represen-
tations. Higgins et al. (2016) term this new computational model the β−V AE and
an example of the kinds of representations that it learns can be seen in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Traversal of the representations learnt by β − V AE when trained on
a dataset consisting of 2D shapes. Each column represents a different latent unit
and each row represents a different mean value for the latent unit. Images are
produced by sampling from the latent distribution. During the traversal of a unit’s
representations, the remaining latent units are set to the values produced by an
image from the dataset. Units with low variance learn to encode independent factors
of variation such as y position or scale. Figure adapted from Higgins et al. (2016).
At first, these findings had important implications for the interpretability of
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the representations learnt by VAE’s. β − V AE was able to discover underlying
latent factors of the input data that were understandable from a human perspective.
However, more pertinent to this thesis was the fact that this disentanglement of
representations also appeared to improve the flexibility of Deep RL approaches so
that they could display the kinds of transfer often exhbited by humans.
In a further paper by Higgins et al. (2017), the authors combined the β − V AE
model with RL algorithms in order to explore the benefits of disentanglement for
RL. In this study the β−V AE was first used to generate representations of a virtual
3D environment. This virtual 3D environment consisted of a basic room that could
have different combinations of objects (two of either a hat, cake, can or balloon) and
coloured walls. The representations from β − V AE were then used with a variety
of different model-free RL algorithms to assess how useful they were for transfer,
independent of the exact RL algorithm implementation. Higgins et al. (2017) called
this combination of β − V AE and RL algorithm a DisentAngled Representation
Learning Agent (DARLA). The task of the agent in the 3D environment was to
avoid hat and cake objects and to collect can and balloon objects. Importantly
the RL algorithms were only trained on a specific subset of the object and wall
combinations (Figure 3.4). This allowed them to be tested on the held out subset
to see whether they could transfer their knowledge from the training set to the new
combinations. DARLA was able to transfer its knowledge and could successfully
collect either the can or balloon and avoid either the hat and cake for combinations
of objects and wall colour that it had not been trained on. This is an impressive
demonstration of transfer as DARLA is able to reason about which objects are
rewarding even in contexts that it has not learnt from before e.g. a can is rewarding
regardless of the room that it is in.
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Figure 3.4: The rooms and objects used to train and test DisentAngled Representa-
tion Learning Agent (DARLA). DU represents combinations that were used for visual
pre-training to obtain disentangled representations from β − V AE. DS represents
combinations that were used to train the policy of the agent using reward feedback.
DT represents the test task, which involved a combination of objects and room that
the agent had no prior experience of with respect to reward feedback. Figure adapted
from Higgins et al. (2017).
One could argue that this example is not true transfer because the β − V AE
component of DARLA has seen all the objects and wall colours at some point.
However this would be a harsh criticism as it is very rare that we as humans have
a perceptual experience that is truly novel, apart from very soon after birth. In
fact when we talk about perceptual novelty we are usually talking about novel
combinations of perceptual features that we have little knowledge of how to act
upon. Higgins et al. (2017) describe DARLA as first using the β − V AE to learn
how to ‘see’ and represent the world, and then using the RL algorithm to learn
how to ‘act’ in the world. One can see how this might parallel the learning of an
infant soon after birth, as it first has to learn how to represent the world before it
can act effectively. The disentangled representations used by DARLA appear to be
useful for transfer for two main reasons. The first reason is because, as with other
unsupervised techniques, they provide a constant latent space for RL algorithms
to learn a policy from. The second reason is because the main factors of variation
are independently encoded in single units. This means that interference is greatly
reduced during learning. For example, to evaluate the value of colour the network
only has to learn the weights for a single unit rather than fitting weights across
many units in order to learn a useful policy.
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Quite how far the approach characterised by DARLA can go to replicating hu-
man like transfer in more complicated tasks, such as the video games often used
to test DQN (Mnih et al., 2015), remains to be seen. One potential criticism that
might be hard to address is the biological plausibility of disentangled representa-
tions. The key property of β − V AE is that units encode independent factors of
variation such as colour or size in a mutually exclusive fashion. If disentangled rep-
resentations are utilised in semantic memory for transfer, then this would suggest
that different regions of the cortex should be responsible for encoding independent
factors of variation. Neuroscience research suggests that this may be the case, for
example the classic model of primate visual cortex states that colour and shape are
encoded separately (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988). However these findings are still
contentious (Garg et al., 2019) and it is not straight forward to define what the
independent factors of variation should be for the rich stream of perceptual data
that is experienced by human beings. This being said, a recent study by Higgins
et al. (2020) has shown a good correspondence between the representations learnt by
β−V AE when trained on images of faces and the response of single inferotemporal
neurons in macaques. Furthermore Higgins et al. (2020) found that just from a
handful of cell recordings they were able to use the decoding portion of β−V AE to
reconstruct images of the faces. β−V AE therefore appears to represent a promising
model of representations in the neocortex.
One criticism that could be made of β − V AE as a model of representations in
the neocortex is its extremely low robustness to damage. For instance, losing the
unit that encodes colour would effectively result in us being unable to represent or
‘see’ colour. This is in contrast to numerous findings in neuroscience that suggest a
high robustness to damage in many brain areas (Aerts et al., 2016). One potential
counter argument to this could be that groups of units in the latent space of β−V AE
could encode each factor of variation rather than a single unit, which would greatly
improve robustness to damage.
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3.3 2. Connections Between the Hippocampus
and Striatum
In Section 3.2 we saw how the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) used in Deep Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) share similar properties to the cortical-striatal pathway
found in the brain (Pathway 1) and that they can tentatively be compared to se-
mantic memory. However, CLS theory states that the presence of episodic memory
is also an important component for intelligent behaviour (McClelland et al., 1995).
Episodic memory in the brain is thought to be the responsibility of the hippocam-
pus (Burgess et al., 2002). Interestingly, the hippocampus projects to the striatum
(Pennartz et al., 2011) indicating that RL in the brain relies on both semantic
(Pathway 1) and episodic (Pathway 2) memory. Therefore in order to capture the
complex RL behaviour demonstrated by humans, CLS theory suggests that Deep
RL approaches should benefit from the addition of a ‘hippocampal’ learning system.
Indeed, many theoretical advantages have been proposed for the use of hippocampal
episodic information in RL. In particular, it has been suggested that episodic in-
formation can be used to approximate value functions, increase data efficiency and
reconcile long-range dependencies (Gershman and Daw, 2017).
When the first rigorous mathematical treatment of RL was proposed by Sutton
and Barto (1998), many of the solution methods relied upon learning tables of values,
otherwise known as tabular approaches. Tabular approaches store a separate value
for every state or state-action pair, which eliminates the potential for interference
and allows for updates to be performed instantly. They therefore appear to share
properties with a hippocampal learning system; both systems quickly learn pattern-
separated values of individual states and/or actions. The main disadvantage of
tabular approaches is that as the number of states and/or actions increases, they
require more experience to encounter each action-value and more computational
resources to store the associated values. The distributed representations of DNNs
then become advantageous because they allow for efficient generalisation over the
state space. In an ideal scenario a DNN would be responsible for generalisation over
the state space while a tabular method would store pattern-separated memories that
are crucial to behavior and that violate the generalisations of the network.
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How does the brain make use of a hippocampal learning system for efficient
RL? The remainder of this section will attempt to answer this question by review-
ing recent advancements in Deep RL and computational modelling that explore
the computational properties of the hippocampus and how they can support rapid
learning and transfer in humans.
3.3.1 Fast Learning in the Hippocampus Supports Efficient
Reinforcement Learning
One of the primary issues with relying on semantic knowledge for Reinforcement
Learning (RL) is that updating of the knowledge is typically slow. As with Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs), learning is supposedly slow and incremental in the neocor-
tex, abstracting similarities over many experiences. For these reasons it is thought
that the brain relies upon the fast learning of the hippocampus to quickly drive
learning in novel situations. Recent work in Deep RL has supported this hypothesis
by demonstrating the power of combining tabular approaches with DNNs (Botvinick
et al., 2019).
Most notably Blundell et al. (2016) proposed an algorithm called ‘model-free
episodic control’, which consisted of a table containing the maximum return (sum
of discounted rewards) for each state-action pair experienced (Figure 3.5). Values in
this table could be updated instantly supporting fast learning in new environments.
The memory requirements for this table were kept constant by removing the least
recently updated table entry once the size limit had been reached. Each observation
from the environment was projected by a DNN-based embedding function (either a
random projection or a variational autoencoder) to a state value and actions were
selected based on a k-nearest neighbours method, which allowed for some degree of
generalisation to novel states. Blundell et al. (2016) tested this approach on the
Arcade Learning Environment (Atari) (Bellemare et al., 2013) and Labyrinth (Mnih
et al., 2016), which both require the use of visual information to learn an optimal
policy. The results of these simulations showed that model-free episodic control was
significantly more data efficient than other classical Deep RL approaches, suggesting
that episodic information is indeed important for fast learning.
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Figure 3.5: Depiction of model-free episodic control (Blundell et al., 2016). The
agent observes the environment at time t and transforms the observation (ot) into a
latent state (st) using a deep neural network. A table is used to store the maximum
return experienced from separate state-action pairings. Actions are then selected
using a k-nearest neighbours approach based on the state values in the table.
While taking a first step towards highlighting the benefits of a ‘hippocampal’
learning system that utilises fast learning of pattern-separated information, the work
of Blundell et al. (2016) has several notable drawbacks. Firstly, the table recorded
the maximum return from any given episode and used this to inform the policy of the
agent. This naturally cannot handle stochastic environments, where the expected
return is the important quantity and not the maximum return of an individual
episode. Secondly, this approach is likely to be highly inflexible. For example if
a state-action pair suddenly becomes highly aversive then the entry in the table
will not be updated because only the maximum value is stored. A third criticism
is that the approach relies on the full return for each state-action pair and this is
only possible when the task has distinct finite episodes. Some of these criticisms
have been addressed in subsequent work, for example Pritzel et al. (2017) propose a
fully differentiable version of ‘model-free episodic control’ that learns the embedding
function in an online fashion using N-step Q-learning.
The above issues not withstanding, what is most pertinent to this thesis is that
‘model-free episodic control’, and its various derivatives, do not rely on two comple-
mentary learning systems that operate in parallel to evaluate actions. The DNN-
based embedding function may be tentatively compared to a neocortical learning
system (as seen in Section 3.2) but it operates before the hippocampal learning sys-
tem and as a result only the output of the hippocampal learning system is used to
evaluate action values. This means that any advantages that may be conferred from
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the additional predictions of a neocortical learning system are lost. In essence, the
aforementioned approaches cannot arbitrate between the predictions of a neocortical
and a ‘hippocampal’ learning system, but are instead restricted to using episodic
predictions. This is inconsistent with the finding that the striatum receives inputs
from both cortical areas and the hippocampus and needs to arbitrate between the
two (Pennartz et al., 2011).
3.3.2 Recurrent Similarity Computation
From a Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) perspective, generalisation is the
primary function of the neocortex due to its slow learning of overlapping represen-
tations that form over multiple experiences (McClelland et al., 1995). However,
this line of reasoning struggles to explain how people are able to generalise a newly
learnt piece of information in a matter of minutes. We are therefore left with the hip-
pocampal system as a potential source of generalisation and transfer for shorter time
scales. This proposal is hard to reconcile with CLS theory because the hippocam-
pus is thought to rely on non-overlapping representations, which try to separate
memories as much as possible in order to avoid interference. However, work by
Kumaran and McClelland (2012) has provided insights into how non-overlapping
representations may still be able to support generalisation over short time scales.
Kumaran and McClelland (2012) proposed a computational model called Re-
currency and Episodic Memory Results in Generalization (REMERGE), which im-
plemented a potential mechanism for generalisation in the hippocampus using non-
overlapping hippocampal representations (Figure 3.6). The model took a connec-
tionist approach and had two key architectural components: a ‘feature’ layer and
a ‘conjunctive’ layer that were connected to each other using bi-directional connec-
tions. The ‘feature’ layer encoded the input to the model as a distributed repre-
sentation across units while the ‘conjunctive’ layer used individual units to encode
conjunctions of features as non-overlapping episodic representations. The strength
of the connections between the units of these two layers were set according to the
features present in a given conjunction e.g. a conjunction unit for features A, B and
D would have strong connections to the corresponding feature units A, B and D. Im-
portantly, this architecture allowed REMERGE to perform an operation Kumaran
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and McClelland (2012) termed ‘recurrent similarity computation’. During recurrent
similarity computation, input is presented to the feature layer and propagated to
units in the conjunctive layer, which in turn activate other units in the feature layer.
This process is repeated for a set number of cycles and the overall result is that the
activity of the conjunctive units reflect their similarity to both externally presented
input and input reconstructed by the network.
Figure 3.6: Architecture of Recurrency and Episodic Memory Results in Generaliza-
tion (REMERGE) for the transitive inference task. Input is presented at the feature
layer, where each unit corresponds to a different stimulus (A-F). Each unit in the
conjunctive layer corresponds to a stimulus pairing that was used during training
(e.g. AB). Each unit in the response layer corresponds to a different choice made
by the network (A-F). Connections between the feature and conjunctive layer are
excitatory and bi-directional. Connections between the conjunctive layer and the
response layer are uni-directional and either excitatory (solid arrow) or inhibitory
(dashed arrow) to represent the learnt transitive relationship. The curved arrow next
to the conjunctive layer denotes a softmax operation that causes competitive inhi-
bition between units in the conjunctive layer. Figure adapted from Kumaran and
McClelland (2012).
Kumaran and McClelland (2012) showed that REMERGE is able to solve an ar-
ray of classical generalisation tasks such as Transitive Inference, Paired Associative
Inference and Acquired Equivalence tasks. It therefore appears that the hippocam-
pal system may be a good candidate for fast, flexible transfer as it is not restricted
by the slow interleaved learning of the neocortex and can acquire episodic memories
quickly for recurrent similarity computation. However, while REMERGE appears
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to be able to account for transfer behaviour on Transitive Inference, Paired Associa-
tive Inference and Acquired Equivalence tasks, it is unclear how its mechanism of
recurrent similarity computation would apply to the types of RL problems typically
tackled by Deep RL systems.
3.3.3 Relational Representations and Cognitive Maps
The work by Kumaran and McClelland (2012) demonstrates how the computational
properties of the hippocampus can allow for specific forms of quick inference that
the RL machinery can then act upon. However, it remains an open question how
‘recurrent similarity computation’ could be extended to tasks other than Transitive
Inference, Paired Associative Inference and Acquired Equivalence tasks. One prop-
erty these tasks have in common is that they involve relationships between items.
For example, the Transitive Inference task involves a linear relational structure be-
tween items; A is greater than B, which is greater than C, which is greater than
D, etc. It is largely thought that the ability to reason about such relationships is
fundamental to making useful inferences in novel situations (Gentner, 1988; Wilson
et al., 1985; Cook and Wasserman, 2007; Torrey, 2009; Holyoak, 2012). Indeed, an
entire field of reinforcement learning known as relational RL has been suggested
as a potential solution to the transfer problem (Van Otterlo, 2005; Džeroski et al.,
2001). The basic premise behind relational RL is that if incoming perceptual in-
formation is represented in terms of abstract relationships between objects then
reinforcement learning should be highly flexible because the representations are not
tied to particular perceptual instances.
The idea of using relational representations for transfer has some interesting
connections to developmental work on transfer. In particular, the fact that children
shift from perceptual matches to relational matches and that transfer appears to be
dependent on domain knowledge suggests that the learning of such representations
may be a key component of adult level transfer (Gentner and Hoyos, 2017). In
fact, the theory of progressive alignment suggests that this may be a reciprocal
relationship, whereby the learning of relational representations supports transfer,
which then bootstraps the learning of further relational representations.
Interestingly, recent work has highlighted the hippocampus as a potential source
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of such relational representations in the brain. For many years neuroscientists have
focused on the role of the hippocampus in spatial reasoning. As a result, researchers
have described a multitude of different cells types in the hippocampus and entorhinal
cortex that are involved in spatial reasoning. The most famous of these cells are
place cells in the hippocampus that only fire in one location in an environment
(O’keefe and Nadel, 1978) and grid cells in the entorhinal cortex that fire at multiple
locations on a triangular grid (Hafting et al., 2005). Along with these two seminal
cell types a multitude of other cells have been discovered such as head-direction
cells (Taube et al., 1990), object-vector cells (Høydal et al., 2019), reward cells
(Gauthier and Tank, 2018), boundary-vector cells (Lever et al., 2009) and goal-
direction cells (Sarel et al., 2017). Collectively it is thought that these different cell
types are the substrate for a cognitive map in the spatial domain (Tolman, 1948),
which can be used for flexible inferences such as path integration (McNaughton
et al., 2006). However, increasing evidence is showing that these cell types are
involved in non-spatial tasks such as the manipulation of sound by rodents (Aronov
et al., 2017) and the navigation of abstract conceptual representations by humans
(Constantinescu et al., 2016). This raises an important question, do these different
cell types support a more general ability to form non-spatial cognitive maps and
how might the hippocampus construct such maps for flexible behaviour outside of
the spatial domain?
To address these questions Whittington et al. (2019) have proposed a computa-
tional model known as the Tolman-Eichenbaum Machine (TEM) (Figure 3.7) that
captures many of the spatial and non-spatial findings in the hippocampus and en-
torhinal cortex. At its core, TEM proposes that entorhinal cells represent a basis
for structural knowledge while hippocampal cells link this basis with sensory repre-
sentations also from the entorhinal cortex. This factorises structural regularities or
relationships from the sensory content of an experience so that the learnt structure
can easily be re-used in novel situations. In the spatial domain, structural regular-
ities are based on the rules of Euclidian space. In comparison, in the non-spatial
domain of the Transitive Inference Task, the structural regularity is that of an or-
dered line. These structural regularities are what allow for flexible inference as they
can be re-combined with different sensory stimuli in order to guide decision-making.
90
Figure 3.7: General architecture of Tolman-Eichenbaum Machine (TEM). Step t-1
describes the architecture in terms of Bayesian logic, step t describes the network
implementation, and step t+1 describes the computations in words. TEM consists of
two models; a generative model (red) and an inference model (green). The inference
model is used to predict the latent variables g (blue units) and p (blue/red units)
based on the observed variable x (red units). The generative model then uses the
results to predict the values of all the variables, which generates training errors for
each of them (yellow arrows). Circular arrows represent attractor dynamics. Red
and green arrows are learnable weights. Black lines between units represent weights
that are updated using Hebbian learning. Figure adapted from Whittington et al.
(2019).
From an implementational point of view, all variables in TEM are encoded as
vectors. TEM represents the abstract relational structure as a graph, where a latent
variable g is used to represent the location in the graph. Learning of the abstract
relational structure corresponds to learning predictive representations that represent
the graph transitions from g to g′ based on different actions. TEM achieves this by
using generative and inference models, along with a training scheme similar to the
Wake Sleep algorithm or a Helmholtz machine (Hinton et al., 1995; Dayan et al.,
1995) (Figure 3.7). Importantly, TEM factorises this structural knowledge from
sensory representations via conjunctive representations. TEM uses a variable p to
represent the grounded conjunction of g and a sensory experience x. p is learnt using
Hebbian learning, which causes the sensory stimulus and the abstract location to be
tied together in a one-shot fashion when both of them are active. One useful property
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of this form of learning is that given either g or x, the Hebbian memory system can
use pattern completion to complete the conjunctive representation p. This allows
TEM to either infer the sensory representation from the abstract location or vice
versa, all via the conjunctive representations stored in hebbian memory. Indeed,
this may be where recurrent similarity computation proves particularly useful as it
can fetch related conjunctive representations.
From the perspective of biological plausibility, Whittington et al. (2019) propose
that abstract locations (g) are stored in the Medial Entorhinal Cortex (MEC),
sensory representations (x) in the Lateral Entorhinal Cortex (LEC) and conjunctions
of the two (p) in the hippocampus. In addition, the weights between the units of p
are learnt using Hebbian learning, which mirrors the very fast learning abilities of the
hippocampus (O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000). Similarly, p is retrieved using attractor
dynamics and pattern completion, which are known properties of the hippocampus
(Wills et al., 2005; Rolls, 2007). Finally, the use of a generative model during
learning is of interest as it has been suggested that hippocampal replay is sampled
from a generative model (Foster and Wilson, 2006; Igata et al., 2020; O’Neill et al.,
2017) (see Section 3.4.2).
Whittington et al. (2019) tested TEM on transitive inference, social hierarchy
and 2D spatial tasks in order to demonstrate its ability to use relational knowledge
for transfer in novel situations. All of these tasks are similar in that they can be
represented as a relational graph with edges and nodes. In all cases, after training
on a variety of environments TEM is able to infer the correct sensory experience on
the second visit to a node even if the edge/route has never been taken before. This
demonstrates that TEM is able to learn the relational structure and use it to make
novel inferences about transitions it has never experienced.
Having demonstrated the ability of TEM to perform relational inferences, Whit-
tington et al. (2019) also investigated the representations learnt by TEM while it
randomly traversed a 2D graph. Starting with the representations of the abstract
graph locations g, Whittington et al. (2019) found that TEM learnt representations
akin to grid cells found in the MEC. The learnt representations formed a grid-like
code at different spatial frequencies and phases, as is commonly found in the MEC.
In addition, as with biological grid cells, these representations remained consistent
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across environments making them a useful basis for generalising structure as they
are not dependent on a single environment. Moving on to the conjunctive represen-
tations p learnt by TEM, they appeared to reflect hippocampal place cells whereby
they only fired in a single location. This is due to the fact that they only fire when
both the abstract location g and the sensory experience x is present. This also
meant that they changed between environments because the configuration of sen-
sory experiences changed, which is also widely described in hippocampal place cells
and referred to as re-mapping. Generally rodents do not perform random walks in an
environment but prefer to approach objects and remain near boundaries. With this
in mind Whittington et al. (2019) made TEM follow such a policy and found that
g representations mimicked border and object vector cells found in the entorhinal
cortex, while p representations mimicked landmark cells found in the hippocampus.
These results suggest that the wide array of different cells types found in the hip-
pocampus, which are commonly associated with spatial reasoning, may actually be
the result of a more general relational reasoning mechanism.
The above findings were based on 2D graphs with a spatial interpretation, how-
ever if the entorhinal cortex truly does learn abstract relational structure then this
should apply to non-spatial tasks. To test this hypothesis Whittington et al. (2019)
gave TEM a circular track whereby it would recieve reward every 3 laps. Such a
task has recently been given to rodents and it was found that hippocampal cells
encoded track location, track location and a specific lap number, or track location
and a count of the number of laps. The p representations learnt by TEM mirrored
these three hippocampal cell types. In addition, TEM learnt g representations that
counted laps suggesting that they may form the basis for hippocampal represen-
tations which are a conjunction of abstract task space i.e. lap count, and sensory
experience i.e. spatial position. These representations are likely to arise from the
fact that they need to encode states that predict both the current sensory expe-
rience and different future states (i.e. reward). It is therefore insufficient to just
encode spatial location, they also need to encode task location. The prediction that
entorhinal cells should encode lap number is open to empirical investigation.
Taking all of the aforementioned results into consideration, it appears that the
hippocampus and entorhinal cortex may be a potential locus for relational reason-
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ing in the brain. In particular, the entorhinal cortex appears to factorise abstract
relational knowledge form sensory experiences, while the hippocampus forms con-
junctive representations of the two. This allows for inferences about state transitions
in novel environments based on the common relationships between environments.
It also demonstrates that spatial reasoning, and the plethora of cells thought to
support it, may be the result of a general relational reasoning mechanism.
3.3.4 Model-Based Reinforcement Learning and the Succes-
sor Representation
The previous section highlighted how the hippocampus may be involved in forming
a cognitive map that allows for relational inferences about state transitions. The
ability to reason about state transitions is extremely useful when faced with a novel
situation because it allows for planning by considering the consequences of one’s
actions. In the field of Reinforcement Learning (RL) this is known as Model-Based
RL, which utilises (see Section 2.1.2.7) a representation of the environment’s dy-
namics to calculate values and/or a policy. A representation of the environment’s
dynamics is viewed as the most flexible representation for RL because it allows for
the updating of values with just a small amount of local experience rather than
having to experience a whole trajectory.
The disadvantage of Model-Based RL, or planning through mental simulation,
is that it is computationally expensive. An alternative approach to Model-Based
RL, is Model-Free RL which learns cached values using trial and error. While com-
putationally lightweight, Model-Free RL is inflexible in response to changes in the
environment because it requires direct experience of all the state transitions and
rewards in order to update the value function. In recent years a third approach
has been proposed that sits between Model-Based and Model-Free RL in terms of
computational cost and flexibility. This approach is called the Successor Represen-
tation (SR) (Dayan, 1993) and works by calculating how likely a future goal state
is given the current state. Access to such a probability can inform decisions with-
out needing to mentally simulate all the states and actions that lead to the goal
state. For example, when deciding to move to France or not it may be useful to
know that there is a higher probability of successfully moving to France if you are
94
currently taking French lessons. Interestingly, the SR has been suggested to reside
in the hippocampus (Stachenfeld et al., 2014; Momennejad et al., 2017; Stachenfeld
et al., 2017), which supports the idea from the previous section that the hippocam-
pus is responsible for forming predictive representations that can be used to make
inferences about novel events.
The SR relies on forming a ‘predictive map’ of a given environment, which con-
tains the predictive relationships between the different states of an environment.
Mathematically the SR can be represented as a simple function that takes the cur-
rent state s and some future goal state s′ and outputs the expected time spent in s′
given the agent is currently at state s:
Mπ(s, s′) = E[
∞∑
t=0
γtI(st = s′) | s0 = s] (3.1)
Mπ(s, s′) is dependent on the current policy and the ‘expected future occupancy’
of s′ from s is typically discounted so that occupancies far into the future are down-
weighted. Armed with the SR, the value function can be decomposed into the inner





The value of a state is the amount of time spent in a future state multiplied by
the amount of reward obtained in that future state, summed over all possible future
states. The primary benefit of the SR is that it can be learned in a Model-Free
manner at a low computational cost. The SR has the same definition as a value
function but it calculates expected discounted occupancies rather than rewards. As
a result, algorithms such as temporal difference learning can be used to update the
SR, using the prediction error between observed and expected state occupancies:
Mπt+1(st, s
′) = Mπt (st, s
′) + η[I(st = s′) + γMπt (st+1, s′)−Mπt (st, s′)] (3.3)
While the computational cost of calculating and using the SR is low, it is signifi-
cantly more flexible than Model-Free RL in circumstances where the environment’s
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reward function changes. This is due to the fact that when calculating values the
reward function is separate from the SR and so changes to the reward function can
be used to update values without any re-learning of the state dynamics. In compar-
ison, changes to the state dynamics will require complete re-learning of the SR via
temporal difference learning, rendering the SR inflexible to such changes.
The predominant behavioural evidence for the SR in animals comes from reward
revaluation studies such as Adams (1982). In this study rats were trained to press a
lever for sucrose and then ceased to do so when the sucrose was paired with illness
outside of the context of lever pressing. This behaviour demonstrates that changes
to the reward contingencies can be accounted for by rats value estimates without
the need for direct experience of pressing the lever and getting the sucrose paired
with illness. Such behaviour cannot be accounted for by Model-Free RL because it
requires direct experience of both the state transitions and the new reward in order
to update value estimates. In comparison, both Model-Based RL and the SR can
account for the behaviour because they can use their knowledge of the state dynamics
to incorporate the change in reward into their value estimates immediately. Similar
conclusions can be drawn from experiments investigating latent learning (Tolman,
1948), whereby rodents learn to obtain reward faster in a maze if they are allowed
to explore the maze reward-free before hand.
Both reward revaluation and latent learning can be accounted for by either the
SR or Model-Based RL, which raises the question of whether one or both are respon-
sible for the observed flexible behaviour. Recent work by Momennejad et al. (2017)
has attempted to dissociate between the two approaches in humans by exploiting
the fact that the SR should be flexible to changes in the reward structure and in-
flexible to changes in the transition structure, where as Model-based RL should be
flexible in response to both. Momennejad et al. (2017) provided participants with
two different non-overlapping sequences of states that led to different monetary val-
ues. During learning participants had to choose which starting state they wanted
in order to obtain the most reward. After this initial learning phase, participants
learnt that the end of each sequence of states was associated with either (1) dif-
ferent reward values or (2) different state transitions. Participants then had to use
this information to reverse their initial starting state preference. Momennejad et al.
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(2017) hypothesised that if participants utilise the SR then they should reverse their
starting state preference more frequently in the reward revaluation case compared to
the transition revaluation case. This was indeed what the authors found, suggesting
that the SR may be a plausible representation for RL in the brain.
From a neural perspective, the SR has been heavily implicated with the hip-
pocampus and in particular place cells. Place cells have long been thought to en-
code an animal’s current spatial location, however it has been proposed that instead
they may encode an animal’s future locations. If true, then in the spatial domain,
future locations are directly related to future state occupancies and place cells may
therefore be a neural correlate of the SR (Stachenfeld et al., 2017). A key prediction
of this hypothesis is that place cells should be dependent on the animal’s policy
and should therefore be affected by the environment’s dynamics. Recent findings
are consistent with this prediction; the firing of hippocampal place cells appear to
be distorted by spatial barriers (Alvernhe et al., 2011) and cluster around reward
locations (Hollup et al., 2001) as expected if place cells encode states that are likely
to be visited based on the animal’s policy. While place cells have been heavily linked
to spatial cognition, a growing body of evidence is suggesting that place cells are
also involved in non-spatial processing (Tolman, 1948; Constantinescu et al., 2016;
Aronov et al., 2017), which is important as the SR is applicable to many domains.
This is pivotal to the current thesis as it suggests that the hippocampus may sub-
serve broader forms of flexible behaviour via a general SR mechanism.
While growing evidence suggests that the SR is encoded by hippocampal place
cells, the neural implementation of how the SR is learnt is still under debate. One
interesting suggestion is that phasic midbrain dopamine neurons, commonly associ-
ated with value learning in temporal difference learning, may also be responsible for
providing the error signal needed to learn the SR. The main evidence for this sugges-
tion comes from the fact that these dopamine neurons appear to respond to many
elements of the environment that are not reward-related. In particular, the firing of
phasic midbrain dopamine neurons appear to respond to sensory prediction errors
(Takahashi et al., 2017) and drive learning from these errors (Chang et al., 2017).
Similarly, they appear to be responsible for learning stimulus-stimulus associations
(Sharpe et al., 2017). These findings that phasic midbrain dopamine neurons are
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implicated in sensory and stimulus-driven learning via prediction errors makes them
a plausible candidate for the learning of future state occupancies required by the
SR.
3.4 3. Connections Between the Neocortex and
Hippocampus
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 explored how the computational properties of either a cortical
or hippocampal learning system could enable humans to perform efficient Rein-
forcement Learning (RL). However, the final pathway in Figure 3.1 indicates that
these two systems do not operate in isolation but communicate with each other to
further support intelligent behaviour. This communication is key as it allows the
two systems to complement each other during learning and decision-making. The
remainder of this section explores how this communication may be enacted in the
brain and how it contributes to efficient RL. Critically, we believe that a holistic
explanation of rapid learning and transfer should address the interaction of these
different learning systems.
3.4.1 Re-play
Interactions between the hippocampus and neocortex have been a topic of interest
for neuroscientists for many years. One of the most well known interactions is that
of ‘replay’ (Skaggs and McNaughton, 1996; Nádasdy et al., 1999; Ji and Wilson,
2007; Karlsson and Frank, 2009). The term replay corresponds to the finding that
experiences stored in the hippocampus appear to be replayed during periods of
rest in biological agents. Importantly this replaying of experiences has been found
to coincide with replay of the same experiences in the neocortex. For example,
Ji and Wilson (2007) recorded the activity of neurons in the visual cortex and
hippocampus of sleeping rodents. They found that spiking patterns corresponding
to the same awake experience occurred in both areas in a coordinated manner during
sleep. Subsequently, similar findings have also been found in awake rodents during
periods of rest (Karlsson and Frank, 2009). Overall, these findings suggest that
during periods of rest both areas work in synchrony to consolidate memory through
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synchronised re-activation.
How could this synchronous activity support memory consolidation? From a
theoretical standpoint, McClelland et al. (1995) have proposed that replay is used
to sample a range of individual memories from the hippocampus. These samples are
then used to train the neocortex to abstract generalities from the sampled experi-
ences. With this view in mind, replay is important for two reasons. Firstly, it allows
for additional training offline, which can speed up the rate of learning. Secondly,
the random sampling of experiences allows for interleaved training that removes
spurious temporal correlations. Ultimately this process leads to the consolidation
of knowledge from the hippocampus to the neocortex, freeing up resources in the
hippocampus. Evidence for this process has comes from the fact that damage to
the hippocampus appears to affect memory for recent events but not distant ones
(Scoville and Milner, 1957; Morris, 2006; Tse et al., 2011). This suggests that as
time progresses memories become less and less dependent on the hippocampus.
The theoretical predictions of McClelland et al. (1995) are particularly interesting
from a Reinforcement Learning (RL) point of view because similar techniques have
been used in Deep RL. For example, the seminal Deep Q Network (DQN) (Mnih
et al., 2015) relied upon a mechanism similar to that of biological replay. In the
case of DQN, the neocortical learning system was represented by a Deep Neural
Network (DNN), with its slow learning of distributed representations over many
training examples. Conversely, the hippocampal learning system was represented
by a table of past experiences (st, at, st+1, at+1) known as an experience replay
buffer. Crucially, this table was used to help train the DNN by randomly sampling
experiences for gradient descent updates.
This method of communication between the two systems therefore appears to
mirror the theoretical motivations for biological replay. More specifically, it allowed
for offline interleaved training of DQN, which sped up learning and removed tem-
poral correlations. However, despite DQN having a mechanism that appears to
parallel biological replay, this does not seem to be sufficient to capture the level of
efficiency demonstrated by humans. This raises the question of whether additional
mechanisms of communication between the two systems can get us closer to an
understanding of how the brain achieves efficient RL.
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3.4.2 Pre-play
The classic account of replay is that the hippocampus and neocortex simultaneously
re-activate cells associated with past experiences. However, recent evidence has sug-
gested that not only are past experiences replayed but so are novel experiences. For
example, a study by Gupta et al. (2010) explored the content of replayed mem-
ories in the hippocampus while rodents participated in a simple maze task with
a food reward. Gupta et al. (2010) found that some of the hippocampal replay
events encoded routes in the maze that had not been experienced before but that
provided short-cuts to the food goal. Similarly, Ólafsdóttir et al. (2015) conducted
another maze task, which involved rats exploring a T-maze. The rats were allowed
to approach the junction of the T-maze but both of the arms were blocked off. Sub-
sequently, the rats observed food being placed into one of the arms. After a rest
period the rats were then allowed to re-enter the maze and the arms were no longer
blocked. Interestingly, replay events in the hippocampus during the rest phase of the
experiment encoded a route along the arm of the maze containing the food but not
the other arm. This was taken as evidence that the hippocampus can replay future
possible experiences and that this replay is modulated by the presence of reward.
This phenomenon is often known as ‘pre-play’ (Dragoi and Tonegawa, 2011, 2013)
and refers to the offline activation of hippocampal cells that encode events that may
happen in the future.
From an RL point of view, pre-play has several interesting implications that may
help to promote transfer and flexible behaviour. If the hippocampus is generating
novel experiences to train the neocortex then this would help prepare the neocortex
for action selection in novel environments even before they have been experienced.
This is similar to the Dyna Q architecture proposed by Sutton and Barto (1998),
whereby a transition model of the world is used to update the value function by
generating simulated trajectories in the current environment. The only difference
here is that the trajectories are not simulations of the current environment but of
potential new environments or unexplored state transitions. It is therefore tempting
to view the hippocampus as a generative model that uses past experiences to gen-
erate plausible new ones. Indeed, human patients with hippocampal amnesia are
severely impaired when it comes to imagining new experiences (Hassabis et al., 2007)
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and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies suggest that the hippocampus
is involved in both remembering and imagining events (Addis et al., 2007). This
suggests that the hippocampus in both humans and rodents may play a key role in
generating new experiences from imagination.
From a computational perspective, a multitude of modelling studies have used
the idea of the hippocampus as a generative model to improve the capabilities of
connectionist approaches. Most notably, Mocanu et al. (2016) demonstrated how
generative replay could be used to reduce catastrophic forgetting in a connectionist
network (Figure 3.8) (see also Shin et al., 2017; van de Ven et al., 2020). Typically
to avoid catastrophic forgetting a history of all past examples must be kept in order
to train a network offline, as we have seen in DQN (Mnih et al., 2015). However
Mocanu et al. (2016) showed that you do not need to store past examples but
instead you can use them in an online manner to train a generative model. In their
case, Mocanu et al. (2016) used a Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) to model
the input data and on every time step it was trained to re-create new incoming
data points as well as a set of data points that were sampled from the RBM itself.
In this way the RBM was trained to incorporate new information and retain old
information without the need to store explicit examples. This is important because
it allows for continual lifelong learning and the incorporation of old information with
new information. Subsequent research has shown that training a generative model
in this way can then be used to replay simulated data to networks that are used for
prediction (Shin et al., 2017; van de Ven and Tolias, 2018). This allows the networks
used for prediction to also avoid catastrophic forgetting and abstract commonalities
across all previous experiences. It is distinctly possible that the hippocampus is
employing a similar mechanism to learn a generative model of the world, which can
then be used to train the neocortex to abstract similarities across a wide range of
experiences.
101
Figure 3.8: Depiction of using generative replay to overcome catastrophic forgetting.
(A) Typically connectionist models are trained by sampling a batch of data (Bt)
from a history of previous data at each time step. This leads to a large memory cost
for storing past data. (B) Online Contrastive Divergence with Generative Replay
(OCDGR) (Mocanu et al., 2016) forms batches at each time step by combining new
data with data sampled from a generative model (B̃t), such as a Restricted Boltzmann
Machine (RBM). This removes the need for a large history of past data and can be
used to train on data that has never been experienced before. Figure adapted from
Mocanu et al. (2016)
The fact that the hippocampus may represent a generative model that can re-
duce catastrophic forgetting is important for transfer because the representations
learnt by the neocortex will not over-fit to the most recent experiences. However,
the aforementioned results from rodent (Gupta et al., 2010; Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015)
and human studies (Hassabis et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2007) suggest that the real
promise of the hippocampus as a generative model is that it can imagine experi-
ences that may be useful for future tasks i.e. pre-play. This can be seen as a form of
forward planning in anticipation for new tasks rather than just maintaining knowl-
edge of previous ones. The ability of the hippocampus to generate such pre-emptive
experiences is likely to be dependent on the knowledge being used to formulate the
generative model. For example, if knowledge of the relationships between objects
or the outcomes of ones actions is incorporated into the generative model then this
should increase the capabilities of the hippocampus to generate examples that are
highly dissimilar from past experiences and that support pre-play. It remains an
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open question how a computational implementation of pre-play could be formulated
in order to improve the transfer ability of RL algorithms.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have explored Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory as
a guiding framework for how humans are able to demonstrate efficient RL in terms
of rapid learning and transfer. A natural analogy appears to exist between the use
of a neocortical learning system in CLS theory, and the use of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in Deep RL. However, this analogy falls short when trying to replicate the
efficiency exhibited by human RL. This failure is likely due to the differences between
the neocortex and DNNs as well as the lack of additional learning systems in Deep
RL.
Several avenues of research are helping to improve the use of DNNs to ap-
proximate a neocortical learning system that contains semantic knowledge for RL.
One critical avenue is preventing catastrophic forgetting in DNNs so that they can
learn representations that generalise across multiple tasks (French, 1999; Kirkpatrick
et al., 2017). In addition, researchers are investigating the objective functions
utilised by the brain and the order in which they occur, in an effort to improve
our understanding of DNNs as a model of semantic memory (Khaligh-Razavi and
Kriegeskorte, 2014; Cadieu et al., 2014). Finally the use of inductive biases in the
training of DNNs appears to be a promising avenue for moving the efficiency of Deep
RL towards human levels. In particular, the learning of disentangled representations
appears to have a positive effect on transfer in DNNs that are used for RL (Higgins
et al., 2016, 2017). Improving DNNs as a model of semantic memory is likely to
have a huge benefit in capturing human RL behaviour, particularly because CLS
theory predicts that it should be the primary source of generalisation in the brain.
Central to CLS theory is the idea that the hippocampus is important for com-
plex behaviour because of its complementary properties with the neocortex. The
hippocampus is thought to rely on the rapid learning of pattern separated represen-
tations that encode individual experiences. This is critical for efficient RL because it
allows for faster learning and reduced interference compared to a neocortical learn-
103
ing system. As we have seen, these benefits have been demonstrated by the use of
tabular approaches in Deep RL (Blundell et al., 2016). It has long been believed
that because the hippocampus stores individual experiences in a pattern-separated
manner it therefore lacks any generalisation properties. However, ongoing research
suggests that this assumption may be ill-founded and that it does in fact possess
properties that allow for transfer. For example, the hippocampus appears to able
to perform some forms of generalisation through recurrent similarity computation,
allowing it to solve relational tasks such as Transitive Inference (Kumaran and Mc-
Clelland, 2012). Some lines of research are beginning to take this one step further
and suggest that the hippocampus forms the basis of a cognitive map that can sup-
port general relational reasoning in novel environments (Whittington et al., 2019).
Finally, the hippocampus may play a critical role in model-based RL by encoding
the probability of occupying a successor state given the current state (Momenne-
jad et al., 2017). All of these bodies of research highlight that in addition to the
fast learning of pattern-separated representations, the hippocampus has other useful
properties such as recurrency, conjunctive representations and predictive represen-
tations. Deep RL models should look to these additional properties if they hope to
capture and explain the efficiency of human RL.
The properties of each system aside, there also appear to be crucial forms of
interaction between the two systems. Most notably, it has been suggested that the
hippocampus may represent a generative model of the world, capable of generating
examples of previous and novel environments (Gupta et al., 2010; Ólafsdóttir et al.,
2015; Hassabis et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2007). This serves two key purposes,
firstly it reduces catastrophic forgetting in the neocortex without the need for vast
memory resources. Secondly, it allows for the hippocampus to preemptively train
the neocortex on potential future environments allowing for pro-active transfer. This
highlights the importance of considering the brain as multiple learning systems that
communicate with each other to support learning.
In the next chapter we will present a novel algorithm that attempts to model
how the benefits of both a neocortical and hippocampal learning system can be
used for efficient RL. This approach incorporates all three pathways in Figure 3.1
by allowing both systems to contribute to the evaluation of states and/or actions
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(Pathways 1 and 2), and allowing communication between the two systems in the
form of Temporal Difference (TD) errors (Pathway 3). The result of this architecture
is that the neocortical system is used to generalise over the state space while the
hippocampus encodes salient experiences that violate these generalisations. The
algorithm demonstrates the utility of CLS theory for understanding efficient RL in
the brain and future work should investigate how its core principles can be combined






In this chapter we present a novel algorithm for efficient Reinforcement Learning
(RL) called Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL). As predicted
by Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory, CTDL combines a neocorti-
cal and hippocampal learning system to exploit the benefits of both systems: the
generalization properties of the neocortex and the fast, interference-free, learning
of the hippocampus. CTDL represents the neocortical learning system as a Deep
Neural Network (DNN) and the hippocampal learning system as a Self-Organising
Map (SOM) (Section 4.2). Key features of CTDL include using both the SOM and
DNN to evaluate actions and states, and using the Temporal Difference (TD) error
from the DNN to update the SOM. We evaluate CTDL on Grid World, Cart–Pole
and Continuous Mountain Car tasks and show several benefits over classic Deep RL
approaches (Section 4.3). Our results demonstrate (1) the utility of complementary
learning systems for the evaluation of actions and states, (2) that the TD error sig-
nal is a useful form of communication between the two systems and (3) that our
approach extends to both discrete and continuous state and action spaces. 1
1The work in this chapter has been published in Neural Networks: Blakeman, S., & Mareschal,




Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory posits that the neocortex and hip-
pocampus have complementary properties that allow for complex behavior (McClel-
land et al., 1995; Kumaran et al., 2016). More specifically, the hippocampus relies
on the fast learning of conjunctive, pattern-separated representations of individ-
ual memories. These memories then support the learning of a second system, the
neocortex, which slowly learns overlapping representations that support generalisa-
tion across features and experiences. The Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) used in
Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) share similar properties with the neocortex in
that they also rely on the slow learning of overlapping representations. CLS theory
therefore predicts that Deep RL algorithms could benefit from the addition of a
hippocampal learning system (Gershman and Daw, 2017).
In Chapter 3 we outlined three distinct pathways that describe how the hip-
pocampus, sensory cortex and striatum may interact to achieve rapid learning and
transfer in RL (Figure 3.1). Previous computational work has focused on subsets of
these pathways and has not attempted to model a system that utilises all three. In
this chapter we focus on how the rapid learning of individual experiences by a hip-
pocampal system can be used in combination with a neocortical system to improve
the efficiency of RL. As mentioned in Chapter 3, previous work by Blundell et al.
(2016) and Pritzel et al. (2017) has already shown that the use of episodic memory
to evaluate states and actions can improve the efficiency of Deep RL systems. This
highlights the importance of pathway 2 (Figure 3.1) in RL and improves the anal-
ogy between Deep RL systems and the brain. However, these approaches still have
several fundamental differences to the architecture of the brain. Most notably, these
approaches rely on a Deep Neural Network (DNN) followed by a tabular method.
This is akin to using a neocortical learning system followed by a hippocampal learn-
ing system, which is at odds with the parallel projections of the neocortex and the
hippocampus to the striatum in the brain. To faithfully replicate CLS theory, a
system would need to use both a hippocampal and neocortical learning system in
parallel to evaluate states and actions. Furthermore, the two systems should com-
munication with each other in order to support each others learning. It therefore
appears that the work of Blundell et al. (2016) and Pritzel et al. (2017) lack mecha-
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nisms that correspond to pathways 1 and 3 in Figure 3.1, which may be crucial for
understanding the importance of complementary learning systems in the brain.
With this in mind, we present a novel method for imbuing a Deep RL agent with
both a ‘neocortical’ and a ‘hippocampal’ learning system so that it utilises all the
pathways in Figure 3.1 (Blakeman and Mareschal, 2020a). Most importantly these
two systems: (1) learn in parallel, (2) communicate with each other using a biolog-
ically plausible signal, and (3) both make value predictions. From a computational
perspective, this allows for the fast learning of pattern-separated representations
that reflect salient individual events and the slow learning of overlapping repre-
sentations that generalise across experiences. We represent the neocortical system
as a DNN and the hippocampal system as a Self-Organising Map (SOM). We use
a SOM to represent the hippocampal learning system because it can utilise large
learning rates for fast learning and each unit stores its own weight vector making the
representations pattern-separated. In addition, the size of the SOM is significantly
smaller than the state space experienced by the agent, which replicates the restricted
computational resources of episodic memory. Importantly, the SOM is tasked with
storing pattern-separated memories of states that the DNN is poor at evaluating.
This allows the DNN to generalise over the state space while the SOM quickly en-
codes important violations of these generalisations. To achieve this interaction we
use the TD error from the DNN to train the SOM. This approach demonstrates how
the TD error of a ‘cortical’ system can be used to inform a ‘hippocampal’ system
about when and what memories should be stored. Both systems contribute to the
evaluation of action-values, which allows the agent to utilize the benefits of both a
neocortical and hippocampal learning system for action selection. We call our novel
algorithm Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) and demonstrate
that it can improve the performance and robustness of a Deep RL agent on the Grid
World, Cart-Pole and Continuous Mountain Car tasks.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL)
Our novel approach combines a DNN with a SOM to imbue an agent with the
benefits of both a ‘neocortical’ and ‘hippocampal’ learning system. The DNN is
a simple feed-forward network that takes the current state as input and outputs
the predicted action values for each action. The network is trained using the same
training objective as Mnih et al. (2015) and a copy of the network is made every C
time steps in order to improve training stability. The optimiser used was RMSProp
and the hyper-parameter values can be seen in Table 4.2. Importantly, unlike in
Mnih et al. (2015), no memory buffer is used to record past experiences, which saves
considerable memory resources. The SOM component is represented as a square grid
of units, with each unit having a corresponding action-value Q(u, a) and weights βu
that represent a particular state.
A general outline of the algorithm detailing how the DNN and SOM interact
can be seen in Algorithm 4. In simple terms, the TD error produced by the DNN is
used to update the SOM and both systems are used to calculate Q values for action
selection. When the agent observes the state st, the closest matching unit in the
SOM ut is calculated based on the euclidean distance between the units weights βu
and st. This distance is also used to calculate a weighting parameter η ∈ {0, 1},
which is used to calculate a weighted average of the action values from the SOM
and the DNN. If the best matching unit is close to the current state then a larger
weighting will be applied to the Q value produced by the SOM. A free parameter
τη acts as a temperature parameter to scale the euclidean distance between βu and
st when calculating the weighted average.
For learning in both the DNN and the SOM, the TD error is calculated using
the difference between the target value and the predicted Q value of the DNN. The
TD error is used to perform a gradient descent step with respect to the parameters
θ of the DNN, which ensures that the predictions of the DNN move towards the
weighted average of the SOM and DNN predictions. After updating the DNN, the
TD error is also used to update the SOM. More specifically, the TD error is used
to create an exponentially increasing value δ ∈ {0, 1}, which scales the standard
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Algorithm 4 - CTDL. Highlighted lines are unique to CTDL when compared to
DQN
Initialize probability of selecting a random action ε = 1
Initialize SOM weights β to random locations in the grid world
Initialize SOM action-values QSOM = 0
Initialize action-value function QDNN with random weights θ
Initialize target action-value function Q̃DNN with weights θ− = θ
for e = 1, E do
If ε > εend then decrease ε by εend/Eε
for t = 1, T do
Observe current state st and reward rt
Retrieve SOM unit ut that is closest to st
ut = arg minu ||βu − st||2
Calculate weighting η based on distance
η = exp (−||βut − st||2/τη)
Calculate Q(st, a
′) as weighted average of SOM and DNN values
Q(st, a
′) = ηQSOM(ut, a
′) + (1− η)Q̃DNN(st, a′; θ−)
set yt =
{
rt if episode is over
rt + γmaxa′ Q(st, a
′) otherwise
Perform gradient descent step on (yt −QDNN(st−1, at−1; θ))2 with
respect to the network parameters θ
Calculate δ based on the TD error produced by the DNN
δ = exp (|yt −QDNN(st−1, at−1; θ)|/τδ)− 1
Calculate the neighbourhood function based on ut−1
Tuj ,ut−1 = exp (−||luj − lut−1||2/2(σc + (δ ∗ σ)))
Update the weights β of SOM
∆βji = α ∗ δ ∗ Tuj ,ut−1(st−1,i − βji)
Update the action value ∆QSOM(ut−1, at−1) =
ρ ∗ ηt−1 ∗ (yt −QSOM(ut−1, at−1))
Replay contents of SOM to DNN using a random sample of actions
at and unit weights βu. yt is set to Q
SOM(βu, at)
Select random action with probability ε, else at =
arg maxa′ ηQ
SOM(ut, a
′) + (1− η)QDNN(st, a′; θ)
Every C steps reset Q̃DNN = QDNN




deviation of the SOM’s neighbourhood function and the learning rate of the SOM’s
weight update rule. Again a temperature parameter τδ is used to scale the TD
error. Next, the action value of the closest matching unit from the previous time
step QSOM(ut−1, at−1) is updated using the learning rate ρ, the weighting from the
previous time step ηt−1 and the difference between Q
SOM(ut−1, at−1) and the target
value yt. The inclusion of ηt−1 ensures that the action value only receives a large
update if the closest matching unit is similar to the state value.
To aid in the training of the DNN and to mimic biological ‘replay’, the contents
of the SOM are replayed to the DNN as a training batch for gradient descent. To
construct the training batch the actions at are sampled randomly, the states st are
set to a random sample of the SOM weights βu and the target values yt are set to
the corresponding Q values stored in the SOM. Finally, the agent’s actual action is
chosen in an ε-greedy manner with respect to the weighted average of the predicted
DQN and SOM Q values.
The aforementioned algorithm has several interesting properties. Firstly, the
calculation of Q values involves the contribution of both the DNN and the SOM. The
size of their respective contributions are controlled by the parameter η, which ensures
that if the current state is close to one stored in SOM memory then the Q value
predicted by the SOM will have a larger contribution. This is akin to retrieving a
closely matching episodic memory and using its associated value for action selection.
Secondly, because the SOM is updated using the TD error produced by the DNN,
it is biased towards storing memories of states that the DNN is poor at evaluating.
Theoretically this should allow the DNN to learn generalisations across states, while
the SOM picks up on violations or exceptions to these generalisations and stores
them in memory along with a record of their action values. If after many learning
iterations the DNN converges to a good approximation of the optimal action-value
function then no TD error will be produced and the SOM will be free to use its
resources for other tasks. Finally, the SOM can use much larger learning rates than
the DNN because it relies on a tabular approximation of the action-value function,
which should improve data efficiency.
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4.2.2 Simulated Environments
4.2.2.1 Grid World Task
The grid world task consists of procedurally generated 2D grid worlds (Figure 4.1).
Each cell in the grid world represents a state s ∈ R2 that is described by its x and
y position. If N is the number of cells in the grid world, then N
5
negative rewards
(-1) are randomly placed in the grid world along with a single positive reward (+1)
and the agents starting position. The agent’s task is to reach the positive reward, at
which point the episode is over and a new episode begins. The agent’s action space
is defined by four possible actions (up, down, left and right), each of which moves
the agent one cell in the corresponding direction with probability 1. If the agent
chooses an action that would move it out of the grid world then it remains where it
is for that time step. Table 4.1 shows the hyper-parameter values used in all grid
world simulations.
Table 4.1: Grid world hyper-parameter values used for all simulations.
Parameter Value Description
W 10 Width of grid world
H 10 Height of grid world
E 1,000 Number of episodes for learning
T 1,000 Maximum number of time steps per episode
4.2.2.2 Cart-Pole
The Cart-Pole problem, as provided by the OpenAI Gym (Brockman et al., 2016),
consists of a cart with a pole attached by a single un-actuated joint. The goal of
the agent is to control the velocity of the cart on a linear friction-less track so that
the pole stays up-right. The state observed by the agent is made up of four values
which correspond to the position of the cart [−4.8, 4.8], the velocity of the cart
[−∞,∞], the angle of the pole [∼ −41.8,∼ 41.8] and the velocity of the end of the
pole [−∞,∞]. Two discrete actions are available to the agent; push the cart left
and push the cart right. The agent receives a reward of +1 at every time step and
an episode ends either when the angle of the pole is greater than 15 degrees, the
cart moves off the screen or the episode length is greater than 500.
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4.2.2.3 Continuous Mountain Car
The continuous mountain car environment, as provided by the OpenAI Gym (Brock-
man et al., 2016), is a 2D problem consisting of a car that starts in-between two
hills. The goal of the agent is to drive the car to the top of the right-hand hill. This
problem is complicated by the fact that the cars engine has insufficient power to
drive straight up the hill. The agent therefore needs to learn to drive forwards and
backwards in order to gain momentum and traverse the hill. The state observed
by the agent is defined by the cars position [−1.2, 0.6] and velocity [−0.07, 0.07].
Importantly the action space is continuous; the agent must choose to apply a force
between 1 and -1 to the car at each time step. The agent receives a reward of +100
for reaching the target location but also receives a negative reward that is equal to
the squared sum of the actions it has chosen. An episode terminates either when
the car reaches the target location or the episode length is greater than 1000.
4.3 Results
In our first simulation we compare CTDL to the standard DQN described by
Mnih et al. (2015) (see Section 2.3.1 for more details) on a range of grid worlds.
Both CTDL and DQN utilise the same DNN architecture (see Table 4.2 for hyper-
parameter values) but there are two key differences between the two approaches.
Firstly, a standard DQN stores a memory buffer of size N that is used to replay
past experiences whereas CTDL relies on the contents of a SOM for replay. For our
simulations we set the memory buffer size M of the DQN to 100,000 while the size
of the SOM was set to 36 units. This represents a significant decrease in memory
resources between the two approaches. The second key difference is that a standard
DQN only uses the DNN for calculation of Q values whereas CTDL also incorporates
the predictions of a SOM. This allows CTDL to utilise the benefits of a ‘hippocam-
pal’ learning system during decision making, namely pattern-separated memories
and larger learning rates. Hyper-parameter values specific to CTDL can be seen in
Table 4.3. Both models learned from 1000 episodes, with a maximum episode length
of 1000. The probability of randomly selecting an action ε was linearly decreased
from 1.0 to 0.1 over the first 200 episodes. The discount factor for future rewards
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was set to 0.99 for all simulations.
Table 4.2: Hyper-parameter values used for the DNN component of DQN and CTDL
in the grid world simulations.
Parameter Value Description
L 3 Number of layers
U [128, 128, 4] Number of units
C 10,000 Number of steps before updating the target network
B 32 Batch Size for training
λ .00025 Learning rate for RMSProp
κ .95 Momentum for RMSProp
φ .01 Constant for denominator in RMSProp
Table 4.3: Hyper-parameter values unique to CTDL. τη, τδ, σ, σc, α and ρ were
selected by using a random grid search on a single grid world.
Parameter Value Description
U 36 Number of units in SOM
τη 10 Temperature for calculating η
τδ 1 Temperature for calculating δ
σ .1 Standard deviation of the SOM neighbourhood function
σc .1 Constant for denominator in SOM neighbourhood function
α .01 Learning rate for updating the weights of the SOM
ρ .9 Learning rate for updating the Q values of the SOM
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the results of the two approaches on a random selection
of grid worlds. CTDL outperforms the DQN in terms of cumulative reward and the
cumulative number of ‘ideal’ episodes. An ideal episode is classified as an episode
where the agent avoids all negative rewards and reaches the positive reward. These
findings suggest that the inclusion of a second ‘hippocampal’ system, which explicitly
contributes to the calculation of Q values, is beneficial in our simple grid world task.
This gain in performance is achieved at a much lower cost in terms of memory
resources. Figure 4.2 shows an example maze along with the weights of each unit in





Figure 4.1: A: First example grid world, dark blue cells represent negative rewards
(-1), the green cell represents the goal (+1) and the yellow cell represents the agents
starting position. B: Performance of CTDL and DQN on the first example gird
world in terms of cumulative reward and ‘ideal’ episodes over the course of learning.
An ‘ideal’ episode is an episode where the agent reached the goal location without
encountering a negative reward. Both CTDL and DQN were run 30 times on each
maze. C: Second example gird world. D: Performance of CTDL and DQN on the
second example grid world. E: Scatter plots comparing the performance of CTDL
and DQN on 50 different randomly generated grid worlds. Both CTDL and DQN
were run 30 times on each maze and the mean value at the end of learning was
calculated. Blue points indicate grid worlds where CTDL out-performed DQN and
red points indicate grid worlds where DQN out-performed CTDL. The pie charts to





Figure 4.2: A: Randomly generated grid world, dark blue cells represent negative
rewards (-1), the green cell represents the goal (+1) and the yellow cell represents
the agents starting position. B: Image showing the locations encoded by the SOM
component of CTDL (yellow cells) at the end of learning in A. C: CTDLs value
function at the end of learning in A, the value is calculated as the weighted average
of the predictions from the SOM and DNN. Each state has four possible values,
corresponding to each of the four possible actions (up, down, left and right).
To improve our understanding of the mechanisms underlying CTDLs perfor-
mance we isolated the contribution of the SOM to the calculation of the Q values
from the replaying of the contents of the SOM to the DNN. Figure 4.3A shows the
performance of CTDL both with and without replay. CTDLs performance was only
marginally reduced by the removal of replay suggesting that the improvements over
the DQN are due to the contribution of the SOM to the calculation of Q values.
A key component of CTDL is the updating of the SOM using the TD error from
the DNN. To investigate the importance of this interaction, we compared CTDL to
a version of CTDL that did not update the SOM based on the TD error from the
DNN. This was achieved by setting the learning rate of the SOM to 0 so that the
weights βu were not updated during learning. Figure 4.3B shows the results of this
comparison. Removal of the interaction between the DNN and the SOM via the TD
signal had a significant impact on the performance of CTDL, suggesting that it is a




Figure 4.3: A: Scatter plots comparing the performance of CTDL and CTDL with-
out replay on 50 different randomly generated grid worlds. Both CTDL and CTDL
without replay were run 30 times on each maze. Blue points indicate grid worlds
where CTDL out-performed CTDL without replay and red points indicate grid
worlds where CTDL without replay out-performed CTDL. The pie chart to the
lower right indicate the proportions of blue and red points. B: Scatter plots com-
paring the performance of CTDL and CTDL without TD learning in 50 different
procedurally generated grid worlds. Both CTDL and CTDL without TD learning
were run 30 times on each maze. Blue points indicate grid worlds where CTDL out-
performed CTDL without TD learning and red points indicate grid worlds where
CTDL without TD learning out-performed CTDL. The pie charts to the lower right
indicate the proportions of blue and red points.
One interpretation of these results is that the SOM is able to store and use
experiences that violate generalisations made by the DNN and that this confers a
significant advantage during learning. To test this hypothesis we ran CTDL and
DQN on three new mazes (Figure 4.4). The first maze had no negative rewards
between the start and goal locations and the agent simply had to travel directly
upwards. We predict that such a maze should favour the DQN because it can
rely upon the generalisation that an increase in y corresponds to an increase in
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expected return. The second and third mazes introduced negative rewards that
violate this generalisation. For these mazes we predict that CTDL should perform
better because it can store states that violate the generalisation in its SOM and
when these states are re-visited CTDL can consult the Q values predicted by the
SOM. Figure 4.4 shows the results of CTDL and DQN on these three mazes. To
help visualise the locations encoded by the SOM we reduced the SOM size to 16
units. The results provide support for our predictions, with the DQN out-performing
CTDL in the first maze but not in the second and third mazes. Interestingly, over
the course of learning the locations encoded by the SOM appeared to reflect regions
of the maze that correspond to violations in the ‘move upwards’ generalisation.
We take these findings as evidence that the SOM is encoding states that violate









Figure 4.4: A: Top-Left: Grid world where the agent only has to travel upwards
to reach the goal. Dark blue cells represent negative rewards (-1), the green cell
represents the goal (+1) and the yellow cell represents the agents starting position.
Bottom-Left: Locations encoded by the SOM component of CTDL at the end of
learning, results are averaged over 30 runs. Top-Right: Locations encoded by the
SOM component of CTDL at the start of learning for a single run. Bottom-Right:
Locations encoded by the SOM component of CTDL at the end of learning for a
single run. B: The performance of CTDL and DQN on the grid world from A
in terms of cumulative reward and ‘ideal’ episodes. The solid line represents the
mean and the shaded region represents the standard deviation. C: Same as A but
an obstacle is introduced, in the form of negative rewards, that the agent must
circumnavigate. D: The performance of CTDL and DQN on the grid world from
C. E: Same as C but with two obstacles for the agent to circumnavigate. F: The
performance of CTDL and DQN on the grid world from E.
If the SOM does encode states that violate generalisations made by the DNN,
then this should translate to improved behavioral flexibility in the face of environ-
mental changes. For example if an obstacle appears in one of the grid worlds then
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this should lead to a large TD error and instruct the SOM to encode the position of
the obstacle using its large learning rate. Subsequently, since the SOM keeps track of
action values independently from the DNN, CTDL should be able to quickly adapt
its behavior in order to avoid the obstacle. To investigate this hypothesis we ran
CTDL and DQN on the grid world in Figure 4.4A immediately followed by the grid
world in Figure 4.4C. Figure 4.5 shows the results of these simulations. As previ-
ously described, the DQN out-performed CTDL on the first grid world in terms of
cumulative reward and the number of ideal episodes. Switching to the second grid
world impacted the performance of both the DQN and CTDL. However, this impact
was more pronounced for the DQN, with a larger decrease in cumulative reward and
a plateauing of the number of ideal episodes. This suggests that CTDL is better
equipped to handle changes in the environment. As before the locations encoded
by the SOM appeared to reflect states immediately preceding the obstacle. This is
consistent with the notion that the TD error from the DNN allows the SOM to iden-





Figure 4.5: A: Top-Left: First grid world presented to the agent for 500 episodes.
Bottom-Left: Locations encoded by the SOM component of CTDL at the end of
learning in the first grid world, results are averaged over 30 runs. Top-Right: Second
grid world presented to the agent for 500 episodes immediately after the first grid
world. Bottom-Right: Locations encoded by the SOM component of CTDL at the
end of learning in the second grid world, results are averaged over 30 runs. B: The
performance of CTDL and DQN on the successive grid worlds from A. The solid line
represents the mean and the shaded region represents the standard deviation. The
dashed line indicates the change in grid worlds and the introduction of the obstacles.
One of the strengths of RL algorithms is that they can be applied to a wide
array of tasks. If one can describe a task using a state space, an action space and
a reward function then often it can be solved using RL techniques, especially if the
states satisfy the Markov property. We therefore wanted to investigate whether the
performance of CTDL was specific to grid worlds or whether it could be applied to
other tasks. With this in mind, we chose to test CTDL on the Cart-Pole environment
from OpenAI Gym because it is a common benchmark task in the RL literature and
it involves a continuous state space, unlike the discrete state space of the grid world
environments. The parameter values used for all Cart-Pole simulations were the
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same as in the grid world simulations with two exceptions. Firstly, the number of
time steps C between updates of the target network was changed to 500 in order to
account for the shorter episodes experienced in the Cart-Pole task. Secondly, the
size of the SOM was increased from 36 units to 225 units, which is still considerably
smaller than the size of the replay buffer used by the DQN (100,000).
An important component of CTDL is the calculation of the euclidean distance
between the current state st and the weights of each unit βu. In the case of the
Cart-Pole task this will cause the velocity values in the state representation to
dominate the distance calculations because their values cover a much greater range.
To account for this we maintain an online record of the largest and smallest values
for each entry in the state representation and use these values to normalise each
entry so that they lie in the range [0, 1]. This ensures that each entry in the state
representation contributes equally to any euclidean distance calculations.
Figure 4.6 shows the results of both CTDL and DQN on the Cart-Pole task.
While the DQN appeared to learn faster than CTDL, it did so with greater variance
and the stability of the final solution was poor. In comparison, CTDL learnt gradu-
ally with less variance and there were no significant decreases in performance. These
results demonstrate that CTDL can be applied to continuous state problems and
is not restricted to discrete grid world problems. They also suggest that CTDL’s
use of dual learning systems may confer a stability advantage that improves the
robustness of learning.
Figure 4.6: Episode reward achieved by CTDL and DQN on the Cart-Pole environ-
ment over the course of learning. Both CTDL and DQN were run 100 times on the
Cart-Pole environment. The solid line represents the mean and the shaded region
represents the standard deviation.
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While the Cart-Pole environment uses a continuous state space it restricts the
agent to a small discrete action space. We therefore explored whether CTDL could
be applied to problems that require a continuous action space as well as state space.
To this end we applied CTDL to the Continuous Mountain Car environment from
OpenAI Gym. The DNN used in both DQN and CTDL has a single output unit for
each action that outputs the Q value for that particular action. This is infeasible for
continuous control problems and so a different underlying network architecture is
required. A common approach to combining value estimates with continuous control
problems is to use an actor-critic framework (Sutton and Barto, 2018). Under the
actor-critic framework, the ‘critic’ is responsible for calculating value estimates and
the ‘actor’ is responsible for choosing actions and updating the policy based on the
values estimated by the critic. The benefit here is that the critic can calculate state
values rather than action values and the actor can output a continuous distribution
over possible actions.
In our simulations we represent both the actor and critic components as feed-
forward neural networks and adopt an Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) approach
(Mnih et al., 2016) (see Section 2.3.2 for more details). The hyper-parameters for our
A2C implementation can be seen in Table 4.4. Our implementation of A2C shares
many common properties with DQN in that it relies upon the slow learning of dis-
tributed representations. We therefore hypothesised that the fast pattern-separated
learning of CTDL should confer the same advantages to A2C as it did to DQN.
Table 4.4: A2C hyper-parameter values used for the continuous mountain car sim-
ulations.
Parameter Value Description
Lcritic 3 Number of layers in critic network
Ucritic [128, 128, 1] Number of units in critic network
αcritic .0001 Critic learning rate for Adam
Lactor 3 Number of layers in actor network
Uactor [128, 128, 2] Number of units in actor network
αactor .00001 Actor learning rate for Adam
In order to augment A2C with the advantages of CTDL we used the same ap-
proach as before except the SOM recorded state value estimates rather than action
value estimates. The state value estimates of the SOM were combined with the esti-
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mates of the A2C ‘critic’ using the same weighted sum calculation and the TD error
from the ‘critic’ was used to update the weights of the SOM. A2C is inherently an
online algorithm and so weight and value updates were simply applied at each time
step in an online fashion with no replay or target networks. We shall denote the
CTDL version of A2C as CTDLA2C and a full outline of the algorithm can be seen
in Algorithm 5. The hyper-parameters used for CTDLA2C are the same as those in
Table 4.3.
Algorithm 5 - CTDLA2C . Highlighted lines are unique to CTDLA2C when com-
pared to A2C
Initialize SOM weights β according to a standard normal distribution
Initialize SOM state-values V SOM = 0
Initialize Critic V A2C with random weights θV
Initialize Actor π with random weights θπ
for e = 1, E do
for t = 1, T do
Observe current state st and reward rt
Retrieve SOM unit ut that is closest to st
ut = arg minu ||βu − st||2
Calculate weighting η based on distance
η = exp (−||βut − st||2/τη)
Calculate V (st) as weighted average of SOM and Critic values
V (st) = ηV
SOM(ut) + (1− η)V A2C(st; θV )
set yt =
{
rt if episode is over
rt + γV (st) otherwise
Calculate the advantage/TD error A(st−1, at−1) = yt − V A2C(st−1; θV )
Update the Actor parameters θV
θV ← θV + αactorA(st−1, at−1)Oθπ log(π(at−1|st−1; θπ))
Update the Critic parameters θπ
θπ ← θπ + αcriticA(st−1, at−1)OθV V A2C(st−1; θV )
Calculate δ based on the TD error produced by the Critic
δ = exp (|A(st−1, at−1)|/τδ)− 1
Calculate the neighbourhood function based on ut−1
Tuj ,ut−1 = exp (−||luj − lut−1||2/2(σc + (δ ∗ σ)))
Update the weights β of SOM
∆βji = α ∗ δ ∗ Tuj ,ut−1(st−1,i − βji)
Update the state value ∆V SOM(ut−1) =
ρ ∗ ηt−1 ∗ (yt − V SOM(ut−1))
Sample action from Actor at ∼ π(at|st; θπ)




Figure 4.7 shows the results of A2C and CTDLA2C on the Continuous Mountain
Car task. CTDLA2C outperformed A2C on the Continuous Mountain Car task and
also demonstrated much greater stability as training progressed. The high variability
in reward obtained is due to the fact that if the agent does not find the target
location quickly enough then it will learn to minimise negative rewards by staying
still. This suggests that the fast learning of pattern-separated representations in the
SOM component of CTDLA2C may allow the agent to either explore more efficiently
or better utilise information about states that are rarely visited. In general these
results suggest that the dual learning systems of CTDLA2C are advantageous for
problems consisting of continuous state and action spaces.
Figure 4.7: Episode reward achieved by CTDLA2C and A2C on the Continuous
Mountain Car environment over the course of learning. Both CTDLA2C and A2C
were run 50 times on the Continuous Mountain Car environment. The solid line
represents the mean and the shaded region represents the standard deviation.
4.4 Neural Underpinnings
It is important to consider how our proposal maps onto real neural systems. As
previously mentioned, the key components of CTDL are the independent contribu-
tion of a ‘hippocampal’ learning system to the evaluation of states and actions and
the use of TD error to update representations in the ‘hippocampal’ learning system.
With respect to the first of these components, it is well known that the striatum is a
central location for updating and evaluating states and actions for decision making
(Schultz et al., 1992; Houk et al., 1995; Schultz, 1998; Setlow et al., 2003; Roesch
et al., 2009). Importantly, the striatum receives direct inputs from both cortical
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areas and the hippocampus (Groenewegen et al., 1987; Thierry et al., 2000). It has
also been proposed that pattern-separated hippocampal representations aid the rein-
forcement learning process (Duncan et al., 2018; Ballard et al., 2019). These findings
lend support to the idea that a ‘hippocampal’ learning system may provide a value
prediction that complements that of a ‘neocortical’ learning system. In addition,
with converging cortical and hippocampal inputs, the striatum needs to be able to
arbitrate between them in order to calculate a state or action value (Pennartz et al.,
2011). The weighting process between the SOM and DNN components performed
by CTDL may represent a simplified example of such an arbitration. Interestingly,
CTDL predicts that the striatum should apply a greater weighting to hippocampal
information when the current state closely matches one stored in episodic memory.
The second component of CTDL relies on the use of TD error to update both
hippocampal value estimates and memory representations. A wealth of evidence cur-
rently suggests that the primary neural correlates of TD error are phasic dopamine
neurons in the midbrain (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2016). One of the major
projection sites of these neurons is the striatum and evidence of TD error has subse-
quently been found in the striatum (Doherty et al., 2003; Mcclure et al., 2003; Bray
and Doherty, 2007). It therefore seems plausible that TD error can be used to up-
date value estimates situated at hippocampal-striatal synapses that are independent
of neocortical value estimates.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether TD error could modulate pattern-
separated state representations in the hippocampus, as in CTDL. It has been widely
reported that midbrain dopamine neurons project directly to the hippocampus and
can influence synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus via Long-Term Potentiation
(LTP) (Lisman and Grace, 2005; Lemon and Manahan-vaughan, 2006; Rosen et al.,
2015). It is therefore believed that midbrain dopamine neurons can mediate the
formation of episodic memories in order to guide memories towards experiences that
are relevant for behavior (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). This biasing of episodic
memory towards reward-related experiences can take many forms. For example,
reward cues appear to engage midbrain dopamine neurons, which then enhances
episodic memory for those cues (Wittmann et al., 2005). Similarly, motivation to
obtain future rewards also promotes the firing of midbrain dopamine neurons and
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subsequent episodic memory of items, even in the absence of reward during learning
(Adcock et al., 2006).
While these results lend support to the hypothesis that midbrain dopamine neu-
rons can bias the formation of episodic memories in the hippocampus, they do not
provide evidence that reward prediction errors, such as TD error, have an effect.
Dopaminergic midbrain neurons are thought to encode many aspects of reward-
related information such as reward outcome, expected reward, novelty and incentive
salience (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010). Part of the ability of dopaminergic neurons
to encode these different forms of information may lie in the differences between
tonic and phasic dopamine responses. It is likely that many of the aforementioned
effects on episodic memory are due to the tonic responses of dopamine neurons
that encode reward-related information other than prediction errors (Shohamy and
Adcock, 2010).
CTDL specifically predicts that reward prediction errors, as encoded by phasic
midbrain dopamine neurons, should promote the formation of episodic memories in
the hippocampus. Empirical support for such a prediction is beginning to emerge.
In particular, a recent study by Rouhani et al. (2018) demonstrated that unsigned
reward prediction errors enhance episodic memory for trial-unique images. When
the reward outcome differed by a large amount from the participant’s subjective
expected value of an image, the participant was better at recognising that image
in a subsequent surprise recognition test. This effect was consistent even when
controlling for reward outcome and subjective value estimates. The effect was also
independent of sign (i.e. both large positive and negative reward prediction errors
improved episodic memory for images that lead to the reward prediction error),
which is consistent with CTDL as the algorithm uses the absolute value of the TD
error to update the SOM. Interestingly, Rouhani et al. (2018) also found that when
participants were presented with the same images again, they tended to choose the
one that previously had the larger reward outcome. This suggests that they also
encoded the rewards associated with the images. From the perspective of CTDL
this could be seen as encoding the value of the episodic memory independently from
the ‘neocortical’ learning system. Indeed, the result of the parameter sweep assigned
a large value to the learning rate (ρ = 0.9, Table 4.3) for the Q values of the SOM,
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perhaps reflecting a direct episodic encoding of the reward outcome rather than a
running average.
Further evidence for the promotion of episodic memory via reward prediction
errors comes from a study by Jang et al. (2018). In this study, participants had to
decide whether to play or pass on a risky gamble. To make the decision participants
were provided with information about the potential payout and an image from one of
two categories, which they could use to incrementally learn the reward probability of
that category. If the participants chose to play the risky gamble then the subsequent
feedback was active, otherwise it was passive. Importantly, the authors showed that
episodic memory for images was improved when reward prediction errors were large
at the time of image presentation. This effect was only apparent for active as op-
posed to passive feedback, suggesting that it was dependent on decision-making.
In addition, the effect was consistent regardless of whether the image recognition
task was performed immediately after the decision-making task or 24 hours after.
This suggests that the effect of reward prediction errors on episodic memory and
subsequently decision-making are potentially fast acting and do not require consol-
idation mechanisms. Taken together these findings provide additional support for
the modulation of episodic memory formation via reward prediction errors.
Reward prediction errors have also been proposed to have a role in the updating
of long-term memories. The theory of memory reconsolidation posits that long-
term memories which have been destabilised into a malleable form can be updated
with new information to aid integration and avoid interference (Sara, 2000). This
process is thought to be hippocampus-dependent (Debiec et al., 2002; Lee et al.,
2004) and rely upon reward prediction errors from midbrain dopamine neurons to
signal the need for integration of new information (Exton-mcguinness et al., 2015).
Evidence for this comes from the fact that reconsolidation appears to decrease once
a behavior becomes well-learnt, supposedly because reward prediction errors have
decreased. This provides an example of how reward prediction errors, such as TD
error, may be able to modify existing memories via the hippocampus; a process that
is critical to CTDL.
While the aforementioned studies demonstrate that reward prediction errors,
such as TD error, can modulate episodic memory, it is worth noting that these find-
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ings are not unanimous. Most notably an fMRI study by Wimmer et al. (2014)
found a negative correlation between striatal reward prediction errors and perfor-
mance on an episodic memory task. The authors suggested that the formation of
episodic memory interferes with classical reinforcement learning by disrupting re-
ward prediction errors. Such a finding argues against the prediction of CTDL that
TD error should promote the formation of episodic memories, however criticisms of
the study have been highlighted. In particular, the trial-unique images were unre-
lated to the actual reward learning task and so the reward prediction errors may not
have been elicited by the images themselves. In comparison, the studies by Rouhani
et al. (2018) and Jang et al. (2018) both required participants to use the images to
perform the decision-making task. In addition, it would have been interesting to
see the results of the correlation analysis using absolute or unsigned reward predic-
tion errors. Both CTDL and Rouhani et al. (2018) predict no linear relationship
between signed reward prediction errors and episodic memory performance. Never-
theless, such confounding findings highlight the need for further empirical work to
elucidate the role of reward prediction errors in the formation of episodic memories.
In reality, it is likely that a combination of reward-related information, encoded
by midbrain dopaminergic neurons, is responsible for the dynamic and selective
episodic memory present in humans. For example a study by Mason et al. (2017)
explored the effect of different reward-related effects on episodic memory. In the
study participants had to learn a collection of words in exchange for monetary
rewards, thereby creating a motivated learning scenario. The authors found that
reward outcome i.e. a combination of expected value and reward prediction error,
was the best predictor of episodic memory. This demonstrates that reward prediction
error on its own may not provide a holistic account of episodic memory formation.
Taking this into account, we believe that CTDL provides a useful initial framework
for exploring the effect of other reward-related signals on the formation of episodic
memories and subsequently goal-directed behavior.
In addition to the algorithmic components, the behavior demonstrated by CTDL
has several interesting parallels with biological findings. Firstly, the ‘hippocampal’
learning system (i.e. the SOM) of CTDL appears to encode violations of the gen-
eralisations made by the DNN. In the case of the grid worlds this corresponded
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to regions close to obstacles. This finding has an interesting parallel with imag-
ing work in rodents demonstrating that CA3 neurons appear to encode decision
points in T-mazes that are different from the rodents current position (Johnson and
Redish, 2007). Such decision points could be viewed as obstacles or important de-
viations from the animals general direction. Their encoding by the hippocampus
is therefore consistent with being encoded by the SOM component of CTDL. In
the future, application of CTDL to other reinforcement learning tasks may make
testable predictions about the regions of the state space that should be encoded
by the hippocampus. Another key behavior demonstrated by CTDL was increased
flexibility when presented with a change in the environment i.e. the introduction of
an obstacle. This was due to the ability of the SOM to quickly encode the states
close to the obstacle. This suggests that the hippocampus may be important for
adapting to changes in the environment and is consistent with recent studies that
have implicated the hippocampus in reversal learning (Dong et al., 2013; Vila-Ballo
et al., 2017).
Aside from ‘what’ should be encoded by the hippocampus, CTDL is also con-
sistent with biological theories regarding the ‘duration’ of encoding. It has been
proposed that memories stored in the hippocampus are consolidated to the neocor-
tex over time via mechanisms such as replay (Olafsdottir et al., 2018). Interestingly,
this process should naturally occur in CTDL; as the neural network improves its
ability to evaluate the optimal value function the TD errors should reduce in mag-
nitude and free up the SOM to represent other episodic memories. If part of the
environment changes then a new episodic memory will form based on the TD error
and it will remain in episodic memory until the ‘neocortical’ learning system has
learnt to incorporate it. This process suggests that the transfer of information from
the hippocampus to the neocortex is very much related to the ‘need’ for an episodic
memory as encoded by TD errors.
4.5 Discussion
According to CLS theory, the brain relies on two main learning systems to achieve
complex behavior; a ‘neocortical’ system that relies on the slow learning of dis-
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tributed representations and a ‘hippocampal’ system that relies on the fast learning
of pattern-separated representations. Both of these systems project to the striatum,
which is believed to be a key structure in the evaluation of states and actions for RL
(Schultz et al., 1992; Houk et al., 1995; Schultz, 1998; Setlow et al., 2003; Roesch
et al., 2009). Current deep RL approaches have made great advances in modelling
complex behavior, with DNNs sharing several similarities with a ‘neocortical’ learn-
ing system. However these approaches tend to suffer from poor data efficiency and
general inflexibility (Lake et al., 2017). The purpose of the present study was to
explore how a ‘neocortical’ and ‘hippocampal’ learning system could interact within
an RL framework and whether CLS theory could alleviate some of the criticisms of
deep RL.
Our novel approach, termed CTDL, used a DNN as a ‘neocortical’ learning
system and a SOM as a ‘hippocampal’ learning system. Importantly the DNN
used a small learning rate and distributed representations while the SOM used a
larger learning rate and pattern-separated representations. Our approach is novel
in that the SOM contributes to action value computation by storing action values
independently from the DNN and uses the TD error produced by the DNN to
update its state representations. More specifically, the TD error produced by the
DNN is used to dynamically set the learning rate and standard deviation of the
neighbourhood function of the SOM in an online manner. This allows the SOM to
store memories of states that the DNN is poor at predicting the value of and use them
for decision-making and learning. Importantly the size of the SOM is smaller than
the state space encountered by the agent and so it requires less memory resources
than the purely tabular case.
We compared the performance of CTDL to a standard DQN on a random set
of 2D grid worlds. CTDL out-performed the DQN on the majority of grid worlds,
suggesting that the inclusion of a ‘hippocampal’ learning system is beneficial and
confirming the predictions of CLS theory. Removal of replay between the SOM and
DNN appeared to have marginal impact upon the performance of CTDL suggesting
that the SOMs contribution to the calculation of action values is the predominant
benefit of CTDL. Future work should explore how information from the SOM may
be replayed to the DNN in a more principled fashion (e.g. Mattar and Daw (2018))
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instead of random sampling. We proposed that the SOM was able to contribute
to the calculation of the action values in a targeted manner by using the TD error
of the DNN to encode states that the DNN was poor at evaluating. We provided
evidence of this by demonstrating that the removal of the TD signal between the
DNN and SOM had a negative impact upon the performance of CTDL.
Our interpretation of these results is that, particularly early on in learning, the
DNN is able to represent generalisations of the state space while the SOM is able to
represent violations of these generalisations. In combination these two systems can
then be used to formulate policies in both a general and specialised manner. We
tested this hypothesis by presenting CTDL and DQN with a grid world consisting
of a general rule and two other grid worlds consisting of violations of this rule. As
our interpretation predicted, CTDL out-performed the DQN when violations of the
general rule were present, presumably because the SOM was able to store states
that were useful for circumnavigating these violations. This hypothesis was further
supported by a simulation that ran both CTDL and DQN on sequential grid worlds.
CTDL appeared to be better equipped to deal with the change in environment
compared to the DQN. In addition, the SOM component of CTDL encoded states
close to the change in the environment, providing further evidence of its ability to
represent violations of predictions.
This ability of the SOM to encode violations of the generalisations made by
the DNN has interesting parallels to imaging work in rodents demonstrating that
CA3 neurons appear to encode decision points in T-mazes that are different from
the rodents current position (Johnson and Redish, 2007). Such decision points can
be viewed as obstacles or important deviations from the animals general direction
and we therefore predict that they would be encoded by the SOM component of
CTDL. In the future, application of CTDL to other reinforcement learning tasks
may provide testable predictions about the regions of the state space that should
be encoded by the hippocampus. In addition, the fact that the SOM encode states
close to obstacles in order to account for changes in the environment suggests that
the hippocampus may be important for adapting to changes in the environment and
is consistent with recent studies that have implicated the hippocampus in reversal
learning (Dong et al., 2013; Vila-Ballo et al., 2017).
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To investigate the generality of CTDL we also applied it to the Cart-Pole and
Continuous Mountain Car problems. The Cart-Pole problem is fundamentally dif-
ferent to the grid world problem because the state space observed by the agent is
continuous. We found that in comparison to the DQN, the learning of CTDL was
more gradual but also more robust. This is a surprising result given that the DQN
has a perfect memory of the last 100,000 state transitions whereas CTDL has no
such memory. Indeed, one would expect the SOM component of CTDL to have
less of an effect in continuous state spaces because generalisation from function ap-
proximation becomes more important and the probability of re-visiting the same
states decreases. That said, Blundell et al. (2016) demonstrated that even when
the probability of re-visiting the same state is low, episodic information can still be
useful for improving learning. Generalisation of episodic information in CTDL is
likely controlled by the temperature parameter τη that scales the euclidean distance
between the states and the weights of the SOM units.
The Continuous Mountain Car problem consists of both a continuous state and
action space. In order to apply deep RL to the Continuous Mountain Car problem
we used an A2C architecture, with two separate DNNs representing an actor and
critic respectively. As with the original implementation of CTDL, we augmented
A2C with a ‘hippocampal’ learning system in the form of a SOM and termed the
resulting algorithm CTDLA2C . CTDLA2C both outperformed the standard A2C
approach and demonstrated more robust learning with no substantial decreases in
performance. A defining feature of the Continuous Mountain Car problem is that
the agent will learn not to move unless it experiences the positive reward of the
target location and then utilizes this information efficiently. It is possible that the
addition of a learning system that quickly learns pattern-separated representations
helps to alleviate this problem by storing rare and surprising events in memory
and incorporating them into value estimates, rather than taking a purely statistical
approach. More generally, these results demonstrate the applicability of CTDL to
continuous control problems and further highlight the benefits of using TD error to
inform the storage of episodic information.
The reduced benefit of CTDL on the Cart-Pole problem compared to the Grid
World and Continuous Mountain Car problems may allude to interesting differences
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in task requirements. In particular, both the Grid World and Continuous Mountain
Car problems appear to rely on rare discrete events that are highly informative for
learning a policy e.g. both tasks involve a goal location. In comparison, the Cart-
Pole task relies on a range of rewarded events or states to inform the policy and
so the utilization of episodic information may be less valuable. From a biological
perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising that CTDL performs better on Grid World
problems given that they represent spatial navigation tasks which are thought to
heavily recruit the hippocampus in biological agents (Burgess et al., 2002). In com-
parison, the Cart-Pole problem can be seen as a feedback-based motor control task
which involves learning systems such as the cerebellum in addition to any cortical-
hippocampal contributions. CTDL may therefore represent a useful empirical tool
for predicting the utilisation of hippocampal function in biological agents during RL
tasks.
Future work will need to investigate whether the increased robustness and per-
formance of CTDL in continuous state and action spaces is a general property that
extends to more complex domains. In particular, it would be of interest to run
CTDL on maze problems such as ViZDoom (Kempka et al., 2016), which are rich
in visual information. Indeed, deep RL approaches using convolutional neural net-
works are at the forefront of RL research and these could be easily incorporated into
the CTDL approach. In the case of ViZDoom, each state is represented by a high-
dimensional image and so the generalisation capabilities of a DNN are crucial. From
a biological perspective, it is worth noting that the hippocampus operates on corti-
cal inputs that provide latent representations for episodic memory. This is captured
in ‘model-free episodic control’, which relies on an embedding function to construct
the state representation for episodic memory (Blundell et al., 2016; Pritzel et al.,
2017). An embedding function therefore represents a biologically plausible method
of scaling CTDL up to complex visual problems such as VizDoom. The embedding
function could be pre-trained in an unsupervised manner or sampled from the DNN
component of CTDL. We leave this interesting avenue of research to future work.
In addition to relatively low complexity, one consistent feature of the tasks pre-
sented in the present study was a low degree of stochasticity. As with discrete state
spaces, low stochasticity means that events re-occur with high probability and the
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episodic component of CTDL can exploit this. It is likely that in more stochastic
environments the benefits of CTDL will be reduced as the DNN is required to gen-
eralise over several outcomes. It is therefore an open question how well CTDL will
perform on tasks that have a high degree of stochasticity, which are also supposedly
harder for biological agents.
One interesting element of CTDL that was not explored in the present study was
the temporal evolution of pattern-separated representations in the SOM. Logically
as the DNN improves its ability to evaluate the optimal value function its TD
errors should reduce in magnitude and therefore free up the SOM to represent other
episodic memories. If part of the environment changes then a new episodic memory
will form based on the new TD error and it will remain in episodic memory until the
‘neocortical’ learning system has learnt to incorporate it. CTDL therefore suggests
that the transfer of information from the hippocampus to neocortex is based to the
‘need’ for an episodic memory as encoded by TD errors. This can be viewed as a form
of ‘consolidation’ whereby memories stored in the hippocampus are consolidated to
the neocortex over time (Olafsdottir et al., 2018).
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have proposed a novel algorithm for combining a neocortical and
hippocampal learning system within a Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework. We
show that this algorithm, termed Complementary Temporal Difference Learning
(CTDL), demonstrates substantial benefits over just using a neocortical learning
system to evaluate states and actions. We therefore believe CTDL represents a
promising avenue for achieving complex, human-like behavior and exploring efficient
RL within the brain. Importantly, CTDL incorporates the three main pathways
highlighted by Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory (Figure 3.1). Firstly,
both the ‘neocortical’ and ‘hippocampal’ system of CTDL contribute in parallel to
the calculation of action values for decision-making. This reflects pathways 1 and
2 in Figure 3.1, where both systems are thought to project to the striatum in the
brain. In the case of CTDL, the arbitration between these two systems is dependent
on the memory content of the ‘hippocampal’ system. Secondly, CTDL updates
135
the contents of its ‘hippocampal’ system using the TD error from the ‘neocortical’
system. This allows the ‘hippocampal’ system to target regions of the state space
that the ‘neocortical’ system is poor at evaluating or that violates generalisations
made by the ‘neocortical’ system. Communication also flows back in the other
direction in the form of replay from the ‘hippocampal’ system to the ‘neocortical’
system. These interactions reflect pathway 3 in Figure 3.1, which represents the
connections between the neocortex and the hippocampus in the brain.
These key properties of CTDL represent directions for future research both com-
putationally and empirically. From a computational perspective, it will be inter-
esting to explore how embedding functions can be used to reflect the fact that the
hippocampus receives latent representations from cortical areas as input. This may
be a key component for scaling up CTDL to complex problems with high dimen-
sional state spaces. With respect to future empirical work, CTDL can be used to
make predictions about which tasks should utilize the hippocampus and which re-
gions of the state space should be encoded by it. CTDL also predicts that TD errors
should promote the formation of episodic memories in the hippocampus and so we
highlight this as a key area for further investigation and clarification.
As a concluding remark, it is worth noting that CTDL only represents one small
step in the direction of understanding efficient RL in the human brain. Chapter 3
highlighted many potential avenues for explaining the efficiency of human RL and
it is likely that a combination of these approaches is required to fully understand
it. For example, CTDL uses a SOM to represent a hippocampal learning system
due to its fast updating of values and pattern-separated representations. However,
we have already seen in Chapter 3 that the hippocampus may offer many other
beneficial computational properties such as predictive representations (Dayan, 1993;
Momennejad et al., 2017; Stachenfeld et al., 2017), recurrent similarity computation
(Kumaran and McClelland, 2012) and cognitive maps (Whittington et al., 2019).
We believe that these other properties are also key to efficient RL and future work
should investigate whether they can be incorporated into the CTDL framework for
further improvements in efficiency. We therefore emphasise that the presence of a
‘hippocampal’ learning system is likely to have additional benefits above and beyond
those demonstrated by CTDL. Nevertheless, we believe that the work in this chapter
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has demonstrated that a neocortical and hippocampal system working in parallel and
communicating via Temporal Difference error are important for achieving efficient
RL.
In the next chapter we propose that the standard view of CLS theory should
be extended in order to understand efficient RL in the brain. More specifically, we
suggest that a distinction should be made between the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC)
and sensory cortices due to their fundamentally different roles in cognition. This
highlights additional pathways that are important for supporting efficient RL and
improves the analogy between the brain and Deep RL. As in Chapter 3 we shall
review recent advancements in computational modelling based on the pathways
involved in this extended CLS framework.
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Chapter 5
Extending CLS Theory to Include
Pre-Frontal Cortex
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to review past literature and argue that Complemen-
tary Learning Systems (CLS) theory should be extended to reflect the differences
between Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and sensory cortices. This extension allows us
to address several cognitive phenomenon that are associated with the PFC and that
are important for efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL), such as meta-learning and
selective attention. Our proposed extension highlights three more pathways that are
important for efficient RL: connections between (1) the PFC and the striatum, (2)
the PFC and the hippocampus, and (3) the PFC and sensory cortices. As before, we
will consider each pathway individually and review recent advancements in Deep RL
and computational modelling (Sections 5.2 - 5.4). Our hope is that this chapter will
help to further elucidate the mechanisms underlying efficient RL in the brain and
also highlight where the analogy between Deep RL and the brain could be further
improved.
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5.1 Pre-Frontal Cortex as an Additional Learning
System
Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory emphasises the role of two learning
systems in the brain; the neocortex and the hippocampus. Both of these learning
systems project to the striatum (Pennartz et al., 2011), which is thought to play a key
role in Reinforcement Learning (RL) by evaluating states and/or actions (Schultz,
1998; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002; Maia, 2009; Setlow et al., 2003). In Chapter
4, we demonstrated the benefits of utilising both systems to evaluate states/actions
and that the two systems could communicate via Temporal Difference (TD) errors.
However, this still represents a major simplification of the different learning systems
in the brain. Most notably, the distinction between different neocortical areas has
largely been ignored by CLS theory. In particular, the distinction between sensory
cortices and the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) has been well characterised empirically
and yet the two structures are aggregated under CLS theory. The PFC has long
been implicated in executive function and is therefore likely to be an important
component of learning and transfer. From an RL perspective, empirical evidence
linking the PFC with reward-based learning is gradually emerging. For example,
the PFC has been shown to encode the expected value of states, objects and actions
(Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Seo and Lee, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006)
as well as a history of previous actions and rewards (Seo et al., 2012; Barraclough
et al., 2004); all hallmarks of an RL algorithm.
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that a dissociation between the PFC and
sensory cortices is important for understanding efficient RL and that CLS theory
should be extended to recognise this. Figure 5.1 provides a graphical depiction of
this extension to CLS theory. The striatum serves as the primary locus for evaluating
states and/or actions via Reinforcement Learning (RL) while the other three learning
systems provide the representations for evaluation. In total there are 6 pathways,
with Pathways 1, 2 and 3 already discussed in Chapter 3. Pathways 1, 2 and 4
provide direct connections between each of the learning systems and the striatum
while Pathways 3, 5 and 6 provide connections between each of the different learning
systems. We believe that this network of interactions is required for efficient RL and
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that empirical examples of rapid learning and transfer rely on different combinations
of these learning systems. As with Chapter 3, the remainder of this chapter will
review advances in Deep RL and computational modelling based on whether they
relate to Pathway 4, 5 or 6. We hope that this will serve as evidence for the need














Figure 5.1: Diagram extending our framework to include the distinction between
Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and Sensory Cortices. This introduces three additional
pathways; (4) projections from the PFC to the striatum, (5) projections between the
PFC and the hippocampus and (6) projections between the PFC and sensory cortices.
5.2 4. Connections Between the Pre-Frontal Cor-
tex and Striatum
A wealth of evidence has implicated the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) in reward-based
learning. In particular several signals associated with Dopamine (DA)-driven Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) have been found in the PFC, such as state, object and
action values (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Seo and Lee, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad, 2006) and a history of actions and rewards (Seo et al., 2012; Barraclough
et al., 2004). These findings suggest that the PFC may implement an RL algorithm
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in collaboration with midbrain dopamine neurons and the striatum (Pathway 4 in
Figure 5.1). A classical interpretation of these results is that reward-prediction er-
rors encoded by DA are responsible for model-free RL whereas activity in the PFC
is responsible for model-based RL (Daw et al., 2005). Model-based RL is important
for transfer because the ability to use a world model in new situations can lead to
inferences with little or no experience in the new situation. It has been suggested
that the PFC is capable of model-based RL because it is able to utilise represen-
tations of task structure to produce behaviour akin to planning. However recent
findings have questioned this dissociation between model-free and model-based sys-
tems because DA reward-prediction errors appear to be influenced by task structure,
suggesting that they reflect model-based value estimates. This therefore raises the
question: what RL algorithm could the PFC be implementing and is it responsible
for the model-based value estimates seen in DA reward-prediction errors? An answer
to this question could help to imbue Deep RL agents with the ability to perform
model-based RL, which could greatly improve their efficiency and ability to perform
rapid learning and transfer.
5.2.1 Meta-Reinforcement Learning
Recent work by Wang et al. (2016, 2018) has begun to answer this question using
an approach known as Meta-Reinforcement Learning (Meta-RL). The basic premise
behind Meta-RL is that DA and the PFC represent two different RL algorithms, with
one implemented in the activation dynamics of the PFC and the other implemented
in the altering of synaptic weights in the PFC. The RL procedure implemented in
the PFC’s activation dynamics is shaped by the altering of the synaptic weights
in the PFC by DA reward-prediction errors. The result of this interaction is that
learning from DA reward-prediction errors helps to improve the learning present in
the activation dynamics. Such an interaction is often called ‘learning to learn’ as
the learning of one system helps to improve the learning of another system. The
reason this is interesting from a transfer perceptive is that the DA-driven algorithm
can operate over a distribution of tasks and tune the activation-driven algorithm
to exploit similarities between tasks thereby transferring knowledge about general
task structure. In other words, an agent is better at obtaining reward in a novel
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environment because it has an RL procedure that is biased towards solving similar,
related tasks efficiently.
In order to implement Meta-RL, Wang et al. (2016, 2018) used a Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) network (Figure 5.2), which is a form of recurrent neural
network with gating mechanisms for inputs, outputs and internal state. In brief,
the activation dynamics of the LSTM network implements an RL algorithm that
can solve a single task, while the modification of connection weights improves the
ability of this RL algorithm to solve other related tasks. To train the network, a task
was randomly sampled from a distribution of related tasks and weight updates were
performed after a short amount of experience. A new task was then sampled and the
process was repeated. As a result, the LSTM was able to extract similarities between
tasks using the weight updates and then solve a novel task using only its memory
and recurrent dynamics. The authors found that the network’s activation dynamics
produced estimates consistent with model-based RL in a variety of simulations.
They therefore concluded that the RL algorithm implemented by the network’s
activation dynamics can be qualitatively different to the one used for updating the
weights, which was purely model-free.
Figure 5.2: Meta-RL agent architecture used by Wang et al. (2016, 2018). The
network was a simple LSTM with the current observation ot, the previous action
at−1 and the previous reward rt−1 as inputs. The outputs of the LSTM were the
chosen action at and the predicted state value vt. The weights of the LSTM were
updated according to a model-free RL algorithm known as Advantage Actor Critic.
Figure adapted from Wang et al. (2018).
Of most importance to this thesis is the efficiency of Meta-RL on novel tasks.
Wang et al. (2016) applied their Meta-RL algorithm to a virtual replication of a
study by Harlow (1949) (Figure 5.3). In the original Harlow (1949) study, primates
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were shown two objects with a food item underneath one of the objects. Periodically
these objects would be replaced by two new objects and a food reward would again
be placed under one of them. Upon a change in objects, the optimal strategy is
to use the first trial to work out which object is rewarded and then to select that
object repeatedly on subsequent trials. This is often referred to as ‘one-shot’ learning
because only one piece of feedback is needed to infer the optimal strategy. It is also
a form of meta-learning because it involves learning that the task structure consists
of one object always being rewarded and another not being rewarded.
Figure 5.3: The virtual Harlow task used to explore the ability of Meta-Reinforcement
Learning (RL) to perform transfer. (A-C) The agent was shown a screen in a 3D
environment with two images on it. The agent had to select the rewarded image on
each trial. The location of the images was randomised on each trial. THe agent made
a decision by performing a saccade to the chosen image. (D) Average performance
during training of the top 40 random seeds. (E) Performance of each random seed
on episode 100,000. (F) Probability of selecting the image associated with reward
over the course of learning. Figure adapted from Wang et al. (2016).
In the virtual replication by Wang et al. (2016), the agent was provided with
the pixel values of a screen that displayed a 3D representation of a world containing
another screen which had two images on it. These two images represented the
objects in Harlow’s original task and the agent had to perform a saccade to one of
the images in order to choose it and receive any associated reward. The saccade
itself caused the pixel values of the 3D world to change as if the agent was looking
around the 3D world. As with Harlow’s original study, after training on one set
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of images the agent was tested on another set of images. The Meta-RL algorithm
proposed by Wang et al. (2016) successfully discovered a ‘one-shot’ strategy, thereby
minimising the reward lost in the face of a new pair of images. Importantly, this
demonstrates that the Meta-RL algorithm can learn the structure of a set of related
tasks and us it to select the most efficient strategy for a new task.
The ability of Wang et al. (2016)’s Meta-RL approach to learn the structure of
the Harlow experiment and infer an optimal policy from a single trial is a promising
demonstration of efficient RL. This being said, one potential problem of Meta-RL
is the lack of a mechanism for selecting appropriate past experiences to learn from.
Meta-RL needs to match the current task with a related set of previous tasks, so that
only useful prior knowledge is transferred. Unfortunately the work by Wang et al.
(2016) circumvents this problem by only using related tasks for learning and testing.
This means that the agent is only ever exposed to a single distribution of tasks and
so it can use all the knowledge that it gains for transfer and no selection is required.
If we compare this to the challenge faced by a human in a novel environment,
we immediately see that one of the greatest challenges faced by the learner is the
appropriate selection of past experiences for inference. Ultimately, the application
of transferable knowledge is secondary to the problem of selecting which experiences
to use for transfer.
In the closely related analogy literature, the problem of selecting appropriate
experiences for transfer has also represented a significant challenge. Much of the
work on analogy has involved explicit analogies, whereby a human participant is
presented with two domains that are to be compared. In contrast, an implicit
analogy involves just a single domain and it is up to the participant to retrieve from
memory a suitable base domain for comparison. In transfer terms, the participant
has to search past experiences in order to find the best match and analogical solution
for the current problem. Some of the first work on analogy by Gick and Holyoak
(1980) highlighted the difficulty of retrieving useful experiences for solving analogies.
In this work they found that exposure to useful experiences only provided a small
improvement in analogical reasoning and that a much larger improvement occurred
when human participants were explicitly told that a past experience was useful for
the task at hand. Subsequent work has demonstrated that the problem of retrieving
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useful analogs appears to be harder for human participants than mapping or using
the analogs once they have been retrieved (Gentner et al., 1993). The exact factors
that affect the retrieval of past experiences for transfer or analogical reasoning are yet
to be elucidated. In terms of domain retrieval at least, there appears to be a trade off
between the surface similarity of objects and the underlying abstract relationships
that determines whether a domain is retrieved for mapping and transfer (Wharton
et al., 1994).
5.3 5. Connections Between the Pre-Frontal Cor-
tex and Hippocampus
We saw in Chapters 3 and 4 how a hippocampal learning system is a central com-
ponent of efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL). These chapters highlighted how
the fundamental properties of the hippocampus and its interactions with the neo-
cortex can promote rapid learning and transfer. However, in this chapter we argue
that the PFC should be considered as its own learning system that is separate from
sensory cortices. With this in mind, in this section we consider how specific in-
teractions between the PFC and the hippocampus could improve the efficiency of
RL by promoting rapid learning and transfer (Pathway 5 in Figure 5.1). Central
to these interactions are two main ideas; (1) the PFC may support the retrieval of
episodic memories for transfer based on the current task and (2) the PFC may sup-
port the formation of conceptual representations in the hippocampus by providing
attentional signals. Both of these processes are fundamental to making accurate
inferences in novel situations and help to demonstrate the importance of extending
CLS theory to include the distinction between the PFC and sensory cortices.
5.3.1 Memory Recall
We saw in the previous section that one of the issues with Meta-RL was the lack of a
mechanism for selecting related memories for learning and transfer. Similarly, in the
field of analogical reasoning, the quality of an analogy will be highly dependent on
the source domain that is chosen for comparison with the target domain, regardless
of how effective the comparison or alignment process is. Both Meta-RL and analog-
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ical reasoning therefore highlight the fact that context-dependent episodic memory
retrieval is crucial for inferences in novel situations.
Within the field of Deep RL, several approaches have been suggested that address
context-dependent retrieval of information from memory. For example, one line of
research focuses on approaches that allow neural networks to learn to read from,
and write to, an external memory store (Graves et al., 2014; Jaeger, 2016; Graves
et al., 2016). Similarly, the models proposed by Blundell et al. (2016) and Pritzel
et al. (2017) (see Section 3.3.1) learn latent representations that can be used to
query episodic information based on similarity in representational space. These ap-
proaches all demonstrate how context-dependent memory retrieval can improve the
efficiency of RL. Importantly, the extent of this improvement is likely to be depen-
dent on the nature of the representations used for retrieving memories. For example,
if the representations used for memory look-up represent relational information in-
stead of perceptual similarities then the degree of transfer may improve because the
comparison process will exploit the underlying relational structure (Gentner, 1983).
From the perspective of the brain, it has been suggested that interactions be-
tween the PFC and hippocampus (Pathway 5 in Figure 5.1) may be responsible for
the retrieval of episodic memories based on the current context (Place et al., 2016;
Eichenbaum, 2017; Dobbins et al., 2002). One metaphor that has been used to de-
scribed the interaction between the hippocampus and the PFC is that of railroads
(Miller and Cohen, 2001). More specifically, the hippocampus has been described
as laying down train tracks while the PFC switches between these tracks. In other
words the hippocampus is responsible for forming memories while the PFC switches
between them based on the current context. Empirical evidence for this analogy
comes from studies that investigate the effect of PFC damage. Such damage is
routinely associated with an inability in rodents, primates and humans to switch
between tasks (Dias et al., 1996; Birrell and Brown, 2000; Rich and Shapiro, 2007;
Ragozzino et al., 2003). One study by Navawongse and Eichenbaum (2013) investi-
gated the effect of inactivating the PFC on representations in the hippocampus of
rats. Rats were trained on two different spatial contexts with the same two objects
present in each context but with the object-reward associations reversed. Nava-
wongse and Eichenbaum (2013) found that certain neurons in the hippocampus
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preferentially responded to a specific object in a specific context. However, upon
PFC inactivation, these neurons lost this specificity and either became inactive or
fired indiscriminately. This suggests that the neurons in the hippocampus lost their
context-specific tuning and that the PFC is indeed required for filtering episodic
memories based on the current context.
If interactions between the PFC and the hippocampus are indeed responsible for
context-dependent retrieval of episodic memories, then this suggests that Deep RL
models could benefit from utilising the computational properties of the PFC to model
episodic memory retrieval. In the previous section we saw how the high recurrency
of the PFC can be used for meta-learning and transfer in Deep RL models. A recent
study by Ritter et al. (2018) has extended this idea to demonstrate how it can
also be used to produce context-dependent episodic memory retrieval. The model,
referred to as Episodic Metal-RL (EMRL), uses the same LSTM architecture as
Meta-RL but also includes an episodic memory. The episodic memory corresponds
to a table, where each entry is a pairing between the hidden state of the LSTM and
the perceptual input that caused it. At the end of each trial EMRL takes a copy of
the hidden state of the LSTM and the current perceptual context and appends them
to the table. Then on each time-step EMRL finds the closest matching perceptual
context in memory by finding the one that minimises the cosine distance between the
current context. EMRL then re-instates the associated hidden state of the LSTM
using a learnt gating function. This mechanism allows EMRL to recognize previously
encountered experiences and retrieve previously learnt solutions. Interestingly, this
form of re-instatement appears to parallel the finding that episodic memory retrieval
in humans re-instates activity patterns that were present during the encoding of the
original memory (Cohen and O’Reilly, 1996; Xiao et al., 2017; Hoskin et al., 2019).
Ritter et al. (2018) tested EMRL on bandit tasks and found that EMRL was able
to exhibit both model-based and episodic learning as well as improved performance
compared to standard Meta-RL. EMRL therefore demonstrates the utility of allow-
ing a PFC-like system access to episodic memory for context-dependent episodic
memory retrieval. However, it is worth noting that the perceptual contexts used
by Ritter et al. (2018) were represented as hand-coded binary vectors. As a result
EMRL is effectively given perfect information about whether two perceptual con-
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texts match or not. As a result this does not solve the problem of learning how to
match the current problem with a previously encountered problem.
5.3.2 Concept Formation
The previous section highlighted how interactions between the PFC and hippocam-
pus may support the retrieval of episodic memories based on the current task. In
addition to this phenomenon, it has been suggested that interactions between these
two systems may support the formation of concepts. The ability to form concepts
is critical to the brain’s ability to make inferences in novel situations. By their very
nature concepts extract commonalities across a set of experiences and allow for the
categorisation of unseen exemplars. This categorisation subsequently has a large
impact on how the brain interprets a new situation and ultimately selects actions.
For example, even being able to categorise someone you have never seen before as
a human being can have a large impact upon how you interact with them for the
first time. A range of mechanisms have been proposed for the learning of concepts
including the memorization of individual exemplars, rule abstraction and hypothesis
testing, and slow perceptual learning (Ashby and Maddox, 2005; Mareschal et al.,
2010). Importantly, recent work has begun to highlight the importance of inter-
actions between the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and the hippocampus for learning
concepts (Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013; Schlichting and Preston, 2016), which cor-
responds to Pathway 5 in Figure 5.1. In particular, it has been suggested that the
PFC may guide attention during the learning of concepts towards relevant features
that constitute a specific concept.
Many of the seminal models on category learning rely on selectively attending
to stimulus dimensions that are relevant for a particular category (Kruschke, 1992;
Love et al., 2004). This includes Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adap-
tive Incremental Network (SUSTAIN) (Figure 5.4), which represents attention as
a receptive field over a stimulus dimension. A category in SUSTAIN corresponds
to a cluster with its own set of receptive fields. All the receptive fields for a given
stimulus dimension have the same tuning but each cluster centers their receptive
fields over different locations. The activation of a cluster is based on how closely
a given stimulus matches the receptive fields of the cluster. When a new stimu-
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lus is presented the clusters compete with each other and the one closest to the
stimulus in representational space wins. The winning cluster can then predict an
unknown stimulus dimension such as the category membership of the stimulus. If
the prediction is incorrect then a new cluster is recruited, which allows SUSTAIN to
dynamically adapt its complexity to the problem at hand. From an RL perspective,
by clustering stimuli and using category membership as a state representation, the
learning problem can be simplified and generalization improved (Niv, 2019).
149
Figure 5.4: Depiction of Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incre-
mental Network (SUSTAIN). A stimulus is encoded along distinct dimensions with
different possible values. Each dimension has a different receptive field tuning. Dif-
ferent clusters position their receptive fields in different locations for each stimulus
dimension based on the category that they represent. The clusters compete with each
other and the winning cluster is the one who’s receptive fields are closest to the stim-
ulus in representational space. The winning cluster is then used to infer the queried
stimulus dimension, which in this case is category membership. Figure adapted from
Love et al. (2004)
Interestingly, increasing evidence is suggesting that interactions between the PFC
and the hippocampus (Pathway 5 in Figure 5.1) may support the mechanism out-
lined by SUSTAIN. For example, a study by Mack et al. (2016) used functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore how activity in the hippocampus
and PFC related to Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental
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Network (SUSTAIN) (Love et al., 2004). Participants were exposed to pictures of
insects as stimuli and were asked to categorise them in two separate categorisation
tasks; e.g. whether they liked warm or cold climates and whether they were found
in the eastern or western hemisphere. The first categorisation task was based on
a single feature while the second task relied upon an exclusive disjunction rule in-
volving two features. Importantly, this experimental design allowed the stimuli to
be kept constant but the relevant features and conceptual similarity to be changed
over the course of the experiment. The experiment therefore promotes the need to
quickly update ones conceptual representations based on the task at hand.
The performance of each participant was used to fit SUSTAIN at an individual
level. This fitting process allowed Mack et al. (2016) to make predictions about
how a participant represented each of the stimuli in vector space and how similar
they perceived different stimuli to be. Using representational similarity analysis
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008), Mack et al. (2016) found that the predictions made by
SUSTAIN best matched representations in the hippocampus. This suggests that
the hippocampus plays a role in the construction of concepts and that its repre-
sentations are updated as concepts change based on task demands. In addition to
this correspondence between the predictions of SUSTAIN and hippocampal repre-
sentations, Mack et al. (2016) also found that, particularly during early learning,
the hippocampus demonstrated a strong functional coupling with the PFC. This
suggests that interactions with the PFC are also important for the hippocampus to
be able to update its conceptual representations.
From a mechanistic view, this dependence on the PFC for conceptual representa-
tions in the hippocampus may be due to the PFC’s role in selective attention (Miller
and Cohen, 2001). In particular SUSTAIN relies on a mechanism of selecting fea-
tures that are predictive of a specific category across sequences of examples and it is
possible that the PFC is responsible for this attention mechanism. This hypothesis
has been backed by recent work by Mack et al. (2020), which used the same stimuli
as the previous study (Mack et al., 2016) but included a third categorisation task
where all three features are needed to categorise an insect. This resulted in three
different categorisation tasks of increasing complexity. Mack et al. (2020) hypothe-
sised that if the PFC is responsible for attending to the relevant feature dimensions
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then its activation should be inversely related to the amount of compression needed.
For example, when only one feature needs to be attended to then two features can
be compressed whereas if all three features need to be attended to then none of
them can be compressed. Mack et al. (2020) used fMRI to measure the activity
in the PFC and measured the degree of compression in this activity using principle
component analysis. Interestingly, the authors found that, after learning, the degree
of compression in the activity of the PFC was inversely related to the number of
features that needed to be attended to. This suggests that the PFC does indeed
play a central role in attending to relevant features based on the current goal and
that this ability supports the formation of abstract concepts.
5.4 6. Connections Between Pre-Frontal Cortex
and Sensory Cortex
In the previous section we saw how interactions between the PFC and hippocam-
pus could support the retrieval of context-appropriate episodic memories and the
formation of concepts. One of the key roles of the PFC in concept formation was
the ability to attend to features that were diagnostic of a particular concept. This
notion of the PFC being responsible for attention is widespread and is not limited to
interactions with the hippocampus (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen,
2001). In particular, the notion of ‘top-down’ or ‘selective attention’ is often used
to refer to the ability of the PFC to to filter incoming information from sensory
cortices based on the the current goal (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) (Pathway 6 in
Figure 5.1). The primary benefit of this top-down attention is that it simplifies the
RL problem by identifying task-relevant features. From a transfer perspective, top-
down attention identifies features from previous experience that are useful for the
current task. This allows for both rapid learning and quick adaptation to changes
in task because new features do not have to be learnt for each task. Different tasks
can simply be associated with different patterns of attention. In terms of Deep RL,
the DNNs used in Deep RL can be tentatively compared to sensory cortices. This
suggests that the addition of a learning system like the PFC that performs selective




Animals and humans constantly face highly complex environments and problems
that involve many dimensions. This greatly increases the complexity of the learn-
ing problem and many RL algorithms either struggle to solve such problems or are
extremely slow to solve them in comparison to biological agents. One potential
explanation for this is that biological agents rely on ‘top-down’ or ‘selective’ at-
tention. Selective attention involves focusing on or prioritising dimensions/features
that are useful for the task at hand and is thought to originate in the Pre-Frontal
Cortex (PFC) (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Selective attention greatly simplifies
the problem faced by the brains RL machinery because it reduces the dimensionality
of the environmental state so that the remaining dimensions are task relevant. At
its core, transfer involves selecting information from past experiences to guide deci-
sions in novel situations. Transfer can therefore be viewed as a problem of selective
attention; knowledge from past experiences is selected from based on its utility for
the current task.
Selective attention effects both choice and learning in RL. With regards to choice,
instead of weighting all dimensions equally, selective attention can differentially
weight certain dimensions when performing value computation. For example, ex-
periments investigating RL over multidimensional states have demonstrated that
people are able to alter their state representations based on the task at hand. Peo-
ple appear to be able to adopt an object-based representation (each combination of
features is evaluated) or a feature-based representation (each feature is evaluated
and then combined) based on which one is more predictive of reward (Farashahi
et al., 2017).
As with disentangled representations (see Section 3.2.3), the effect of selective
attention on choice can be reduced to a problem of representation; i.e. learning a
useful state representation for the RL machinery to act upon. A natural question
that arises is how does selective attention differ from standard learning procedures?
For example, instead of selective attention one could just learn a new representation
that ignores irrelevant dimensions. Selective attention differs from standard learn-
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ing because it acts on existing representations to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem and as a result the learning of new representations is not required. This
improves the flexibility of learning because existing representations are left unper-
turbed for future tasks. If the current task changes then selective attention need
only shift, while the representations it acts upon remain the same. Importantly, this
means that different sets of attentional weights can be used to switch between differ-
ent tasks. This allows the PFC to utilise different sub-networks to quickly refactor
existing representations for different task demands. In comparison, the learning
of new perceptual representations is thought to occur in early sensory cortices and
does not change (or changes very slowly) in response to task demands (Schyns et al.,
1998), allowing them to retain a degree of generality.
In addition to choice, selective attention also effects learning in RL. Selective
attention can bias learning towards certain dimensions by updating their values
more given a certain reward prediction error. This leads to much faster and efficient
learning as only the dimensions that matter are updated and the influence of other
dimensions is negated. Interestingly, this effect on learning creates a bi-directional
relationship between selective attention and learning. On the one hand selective
attention biases learning from reward prediction errors and on the other learning
is required to learn which dimensions to attend to. How the brain learns which
dimensions to attend to is still an open question. Two main theories have been
proposed; 1) the brain learns to attend to features that are most predictive of reward
(Mackintosh, 1975), 2) the brain learns to attend to features that it is most uncertain
about i.e. features that generate a lot of reward prediction errors (Pearce and
Hall, 1980). Several studies have suggested that both of these proposals may be
true although it is under contention whether both processes occur independently
(LePelley and McLaren, 2004; Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010) or in combination
(Esber and Haselgrove, 2011; Nasser et al., 2017). Equally, some studies argue that
the balance between the two processes may be different between choice and learning.
In particular, Dayan et al. (2000) has suggested that during choice it makes sense to
attend to the features most predictive of reward whereas during learning it makes
sense to attend to the features with the most uncertainty.
What empirical evidence is there for a relationship between selective attention
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and RL in the brain? A study by Leong et al. (2017) has demonstrated the effects of
selective attention on RL in humans using a combination of computational modelling
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the study participants were
given a simple RL task where they had to select one of three stimuli. Each stimuli
was made up of three dimensions (a face, landmark and tool) and for each block
of questions (25 questions), only one of the dimensions (e.g. tool) was relevant for
predicting reward based on a target feature (e.g. wrench). The target feature was
associated with a high probability of reward (p=0.75) while all other features were
associated with a low probability of reward (p=0.25). Participants had to use trial
and error to identify the target feature and obtain a high rate of reward.
While participants performed this task, Leong et al. (2017) conducted eye-
tracking and fMRI. Eye-tracking was used to quantify selective attention based on
the proportion of time spent looking at each dimension. Similarly, fMRI was used
to quantify selective attention based on the amount of face-, tool- and landmark-
specific neural activity. The choices made by each participant, along with their
measures of selective attention were used to fit a variety of RL models to see which
one best described the experimental data. After fitting each model, feature values
were summed to produce a stimulus value, which was then input into a softmax
function to calculate choice probabilities. The feature values were learnt using the
trial-by-trial reward prediction error. The differences between models came from
the influence of selective attention on choice and learning. In total there were four
different RL models; Uniform Attention (UA) where all stimulus dimensions were
equally weighted at choice and learning, Attention at Choice (AC) where dimen-
sion weights were based on estimates of attention when calculating stimulus value,
Attention at Learning (AL) where dimension weights were based on estimates of at-
tention when updating feature values, and Attention at Choice and Learning (ACL)
where dimension weights were based on estimates of attention for both calculating
stimulus value and updating feature values (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: Effect of attention during choice and learning for the Reinforcement
Learning (RL) models used by Leong et al. (2017). At choice, the value of a stim-
ulus was calculated as the sum of the features values, which were weighted by their
corresponding attention weights. During learning, the prediction error was weighted
by another attention weight. Depending on the model, the attention weights were
based on estimates from empirical data or set to 1/3. Figure adapted from Leong
et al. (2017).
Using a cross-validation procedure and metrics that penalised model complexity
(e.g. Bayesian Information Criterion), Leong et al. (2017) found that the ACL model
fit the behavioural data the best. This suggests that selective attention does indeed
modify both choice and learning during human RL. To further test this hypothesis
Leong et al. (2017) also investigated whether the effect of selective attention at
choice and learning could be seen in the neural data as well as the behavioural
data. To achieve this, Leong et al. (2017) entered the trial-by-trial value estimates
of the chosen stimuli for each of the four RL models into a generalized linear model.
This allowed the authors to look for brain regions that correlated with the value
estimates while controlling for the value estimates of the other models. Leong et al.
(2017) found that activity in the ventro-medial PFC, which has consistently been
associated with expected value signals, was only significantly correlated with the
value estimates from the ACL model. The same analysis was repeated for the
reward prediction error estimates of the four models. In this case, only the reward
prediction error estimates of the ACL model correlated with activity in the striatum,
which is commonly associated with reward prediction errors. Taken together, these
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results provide neural evidence that selective attention modifies both choice and
learning during RL.
As previously mentioned, it has been proposed that the relationship between
selective attention and learning in RL is bi-directional; selective attention biases RL
value updates while learning guides selective attention towards important features.
To explore the effect of learning on selective attention Leong et al. (2017) looked at
the trajectory of selective attention over the course of learning. More specifically,
Leong et al. (2017) calculated the standard deviation of the three attentional weights
from the ACL model on each trial. A high standard deviation corresponds to highly
selective attention whereas a low standard deviation corresponds to uniform atten-
tion. The authors found that attention became more selective and consistent over
the course of learning as participants learnt to focus on the diagnostic dimension.
In addition, attention was directed towards the dimension with the highest feature
value, particularly when attention was more selective and when the difference in val-
ues was larger. Similarly, Leong et al. (2017) found that attention was more likely to
switch from one dimension to another when the difference between expected values
was lower. Finally the authors conducted a model-based analysis and found that
the attention measures were best explained by a model that used feature values as
opposed to choice or reward history for calculating attention. These results suggest
that values learnt by participants modify the dimension attended to, the strength
of attention and when a switch in attention occurs.
While the work of Leong et al. (2017) provides both behavioural and neural
evidence for the dynamic relationship between attention and RL, the biological and
computational mechanisms underlying the relationship are still to be elucidated. In
a step towards a biological explanation Radulescu et al. (2019) proposed a neural
model that attempts to explain how RL and selective attention may interact in the
brain (Figure 5.6). The model proposes that cortical pools found in the PFC may
be responsible for selective attention by representing hypotheses about the current
task structure. These cortical pools use lateral inhibition to compete with each other
and the inhibition is governed by the strength of connections between each pool and
the striatum. The stronger a pool’s connectivity with the striatum the stronger
the striatal response and the stronger the thalamic feedback onto the cortical pool.
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The result of this is that unexpected rewards cause a positive reward prediction
error that preferentially strengthens synapses from the most active cortical pool.
This eventually leads to one pool inhibiting the other pools and a ‘winner takes all’
scenario. The winning cortical pool performs selective attention by potentiating the
responses of a subset of features in sensory cortices so that the corresponding striatal
synapses are preferentially altered by reward prediction errors. The result of this is
that RL is biased towards a subset of features that are relevant for decision-making.
Features that are present in the environment but that aren’t part of the winning
hypothesis will still be reinforced to some extent and this will increase the likelihood
that associated rules will be chosen in the future. This neurobiological explanation
for selective attention demonstrates how reinforcement learning can both affect, and
be affected by, selective attention.
Figure 5.6: Neurobiological model of selective attention by Radulescu et al. (2019).
The hypothesis that ‘red and square’ is the correct categorisation rule is represented
in the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) (yellow). This provides top-down signals to sensory
cortices (green) and biases attention towards features corresponding to ‘red’ and
‘square’. This influences the calculation of values in the basal ganglia (blue) and
the updating of values using Reward Prediction Errors (RPEs). Subsequently, this
completes the cycle by influencing the selection of hypotheses in the PFC. Figure
adapted from Radulescu et al. (2019).
While Radulescu et al. (2019) propose a neurobiological mechanism for selective
attention within an RL framework, a computational implementation is still to be
elucidated. Outside of an RL setting recent work has started to explore how selective
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attention from the PFC to visual areas could be implemented. Of note, Luo et al.
(2020) combined ‘top-down’ attentional weights with a Deep Convolutional Neural
Network (DCNN) to model how selective attention can bias already existing rep-
resentations towards a particular task. Attentional weights (w ∈ [0,∞]) were used
as a filter for the feature maps of a DCNN so that only information from a subset
of the features maps was passed to deeper layers of the network (Figure 5.7). The
attentional weights were trained using a modified cost function, which increased the
cost of wrongly classifying examples that were pertinent to the task at hand. The
task consisted of correctly predicting a target ImageNet class; e.g. correctly classi-
fying images of cats. The trade-off between correctly classifying the target class as
opposed to the other classes was governed by a parameter (α) that represented the
attention intensity.
Figure 5.7: Architecture of the approach proposed by Luo et al. (2020). An attention
layer (dashed box) is inserted into the architecture of VGG-16. Attention weights are
applied to the feature maps produced by VGG-16 using element-wise multiplication.
This serves to re-weight the activation values before they are passed on to the rest
of VGG-16. Figure adapted from Luo et al. (2020).
Luo et al. (2020) found that there was a balance between the benefits and costs
of selective attention. As attention intensity increased, there were increases in both
true positives and false positives with respect to the target class. Correspondingly,
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the sensitivity index (d′) was highest for moderate levels of attention. These re-
sults demonstrate how a pre-trained network can be re-purposed for a particular
task using a simple attentional mechanism that is driven by the current goal. The
authors propose that this approach serves as a model of top-down attention, with
the attentional weights modelling the output of the PFC and the DCNN modelling
the ventral visual stream.
While the work of Luo et al. (2020) has taken a promising first step in the di-
rection of modelling selective attention between the PFC and sensory cortices, it
remains an open question how this would work in an RL setting. The approach sug-
gested by Luo et al. (2020) involved a weighted cost function where the target class
was pre-specified. Unfortunately, in an RL setting it is unclear which predictions
are most salient and how the prediction error (whether it be value or policy based)
relates to selective attention. In an ideal RL scenario, an agent would attend to
dimensions of the state space that are most predictive of future reward, rather than
dimensions most diagnostic of a category.
In the field of artificial intelligence, one recent study by Mott et al. (2019) has
explored an approach that utilises top-down attention in an RL setting (Figure 5.8).
The approach consisted of a collection of neural networks, whereby a top-level LSTM
actively queried a DCNN for visual information that it deemed relevant for predict-
ing rewards. This process relied on the generation of attentional maps that were
used to weight information provided by the DCNN. These attentional maps were
calculated by taking the inner product between a ‘query’ vector and a ‘keys’ tensor.
The ‘keys’ tensor was generated by the DCNN and the ‘query’ vector was generated
using information from the LSTM. This allowed the top-level LSTM to attend to
both content (the ‘what’) and spatial location (the ‘where’). Importantly, the whole
agent architecture was fully differentiable and therefore amenable to gradient-based
optimisation.
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Figure 5.8: Architecture of the approach proposed by Mott et al. (2019). Observations
are converted into key and value tensors using a recurrent Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN). A Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network takes the result of
the previous time step and provides an input to a third network, which is responsible
for generating a query tensor. The inner product between the query and key tensors
is passed through a soft-max function to produce an attention map. This attention
map is multiplied element-wise with the values tensor to produce an answer tensor,
which is passed to the LSTM for action selection. Figure adapted from Mott et al.
(2019).
Mott et al. (2019) tested the agent architecture on the ATARI learning envi-
ronment, which consists of a variety of computer games consisting of rich visual
input. The authors found that their approach was competitive with state-of-the-art
baselines without attention. Interestingly, the attention based architecture was not
significantly better for every game and average performance across all games was
only marginally better. When investigating the attention maps learnt by the agent,
the authors found that the agent did indeed learn to attend to task-relevant features
such as the player object and potential hazards, even when they were introduced un-
expectedly. As a further analysis, Mott et al. (2019) compared their model to other
approaches that utilise bottom-up attention (i.e. the vision network has control over
the attention process) instead of top-down attention. Mott et al. (2019) found that
top-down attention performed significantly better than bottom-up attention for all
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but one game known as Seaquest. Interestingly, the authors note that Seaquest
consists of a very stereotyped pattern of enemies and so they hypothesise that the
requirement for top-down decision making is low.
The work of Mott et al. (2019) demonstrates the utility of a highly recurrent top-
down module, that can selectively attend to different elements of visual perception,
for solving the RL problem. With respect to the brain, it seems likely that the PFC
may fulfill the role of such a module. Indeed, the degree of recurrency within the
PFC is high (Mante et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2018) and the vision network proposed
by Mott et al. (2019) could be viewed as modelling early visual sensory cortices that
the PFC queries against and selectively attends to. However, several discrepancies
exist between the agent architecture proposed by Mott et al. (2019) and selective
attention mechanisms in the brain. In particular, the agent architecture proposed
by Mott et al. (2019) is fully differentiable, and so all of the learnable parameters
are updated via back-propagation. This means that all of the networks learn slowly
and are dependent on each other. Most importantly the representations learnt by
the vision network are dependent on the current task and the learning occurring
in the top-down attention network. This is the opposite of the work by Luo et al.
(2020) who used a top-down attention mechanism to re-configure a pre-trained vision
network that does not change based on the task at hand. Typically, representations
that are supervised and depend on the current task are less flexible to changes in the
task and are slow to adapt to changes in the environment or goal. The architecture
of Luo et al. (2020) only needs to learn a new set of attention filters for a new task,
which allows it to quickly re-purpose the representations learnt by the vision network
and can create sub-networks for different tasks. In comparison, the architecture of
Mott et al. (2019) will alter the parameters across all of its networks in response
to a new task. This is likely to greatly reduce the flexibility of Mott et al. (2019)’s
approach and misses out on one of the greatest benefits of selective attention; fast
and dynamic changes in state representation based on the current goal. In both Luo
et al. (2020) and Mott et al. (2019) the ability of each of the agent architectures to
deal with task changes is not explored qualitatively or quantitatively.
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen that the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) is able to support
efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL) by interacting with the straitum, hippocam-
pus and sensory cortices. These interactions highlight the need for Complementary
Learning Systems (CLS) theory to account for the distinction between the PFC and
other cortical regions. The PFC has long been associated with executive control and
this is apparent in each of the pathways that we have described here. In particular,
we have highlighted the ability of the PFC to perform meta-learning, contextual
memory retrieval and selective attention as important for performing rapid learn-
ing and transfer in RL. Imbuing Deep RL systems with these abilities is likely to
dramatically improve their efficiency.
Wang et al. (2016, 2018) have proposed that the PFC can act directly with the
striatum to support efficient RL through meta-learning or ‘learning to learn’. This
proposal suggests that the high-degree of recurrency within the PFC allows it to
implement an RL algorithm within its activity dynamics, while the updating of
synapses are used to improve this RL algorithm. In this way the PFC is able to use
dopamine reward-prediction errors to learn how to improve its learning on a series
of related tasks. The only conditions required for such an ability is the presence of
a recurrent network with memory and access to reward prediction errors, which are
both satisfied by the PFC-striatal pathway. No task specific engineering is required
and so this form of meta-learning can be considered a domain general mechanism.
Due to these simple requirements Wang et al. (2016) have demonstrated that this
form of meta-learning can occur naturally in Deep RL algorithms and that it can
perform interesting forms of rapid learning and transfer, such as solving the Harlow
(1949) task via ‘one-shot’ learning.
Aside for direct interactions with the striatum, the PFC can also interact with
the hippocampus to support efficient RL. Often mechanisms of transfer and anal-
ogy do not consider the problem of selecting memories to transfer knowledge from
and instead focus on the transfer or alignment process itself. A wealth of empirical
evidence has started to suggest that the selection of episodic memories based on the
current context might be due to interactions between the PFC and the hippocampus
(Place et al., 2016; Eichenbaum, 2017; Dobbins et al., 2002; Navawongse and Eichen-
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baum, 2013). In addition to contextual memory retrieval, interactions between the
PFC and hippocampus have also been suggested to give rise to conceptual rep-
resentations in the hippocampus (Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013; Schlichting and
Preston, 2016; Mack et al., 2016, 2020). Concepts are likely to be a critical com-
ponent of efficient RL as they allow for reasoning about exemplars that have never
been seen before. It appears that the PFC provides an attentional signal to the
hippocampus in order to highlight the features that are diagnostic of a particular
concept. Evidence for this comes from the fact that a computational model of con-
cept learning called SUSTAIN, which utilises attentional signals, is able to predict
the neuronal responses of the hippocampus and PFC (Mack et al., 2016).
The role of the PFC in selective attention is not only limited to interactions with
the hippocampus. The PFC is also thought to exert selective attention on sensory
cortices to guide perception towards features of the environment that are important
for the task at hand (Radulescu et al., 2019). From a transfer perspective, selective
attention on sensory cortices can be seen as selecting features from past experience
that are useful for the current goal. In this way, selective attention can influence
RL during both choice and learning. At choice, selective attention can bias state
and/or action evaluations by increasing the influence of certain features, while during
learning it can bias synaptic updates towards certain features (Leong et al., 2017).
This can greatly improve the efficiency of RL by reducing the dimensionality of the
state representation and streamlining learning towards the most relevant features.
Current models of selective attention in Deep RL have demonstrated these benefits
(Mott et al., 2019) but have missed out on another major benefit; increased flexibil-
ity. One of the key properties of selective attention is that it can be changed quickly
in the face of changing task demands thereby greatly increasing the flexibility of
RL. Deep RL models typically rely on backpropagation to learn attentional weights
and are therefore slow to adapt to changes in the task. This suggests that these
approaches are missing key computational properties of selective attention and the
interactions between the PFC and sensory cortices.
With this in mind, in the next chapter we propose a novel algorithm for imbuing
a Deep RL agent with the ability to perform selective visual attention. The goal
of this algorithm is to provide a computational account of how the brain is able to
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flexibly learn which features to attend to based on the task at hand. Rather than
using slow incremental learning, such as backpropagation, our approach relies on
Bayesian approximation in the form of a particle filter. The particle filter represents
different hypotheses about which latent visual features are useful for the current
task, which is thought to be the responsibility of the PFC (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Radulescu et al., 2019). The particle filter is updated based on bottom-up and
top-down influences, which are both important components of human attention
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Treue, 2003). Critically, we demonstrate that our
approach improves the efficiency of RL both in terms of rapid learning and transfer.
This further serves to highlight the importance of extending CLS theory to include






In this chapter we present a novel algorithm called Selective Particle Attention (SPA)
that uses visual feature-based attention to improve the efficiency of Reinforcement
Learning (RL). SPA mimics interactions between the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and
sensory cortices by identifying learnt features of the visual scene that are important
for the current task, regardless of their spatial location. Such a mechanism has been
proposed to improve the efficiency of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in the brain by
reducing the dimensionality of state representations and guiding learning towards
relevant features. From a mechanistic point of view, SPA uses a particle filter to
model how the PFC represents multiple hypotheses about which features to attend
to based on the current task (Section 6.2). SPA filters these hypotheses based on how
accurately each one predicts future reward and the bottom-up saliency of individual
features. We evaluate SPA on a multiple choice task and a 2D video game that both
involve raw pixel input and dynamic changes to the task structure (Section 6.3). We
show various benefits of SPA over approaches that naively attend to either all or
random subsets of features. Our results demonstrate (1) how visual feature-based
attention in Deep RL models can improve their learning efficiency and ability to deal
with sudden changes in task structure and (2) that particle filters may represent a
viable computational account of how visual feature-based attention occurs in the
brain. 1
1The work in this chapter is under review and a pre-print can be found at: Blakeman, S.,
& Mareschal, D. (2020). Selective Particle Attention: Visual Feature-Based Attention in Deep
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6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we made a case for extending Complementary Learning
Systems (CLS) theory to include the differentiation between sensory cortices and
the PFC. From making this distinction we saw that the interaction between the
PFC and sensory cortices (Pathway 6 in Figure 5.1) is responsible for selective at-
tention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001), which refers to the
identification of features of the environment that are relevant for the task at hand.
Selective attention can occur across several modalities including vision and audition.
In vision, selective attention is often broadly split into two types; spatial and feature-
based attention (Lindsay, 2020). Spatial attention refers to the selective processing
of specific areas of the visual field. In comparison, feature-based attention is used to
selectively process specific features of the visual input regardless of their location in
the visual field and is the focus of this chapter. Feature-based attention is typically
studied by priming individuals to attend to a certain feature and then measuring
their ability to detect the primed feature. For example, participants who are primed
to attend to a specific orientation of visual grating are subsequently better at detect-
ing that grating (Rossi and Paradiso, 1995). From a neural point of view, the firing
of neurons that encode the attended feature appear to increase, while the firing rates
of neurons encoding the non-attended feature appear to decrease (Treue and Tru-
jillo, 1999; Saenz et al., 2002). This modulation of firing rates in the visual stream
is thought to originate from the PFC (Bichot et al., 2015; Paneri and Gregoriou,
2017) and be most effective in higher order visual areas (Lindsay and Miller, 2018;
Baluch and Itti, 2011). Importantly, these top-down goal-driven influences from the
PFC are thought to work in combination with bottom-up influences (Desimone and
Duncan, 1995), which are driven by intrinsic properties of the stimuli that are task-
agnostic (Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004). While these priming studies demonstrate the
effect of selective attention they do not tackle the problem of how to learn which
features to attend to.
The work in this chapter focuses on a computational account of how visual
feature-based attention can interface with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to help us
learn which features to attend to in a task with a specified reward structure. Selective
Reinforcement Learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.11491.
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feature-based attention can greatly reduce the complexity of the RL problem by
reducing the dimensionality of the state representation to only the features that are
important for the current task (Jones and Canas, 2010; Niv et al., 2015; Wilson and
Niv, 2012). It is typically thought to be much faster acting than the incremental
learning of new representations as it allows for the quick and flexible re-purposing
of existing representations. Selective attention in RL can affect both learning and
choice. During learning, selective attention can modify the magnitude of weight
updates for each feature and during choice it can alter the magnitude of each features
contribution to a decision (Leong et al., 2017). There is therefore a reciprocal
relationship between attention and learning in RL; attention biases learning but
learning guides which features are attended to. It remains an open question how we
learn which features to attend to based on the reward structure of the current task.
One proposal is that we learn to attend to the features that are most predictive
of reward (Mackintosh, 1975). For example, people are able to switch between an
object-based or a feature-based state representation based on which one is the best
predictor of reward (Farashahi et al., 2017).
Advances in Deep RL have provided the opportunity to begin examining how
the brain may go from naturalistic high-dimensional input to action based on re-
ward signals. Deep RL has been particularly powerful in the visual domain where
Deep RL agents have learnt to perform complex tasks from raw pixel inputs, such
as playing video games at human level performance (Mnih et al., 2015, 2016). These
models typically rely on the use of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs)
to approximate a value function and/or a policy. This is of interest to cognitive
scientists and neuroscientists because a growing body of evidence is suggesting that
the hierarchical representations learnt by DCNNs are similar to those found in the
ventral stream of the human brain (Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015; Yamins and Di-
Carlo, 2016; Schrimpf et al., 2018). Despite these successes, one consistent criticism
of Deep RL models is that they lack the efficiency and flexibility demonstrated by
human learning. Selective attention represents one potential mechanism for helping
to address these issues. We saw in Chapter 5 that initial attempts to imbue agents
with selective attention have involved a mechanism known as self-attention, which
maps query and key-pair vectors to an output vector (Mott et al., 2019; Manchin
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et al., 2019; Zambaldi et al., 2018; Bramlage and Cortese, 2020). This computation
is fully differentiable and so can be trained end-to-end using backpropagation.
These forms of selective attention in Deep RL, and indeed other forms (Sorokin
et al., 2015), have several striking differences to feature-based attention in the human
visual cortex. Firstly, when presented with a novel situation humans typically select
from pre-existing features and use a function of these features to guide decision-
making, rather than learning a completely new set of features. This is important
because it eludes to one of the most powerful properties of selective feature-based
attention; it can quickly and dynamically re-purpose representations without over-
writing them. In comparison, learning new features in the visual stream is thought
to occur slowly over many experiences and is often referred to as perceptual learning
(Schyns et al., 1998). Being fully differentiable, the aforementioned approaches rely
on a selective attention mechanism that ultimately learns the underlying represen-
tations that are to be attended to, which is both slow and inflexible. A second
noticeable difference between current visual selective attention mechanisms in Deep
RL and those in the brain is the lack of bottom-up influences. Bottom-up influences
are a critical component of human visual attention and help to guide us to salient
pieces of information in the environment (Treue, 2003). This suggests that their in-
clusion in Deep RL models may help to improve their performance and bring them
closer to models of human visual selective attention.
With these criticisms in mind, we propose a novel algorithm that we term Selec-
tive Particle Attention (SPA), which implements visual feature-based attention in
a Deep RL agent (Figure 6.1A) (Blakeman and Mareschal, 2020b). SPA consists
of three main steps; feature extraction, feature selection and value computation. At
its core SPA uses Bayesian principles to quickly and flexibly re-purposes features
that are learnt slowly over many examples. This speeds up learning by reducing the
dimensionality of the problem and reduces interference by preserving the underlying
features. Each step of SPA resembles the problem faced by the human brain in
several important ways. Firstly, a pre-trained DCNN is used to extract features
of the visual input. We use VGG-16 due to its relatively low computational costs
and good correspondence with representations found in the visual stream (Schrimpf
et al., 2018). Importantly, no further training of VGG-16 is performed in order to
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Figure 6.1: Depiction of Selective Particle Attention (SPA). (A) Overall architec-
ture of SPA. A pre-trained deep convolutional neural network (VGG-16) is used to
extract 2D feature maps from an image. The feature maps are then fed to an at-
tention layer, which uses a particle filter to generate attention values. Each particle
(xi) in the particle filter uses a binary vector to represent a hypothesis about which
feature maps are useful for the current task. The attention values are calculated
as the mean over all particle states, normalised to sum to one (x̃). Each of the
feature maps is multiplied by its corresponding attention value in an element-wise
fashion to produce the output of the attention layer. The result is passed to a Deep
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm for action selection. (B) Updating of the
particle filter. In the first (movement) step, a small proportion of particle states (xi)
are updated to reflect the most active features given the current input. In the second
(observe) step, particles are assigned re-sampling weights based on how accurately
they predict reward. In the final (re-sample) step, the re-sampling weights are nor-
malised to produce a probability distribution and the particles are re-sampled with
replacement.
mimic how the human brain has to pick from existing representations that change
very slowly in sensory cortices.
Once the features have been extracted from VGG-16, we implement selective
feature-based attention by filtering the features using a set of attention values gen-
erated by a particle filter (Figure 6.1B). Particle filters have been proposed to repre-
sent a computationally plausible model of selective attention in the brain (Radulescu
et al., 2019) and have been shown to better model shifts in attention than gradual
error-driven learning (Radulescu et al.). In our approach, each particle represents a
hypothesis about which features are important for the current task. This is analo-
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gous to the PFC, which represents competing hypotheses about which features of the
visual input to attend to given the current goal (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Radulescu
et al., 2019). Each particle is updated based on how accurately it predicts future
reward and the bottom-up salience of individual features. SPA therefore combines
both bottom-up and top-down attention to help guide feature selection. The at-
tention values are calculated by normalising the mean particle state to sum to one.
Interestingly, computational models of visual attention highlight normalisation as a
key step for capturing competition between features in the visual cortex (Reynolds
and Heeger, 2009).
After the particle filter has been used to selectively attend to specific visual
features, we apply a Deep RL algorithm to approximate the value function and/or
policy. This can be tentatively compared to the role of the striatum, which is
thought to evaluate states and/or actions based on inputs from cortical regions
(Schultz, 1998; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002; Maia, 2009; Setlow et al., 2003)
and temporal difference errors (Schultz et al., 1997). Our approach is compatible
with a wide range of Deep RL algorithms, the only requirement is that the Deep
RL algorithm utilises a value function. This is so that the particle filter can use the
value predictions to assess how accurately each particle predicts future reward.
We assess our approach, on two key tasks; a multiple choice task and a 2D video
game based on collecting objects. Both tasks involve processing observations from
raw pixel input and dealing with unannounced changes in task structure. In both
cases the selective attention mechanism of SPA leads to improved performance in
terms of the onset, speed, robustness and flexibility of learning compared to naive
approaches that either attended to all or a random subset of features. We also
show that these findings occur independently of the RL algorithm used, making it
applicable to a variety of problems. Overall our results demonstrate that SPA is a
viable method for performing visual feature-based attention in a Deep RL agent and
that it may capture some of the key computational properties of selective attention in
the brain. In particular, SPA provides a mechanistic explanation of how bottom-up
and top-down attention may interact in the brain in order to guide feature selection




We used two different tasks to assess our approach: a multiple choice task and a 2D
video game called the object collection game. Both tasks require the agent to select
actions based on raw pixel input and to switch attention in response to changing task
demands. The multiple choice task involves making a single decision on each trial,
which is equivalent to a single step Markov Decision Process (MDP). In comparison,
the object collection game involves sequential decisions and therefore corresponds
to a multi-step MDP. The subsequent sections will discuss each task in more detail.
6.2.1.1 Multiple Choice Task
For the multiple choice task we used the Caltech 101 data set (Fei-Fei et al., 2006),
which consists of 101 object categories with approximately 40 to 800 images per
category. Three categories from the Caltech 101 data set were chosen at random and
the images from those categories were used for the multiple choice task (Figure 6.2).
The task consisted of 200 blocks of 50 trials. A single trial consisted of presenting
the agent with 3 different natural images, one from each of the chosen categories.
The images were presented separately, one after the other. For each block one of
the categories was chosen at random and associated with a positive reward of +1
while the others were associated with no reward. The agent therefore has to work
out which image is associated with a reward on each trial based on features of a
specific category. Every time a new block starts the agent also has to adapt to the
change in reward structure using only reward feedback.
Figure 6.2: Example images from the Caltech 101 data set. Left image is from the
‘motorbikes’ category, the middle image is from the ‘butterfly’ category and the right
image is from the ‘chair’ category. On each trial the agent was presented with three
separate images each selected randomly from three different categories. For a given
block, only one image category was associated with a reward of +1 and the rest were
associated with a reward of 0. The rewarded category was chosen at random for each
block of trials.
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To ensure that the agent did not learn to remember specific exemplars in the data
set we had training and test phases. During the training phase the agent was able
to update the parameters of the Deep RL network in response to reward feedback,
however during the test phase it was not. With respect to attention, the agent was
allowed to update its attention values during test but the network weights were kept
fixed. The test phase used images from the chosen object categories that were not
presented during training and consisted of 10 blocks of 50 trials.
6.2.1.2 Object Collection Game
The 2D video game, which we refer to as the object collection game, was made
using Pygame (www.pygame.org). In the game, the agent controlled a grey block
at the bottom of the screen and could move it either left or right at each time step.
Every second an object that could vary in shape and colour was generated at the
top of the screen and moved downwards to the bottom of the screen. The goal of
the agent was to collect objects by colliding with them as they reached the bottom
of the screen. Agents were trained for 2000 episodes, with each episode lasting 60
seconds.
We explored two different variations of this basic game configuration. In the first
variation, the agent was given a reward of +1 for collecting objects of a certain shape
and a reward of 0 for all other shapes (Figure 6.3A). This tested the agent’s ability to
focus on particular features of the environment and ignore others; the agent had to
attend to the target shape while ignoring colour and all other shapes. As we saw in
the multiple choice task, one benefit of an effective selective attention mechanism is
that attention can be altered in response to changes in the reward structure. To test
whether this was also the case in the object collection game, we randomly selected a
new shape to be rewarded after 1000 episodes. This is akin to changing the reward
function of the environment and requires the agent to re-evaluate its policy. We
refer to this variation as the reward revaluation task.
In addition to the reward function, other aspects of the environment can change
such as the set of perceptual observations experienced by the agent. In RL this
is commonly referred to as a change in state space. The second variation of the
object collection game therefore explored the ability of SPA to deal with changes in
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state space (Figure 6.3B). For the first 1000 episodes, all the objects were the same
shape and colour and were associated with a reward of +1. After 1000 episodes the
shape and colour of the objects were changed to a different shape and colour. This
corresponds to a change in the perceptual input of the agent because the objects
present in the first half of training are different to the ones present in the second























Figure 6.3: Example screenshots from the two variations of the object collection
game. The agent is in control of the grey rectangle and can move it either left
or right to catch objects that move from the top of the screen to the bottom. The
rewarded object is depicted above each screenshot. (A) The reward revaluation task.
A specific shape is associated with a reward of +1 regardless of its colour. All other
shapes are associated with a reward of 0. The rewarded shape is then randomly
changed after 1000 episodes, which corresponds to a change in the reward function
of the environment. (B) The state revaluation task. All objects are the same shape
and colour, and are associated with a reward of +1. The shape and colour of these
objects is then randomly changed after 1000 episodes, which corresponds to a change
in the state space of the environment.
6.2.2 Selective Particle Attention
Our approach, termed Selective Particle Attention (SPA), consists of three main
components; a pre-trained Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN) for feature
extraction, a particle filter for selective attention and a Deep RL algorithm for action
selection. The subsequent sections break-down each component and their underlying
mechanisms in more detail.
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6.2.2.1 VGG-16
To perform feature extraction on raw pixel values we use a pre-trained Deep Con-
volutional Neural Network (DCNN). We chose VGG-16 (Simonyan and Zisserman,
2014) as the DCNN for all simulations because of its relative simplicity and good
correspondence with representations found in the visual stream (Schrimpf et al.,
2018). The architecture of VGG-16 consists of 5 blocks of convolutional layers each
with a max pooling layer at the end. VGG-16 was trained on a classification task
using the Imagenet dataset (Deng et al., 2009), which consists of naturalistic im-
ages. For our simulations we performed no further training of VGG-16 and removed
the fully connected layers after the final convolutional block. This left us with 512
feature maps as output, which served as the basis for selective attention. For all
simulations the input images were resized to be 224 X 224 pixels and converted to
RGB format in order to match the required inputs of VGG-16. Pre-processing was
performed in the standard manner for VGG-16 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014).
6.2.2.2 Attention Layer
The attention layer is applied to the final feature maps provided by VGG-16 using
a process similar to the one described by Luo et al. (2020). Attention is represented
as a K dimensional vector that can take on any real valued number between 0 and
1 inclusive:
A ∈ [0, 1]K (6.1)
Where K is the number of feature maps, which in our case was 512. This
attention vector is applied to the final feature maps of VGG-16 using the hadamard
product between A and the values of each feature map. This requires that each
entry in A is replicated to match the dimensions of a single feature map, with the
same attentional value applied across all spatial locations. This process re-weights
the feature map activations, amplifying feature maps with a large attentional weight.
The output of the attention layer is then reshaped into a single vector and passed
on to a Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm for action selection. Our
approach is independent of the Deep RL algorithm used, so long as it involves the
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approximation of a state value function (see below).
6.2.2.3 Particle Filter
The particle filter is responsible for learning the values of the attention vector given
the current task. Particle filters are typically used to estimate the value of a latent
variable (X) given noisy samples of an observed variable (O) when the number
of potential values is large. The overall goal of a particle filter is to use a set
of ‘particles’ to represent a posterior distribution over the latent variable. Each
particle represents a belief or hypothesis about the value of the latent variable and
the density of the particles can be used to approximate the posterior distribution.
In our case the latent variable X represents the configuration of features that
are useful for the current task. We use a value of 1 to denote a feature as useful and
a value of 0 to denote a feature as not useful. This means that x can be any binary
vector of size K:
x ∈ {0, 1}K (6.2)
Where K is the number of features, which in our case was 512 corresponding to
the number of feature maps of VGG-16. As the number of possible values that X
can take is 2K , we use N particles to approximate the posterior distribution over X
where N << 2K . The state xi of the ith particle therefore corresponds to a binary
vector of length K and provides a hypothesis about which features it deems relevant
for the current task.
A particle filter consists of two main steps; a movement step and an observa-
tion step. In the movement step, the particles are updated based on some known
transition probability for the latent variable:
x′ ∼ P (X ′|x) (6.3)
This process is often used to represent the passing of time. In our approach
we introduce the notion of bottom-up attention during the movement step. Let f
k
t
denote the average value over all the units in feature map k from VGG-16 at time
















P (x′k = n) =
p
k for n = 1
1− pk for n = 0
(6.6)
First the mean activation values for each feature map of VGG-16 are normalised
to sum to 1. This normalisation accounts for differences in overall activation values
between time steps and preserves relative differences between activation values. The
activation values are then exponentiated and normalised by the maximum value
across all feature maps. This ensures that the most active feature will receive a
value of 1. Finally this is used as the probability that the kth entry of the particle
state will be equal to one, as described by a Bernoulli distribution. In this way, a
proportion of the particles are updated to represent the most active features given
the current input. This is akin to bottom-up attention, whereby highly salient
perceptual features capture ones attention in an involuntary manner. In our agent
this serves to introduce a prior to attend to the highly active features of the current
task. The free parameter τBU controls the strength of the bottom up attention, a
higher value of τBU leads to a higher probability of the most active features being
attended to and the least active features not being attended to.
In the observation step of a particle filter, particles are weighted based on the
likelihood of the observed variable O given the value of the latent variable X rep-
resented by a particle. These weights are then used to re-sample the particles and
update the posterior distribution ready for the next time step. In our approach, we
introduce top-down attention during this step. We take our observed variable O to
be the return from a given state Rt. We calculate the likelihood of this return by
using the particle state as the attention vector and calculating the error between
the predicted state value and the return. Let xi denote the state of the ith particle,








δi = (Rt − V (st; Ai))2 (6.8)
P (Rt|xi) ∝ exp(−(δi −min
j
δj) ∗ τTD) (6.9)
Where Rt is the return from state st and V (st; A
i) is the predicted state value
calculated by using the normalised particle state xi as the attention vector. The
normalisation step in Equation 6.7 accounts for the different numbers of features
that are attended to by different particles. Equation 6.8 calculates the squared
error between the return and predicted state value. The likelihood of the return
Rt is then proportional to this error value. This process can be seen as evaluating
the accuracy of a particle’s hypothesis over which features are relevant for the given
task. If the particle’s hypothesis is good then it will more accurately predict the
target return and so will produce a larger likelihood. In this way we capture the
effect of top-down attention, whereby a set of hypotheses are evaluated and the most
accurate ones are considered for the next time step. τTD controls the strength of
this top down attention; a larger value will more strongly penalise hypotheses that
are inaccurate.
Once the likelihoods have been calculated they are normalised to form a proba-
bility distribution and the particles are re-sampled with replacement:
P (x′) =
∑N
i=1 P (Rt|x′)I(xi = x′)∑N
i=1 P (Rt|xi)
(6.10)
x′ ∼ P (x′) (6.11)
Once the re-sampling has been performed, the final step is to reset the value of
the attention vector. This is done by setting the attention vector to be the mean of












Where N is the number of particles and K is the number of features. The full
algorithm used to update the attention vector can be seen in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 UpdateAttention(v, s,R, φ)
Receive vector of normalised mean feature map values v = {vt, ..., vt+Z}
Receive vector of states s = {st, ..., st+Z}
Receive vector of returns R = {Rt, ..., Rt+Z}
Receive movement probability φ
















Update each particle state xi with probability φ
P (xik = n) =
{
pk for n = 1
1− pk for n = 0
2. Perform Observe Step









z=t (Rz − V (sz; Ai))2
P (R|xi) ∝ exp(−(δi −minj δj) ∗ τTD)
Re-sample particles based on calculated likelihoods
P (x′) =
∑N
i=1 P (R|x′)I(xi = x′)∑N
i=1 P (R|xi)
xi ∼ P (x′)
3. Update Attention












6.2.2.4 Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
The final component of our approach is a standard Deep Reinforcement Learning
(RL) algorithm for selecting actions based on the results of the selective attention
mechanism. Our approach can be used with a variety of Deep RL algorithms as long
as they involve a value function. The use of a value function is critical because the
particle filter uses the value predictions of each of its particles to calculate likelihood
values for re-sampling (Equation 6.9). A value function therefore allows the particle
filter to assess different hypotheses based on how predictive they are of reward. The
specifics of each of the Deep RL algorithms used are covered in the following sections
based on the task being considered.
Multiple Choice Task
For the multiple choice task we passed the results of the attention layer to a three
layer feed forward Deep Neural Network (DNN) (Figure 6.4). The DNN was used
to approximate the value of a given state, which in this case was the value of a given
image. To select an action the value of each image was calculated and one of the
images was chosen in an ε-greedy manner, with ε = .2. As each trial was based on
a single choice, the problem is equivalent to a single step Markov Decision Process
(MDP). We therefore trained the DNN after each trial to minimise the squared error




(Rt − V (st; θ,A))2 (6.14)
= 1
2
(rt − V (st; θ,A))2 (6.15)
∇θJ(θ) = −(rt − V (st; θ,A))∇θV (st; θ,A) (6.16)
Where θ are the parameters of the DNN, A is the attention vector, st is the
image chosen at time t and rt is the reward associated with the image chosen. We
used RMSProp as an optimizer and the hyper-parameter values can be seen in Table
6.1. As mentioned in Section 6.2 the weights of VGG-16 were kept constant and a
particle filter was used to dynamically update the features that are being attended
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to. For the particular filter the return (Rt) in Equation 6.8 was simply the reward
experienced at the end of each trial (rt). The full algorithm for the multiple choice
task is shown in Algorithm 7.
Figure 6.4: Architecture used in the multiple choice task for the deep reinforcement
learning component of Selective Particle Attention (SPA). Numbers in brackets
represent the number of units and each layer was fully connected. V (st) corresponds
to the value of a particular image.
Table 6.1: Hyper-parameter values used for the multiple choice task.
Parameter Value Description
N 250 Number of particles
τBU 10 Strength of bottom-up attention
τTD 10 Strength of top-down attention
ε .2 Probability of selecting a random action
λ .00025 Learning rate for RMSProp
κ .95 Momentum for RMSProp
ι .01 Constant for denominator in RMSProp
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Algorithm 7 Full algorithm for the multiple choice task.
Initialize value function parameters with random weights θ
Initialize attention vector A← 1K· 1
K
Initialize state of each particle xi ← 0K
Initialise movement probability φ← 1
for t = 1, T do
Observe the three images {s1t , s2t , s3t}
With probability ε select a random action at
Otherwise at ← arg maxa(V (sat ); θ,A)
Receive reward rt
Get mean feature maps f t from random image ∼ U{s1t , s2t , s3t}







UpdateAttention({vt}, {satt }, {rt}, φ)




For the object collection game we passed the results of the attention layer to a fully
connected layer followed by a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, which
output the state value and a softmax distribution over actions (Figure 6.5). The
network therefore resembled an advantage actor critic (A2C) architecture (Mnih
et al., 2016), whereby the predicted state value from the critic was used to calculate
the advantage function. We chose this setup to explore whether SPA could work
when the network also had to compute a policy. The agent received every 8th frame
as input. The cost function of the critic was the mean squared error between the
return and the predicted value:
J(θ) = 1
2
(Rt − V (st; θ,A))2 (6.17)
∇θJ(θ) = −(Rt − V (st; θ,A))∇θV (st; θ,A) (6.18)
Where θ are the parameters of the DNN, A is the attention vector, st is the
frame of the game at time t and Rt is the return from state st. The actor was
updated using the advantage calculated from the critic:
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Figure 6.5: Architecture used in the object collection game for the deep reinforcement
learning component of Selective Particle Attention (SPA). Numbers in brackets
represent the number of units and each layer was fully connected. An actor-critic
architecture was used so that the network output both a state value and a probabilistic
policy in the form of a soft-max distribution.
A(st, at) = Q(st, at)− V (st) (6.19)
= Rt − V (st; θ,A) (6.20)
∇θL(θ) = A(st, at)∇θ ln π(at | st; θ,A) + β∇θH(π(at | st; θ,A)) (6.21)
Where H represents the entropy of the softmax distribution over actions and is
included to encourage exploration. β is a free parameter that controls the strength
of this entropy term and was set to 0.01 for all simulations. In all cases, the return
Rt from state st was estimated using n-step Temporal Difference (TD) learning:
Rnt = rt + γrt+1 + ...γ
n−1rt+n−1 + γ





nV (st+n; θ,A) (6.23)
This was used for calculating the target for the critic via Equation 6.17 and for
calculating the advantage in Equation 6.20. The training procedure was the same
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as in Mnih et al. (2016) with tmax set to 10. More specifically, the agent selects
actions up until tmax or the trial ends. At this point the the gradients are calculated
for each of the n-step TD-learning updates using the longest possible n-step return.
For example, the update for the last state will be a one-step update whereas the
update for the first state will be a tmax-step update. These gradients are all applied
in a single update.
The returns calculated using the aforementioned procedure were also used in
Equation 6.8 for calculating the observation step of the particle filter. However,
the movement and update steps of the particle filter were not performed on every
training step (when tmax or the trial ends). Instead they were performed every cmax
training steps, we found that this improved both stability and reduced training time.
The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 8 and Table 6.2 shows the hyper-parameter
values used.
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Algorithm 8 Full algorithm for the object collection game.
Initialize A2C network parameters with random weights θ
Initialize time step and attention step counters t← 0, c← 0
Initialize attention vector A← 1K · 1
K
Initialize state of each particle xi ← 0K
Initialise movement probability φ← 1
for e = 1, E do
dθπ, dθv ← 0
tstart ← t
Get state st and mean feature maps f t
repeat







Perform action at using policy π(at | st; θπ,A)
Receive reward rt, state st+1 and mean feature maps f t+1
t← t+ 1
until terminal st or t− tstart == tmax
Rt =
{
0 if terminal st
V (st; θv,A) otherwise
for i ∈ {t− 1, ..., tstart} do
Ri ← ri + γRi+1
end for
c← c+ 1
if c == cmax then
v← {vtstart , ..., vt−1}
s← {ststart , ..., st−1}





for R ∈ {Rtstart , ..., Rt−1} do
dθπ ← dθπ +∇θπ log π(at | st; θπ,A)(R− V (st; θv,A))
dθv ← dθv + (R− V (st; θv,A))∇θvV (st; θv,A)
end for
θπ ← θπ + αdθπ
θv ← θv + αdθv
end for
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Table 6.2: Hyper-parameter values used for the object collection game.
Parameter Value Description
N 250 Number of particles
τBU 1 Strength of bottom-up attention
τTD 10 Strength of top-down attention
cmax 1000 Frequency of attention updates
tmax 10 Maximum length of return
β 0.01 Exploration strength
γ .99 Discount factor for future rewards
m 8 Number of frames skipped
α 0.0001 Learning rate for Adam optimizer
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Multiple Choice Task
As a baseline to measure the effectiveness of our proposed attention mechanism
we compared the performance of SPA to a version of SPA where each entry of the
attention vector was set to a fixed value of 1/K. This corresponds to attending to all
features of VGG-16 equally and we refer to this approach as SPAALL. We also ran
an ideal observer model on the multiple choice task to provide a measure of ceiling
performance. The ideal observer model selects the image corresponding to the last
rewarded object category. All models select a random action with probability ε in
order to encourage exploration.
Figure 6.6A shows the performance of SPA, SPAALL and the ideal observer
during training for one random combination of object categories over 5 random
seeds. The rewarded image category was changed every 50 trials. In this example
SPA performs close to optimal as it shows a similar learning trajectory to the ideal
observer. In comparison, SPAALL performs poorly and is substantially worse than
both SPA and the ideal observer. To test the robustness of these findings we ran
all three approaches over 5 random seeds on 20 different combinations of object
categories. Figure 6.6C shows the results of these simulations. SPA out-performed




Figure 6.6: Performance of Selective Particle Attention (SPA) on the multiple
choice task. (A-B) Training (A) and test (B) scores over 5 random seeds for
the leopards, faces and soccer balls image categories. The rewarded image category
was changed randomly every 50 trials and is represented by a vertical black line in B.
Error bars represent one standard deviation. SPA used selective attention to attend
to features that it deemed useful for the current task. SPAALL did not use selec-
tive attention and instead attended to every feature of VGG-16. The Ideal observer
model represents ceiling performance. (C-D) Comparison of SPA and SPAALL
in terms of total training (C) and test (D) scores for 20 different image category
combinations. Each point represents the mean performance over 5 random seeds
for an image category combination. Solid line represents equal performance between
SPA and SPAALL
While the dynamic attention mechanism of SPA appeared to provide a substan-
tial benefit during training, we also wanted to test whether this benefit generalized
to unseen images. Figure 6.6B shows the results of the three approaches on the test
phase after the training seen in Figure 6.6A. Again the rewarded image category
was changed every 50 trials. Importantly the test blocks used images that were
not used during training and all the weights of the Deep RL algorithm were frozen
so that only the attention vector could change in the case of SPA. Again SPA
exhibited performance similar to that of the ideal observer, while SPAALL showed
significantly worse performance. Figure 6.6D shows the test results over 5 random
seeds for all 20 of the different category combinations. As with training, SPA out-
performed SPAALL for all of the category combinations. These results suggests that
the benefit of the attention mechanism of SPA generalizes well to unseen images.
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Both the training and test results suggest that SPA is able to cope with changes
in the reward function by dynamically re-configuring existing representations for the
purpose of state evaluation. Figure 6.7 shows an example of the attention vector
during the test phase. The attention vector reliably changes when the target image
category changes. This confirms that the attention mechanism of SPA is able to use
changes in the reward function to re-evaluate the features that need to be attended
to. Interestingly, the attention vector is not the same every time a given image
category is made the target. This is likely due to the fact that SPA will be biased
towards attending to features that are present in the first few images, which will
be different for each block. In addition, there is likely to be a contextual effect of
the rewarded image category in the previous block. For example, if in the previous
block the category ‘soccer ball’ was rewarded and in the current block ‘faces’ are
rewarded, then this might bias the selection of features that correspond to ‘round’
in the current block.
























Figure 6.7: Example of the attention vector values for the leopards, faces and soccer
balls image categories. Black represents a value of 0 and white represents a value of
1. The solid blue horizontal line represents a random change in the rewarded image
category. The rewarded image category for a given block is presented on the right.
The results shown in Figures 6.6B and 6.6D indicate that the performance of
SPA can vary depending on the combination of image categories that are chosen.
This suggests that SPA finds it easier to discriminate between certain image cate-
gories compared to others based on their features. Figures 6.8A and 6.8B show the
mean feature map values of VGG-16 for the image categories that SPA performed
best (leopards, faces and soccer balls) and worst (cups, chandeliers and cellphones)
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on. In the best case scenario, the feature maps contain several features that are
substantially more active than others. This likely provides a good substrate for
bottom-up attention because there are a handful of features that are reliably more
active than the others, which corresponds to a strong prior over hypotheses. In com-
parison, in the worse case scenario, the features take on a more uniform distribution
of activation values and so the prior over hypotheses is weaker.
A C
B D
Figure 6.8: Analysis of the feature map values produced by VGG-16 during the mul-
tiple choice task. (A-B) Average feature map values of VGG-16 for the combination
of image categories that lead to the best (A) and worst (B) training performance of
SPA. (C-D) Euclidean distances between the average feature map values of VGG-
16 for the combination of image categories that lead to the best (C) and worst (D)
training performance of SPA.
Bottom-up attention aside, having a few highly active features is only useful for
the multiple choice task if they help to discriminate between the different image
categories. As seen in Figures 6.8A and 6.8B, each image category produces 512
average feature values, which can then be expressed as a vector in Euclidean space.
Figures 6.8C and 6.8D show the Euclidean distance between these vectors for the
best and worst case scenarios respectively. In the best case scenario, the euclidean
distance between the majority of the image categories is larger than in the worst
case scenario. In addition the mean euclidean distance over all pairwise comparisons
in the best case scenario is nearly double that of the worst case scenario. This
suggests that the categories in the best case scenario are easier to discriminate
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between because they are further apart in euclidean space. This is likely to help the
top-down attention of SPA because each particle will produce very different value
estimates depending on the image category being attended to.
6.3.2 Object Collection Game
As with the multiple choice task, we compared SPA to a baseline approach that
attended to all features of VGG-16, which we refer to as SPAALL. In addition to
SPAALL, we also included a condition that set the attention vector to a random
binary vector, which was then normalised to sum to 1. This condition was included
to account for the fact that random feature reduction may lead to improved perfor-
mance and we refer to it as SPARANDOM .
A B
Figure 6.9: Performance of SPA, SPAALL and SPARANDOM on the object collec-
tion game. Each point is the average score over the last 20 episodes. Error bars rep-
resent one standard deviation. Each approach was run over 5 different random seeds
and the error bars represent one standard deviation. SPA used selective attention
to attend to features that it deemed useful for the current task. SPAALL did not use
selective attention and instead attended to every feature of VGG-16. SPARANDOM
attended to a random subset of features, which changed with each random seed. (A)
The vertical dashed line indicates where the rewarded object was changed without
warning. (B) All objects were the same colour and shape. The vertical dashed line
indicates where the shape and colour of these objects was changed without warning.
Figure 6.9A shows the results of SPA, SPAALL and SPARANDOM on the re-
ward revaluation task. Focusing on the first 1000 episodes before the change in
reward function, SPA significantly out-performed SPAALL and SPARANDOM over
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the course of learning. SPAALL saw the worst performance showing no evidence of
learning over the first 1000 episodes. This suggests that naively learning over all
features is a highly ineffective strategy given a limited amount of experience. In
contrast, SPARANDOM showed evidence of learning after around 500 episodes. This
learning was highly variable as would be expected given that the features were ran-
domly selected for on each random seed. Nevertheless this demonstrates that simply
reducing the number of features at random is sufficient to provide a learning benefit.
Out of all of the approaches, SPA performed the best on the first 1000 episodes for
several reasons. Firstly, SPA began improving its score almost immediately after
a handful of episodes. This onset of learning is noticeably earlier than the other
approaches. Not only did learning occur earlier but it was also much faster, as in-
dicated by the sharper increase in score compared to the other approaches. As a
result, by episode 1000 SPA was able to achieve a higher score than the other ap-
proaches. Importantly, SPA was also more robust than SPARANDOM as indicated
by the smaller standard deviation in Figure 6.9A. Overall, these results suggest that
the particle filter mechanism of SPA is able to identify features useful for value
computation and that this translates into a substantial learning benefit given the
current task.
Upon the change in reward function after 1000 episodes, SPAALL continued to
demonstrate no evidence of learning. In comparison, SPARANDOM showed a marked
decrease in performance as soon as the reward function changed and was slow to
recover performance. SPA also showed a marked decrease in performance imme-
diately after the change in reward function. This is to be expected as the agent
had no prior warning that the reward function was about to change. However,
the performance of SPA dropped to a level that was still above SPARANDOM and
remained significantly higher than SPARANDOM throughout the recovery in perfor-
mance. This resulted in SPA achieving a higher score than all other approaches on
the final episode. These results suggest that the particle filter mechanism of SPA
is better equipped to handle changes in the environment by quickly re-evaluating
which features are important for the current task.
Figure 6.9B shows the results of the three approaches on the change in state
space task. As before, for the first 1000 episodes SPA demonstrated evidence of
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learning that occurred earlier, faster and more robustly than the other approaches.
Upon the change in state space after 1000 episodes, SPA showed a slight decrease in
performance but was quickly able to recover from it. In comparison, SPARANDOM
also saw a drop in performance but the rate of recovery was slower, while SPAALL
continued its slow gradual learning. For both SPARANDOM and SPAALL, perfor-
mance for the second 1000 episodes was highly variable and significantly lower than
SPA. These results further support the idea that the selective attention mechanism
of SPA is able to quickly adapt to changes in the current task by re-orientating
its attention towards a different set of features. In addition, the consistently high
performance of SPA and its fast rate of recovery during the change in state space
indicates that much of the knowledge learnt by the Deep RL algorithm in the first
1000 episodes was still of use in the second 100 episodes. This suggests that the selec-
tive attention mechanism of SPA is also able to promote the transfer of knowledge
between tasks.
6.4 Discussion
When presented with a visual scene we need to be able to quickly identify the
relevant features based on our current goal. For example, if we are in a forest and
are looking to start a fire then we need to attend to features indicative of dry wood.
Conversely, if we are thirsty then we must attend to features that are indicative of
a water source. This goal driven modulation of perceptual features is often referred
to as selective attention and is thought to be the responsibility of the Pre-Frontal
Cortex (PFC) (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen, 2001). However, it
remains an open question how we are able to learn which features of the environment
to attend to given the current goal. Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) represents
a promising avenue for modelling how humans learn to map raw perceptual input to
goal-driven behaviour. Deep RL systems typically rely on the incremental learning
of representations via backpropagation in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). As a
result they lack the ability to quickly adjust their representations given a sudden
change in task.
To address these issues and imbue Deep RL agents with the ability to perform
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selective attention we propose a novel algorithm called Selective Particle Attention
(SPA). SPA uses a pre-trained deep convolutional neural network VGG-16, to
extract features that are similar to those found in the visual stream (Schrimpf et al.,
2018). Rather than using gradual error-driven learning, SPA uses a particle filter
to learn attention values that filter these features based on the current goal (Rad-
ulescu et al., 2019; Radulescu et al.). Each particle in the particle filter represents a
hypothesis about which set of features are important for the task at hand, which has
been proposed to be the role of the PFC (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Radulescu et al.,
2019). Crucially, the particle filter combines bottom-up and top-down attention to
perform selective attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Treue and Trujillo, 1999).
Bottom-up attention occurs during the movement step of the particle filter; particles
are biased to attend to features that are highly active. Top-down attention occurs
during the observation step; particles that are better at predicting reward are more
likely to be re-sampled. In this way hypotheses are biased towards features that are
highly active and are constantly evaluated based on their ability to predict reward
(Mackintosh, 1975). The particles are used to generate attention values by calcu-
lating the mean particle state and normalising it to sum to one. This is consistent
with other computational models of visual attention that highlight normalisation
as a key computation for capturing competition between features (Reynolds and
Heeger, 2009). The attention values are used to filter the features produced by
VGG-16, which are then passed on to a Deep RL algorithm to evaluate the current
state of the environment. This evaluation process is thought to be the responsibility
of the striatum through the use of cortical inputs (Schultz, 1998; Houk et al., 1995;
Joel et al., 2002; Maia, 2009; Setlow et al., 2003) and temporal difference errors
(Schultz et al., 1997).
We evaluated SPA on two different tasks. The first task was a multiple choice
task involving naturalistic images. Three object categories were chosen at random
and on each trial the agent was presented with an image from each of the cate-
gories. Trials were organised into blocks and for any given block only one of the
object categories would result in a reward. SPA was able to achieve close to ceiling
performance on this task for several examples and dramatically out-performed a
naive version that attended to all features. Inspection of SPA’s attention vector
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showed that it was able to quickly change its configuration in response to changes in
the reward function. This highlights how selective attention can be used to quickly
respond to unannounced changes in the environment and improve the efficiency of
learning.
The power of RL is its ability to deal with temporal dependencies and to make
actions that lead to reward in the future. The aforementioned multiple choice task
can be viewed as a single step Markov Decision Process (MDP). We therefore wanted
to test if SPA could be applied to more complex domains and multi-step MDPs.
With this in mind we chose the second task to be a simple 2D video game. The
agent was in control of a rectangular block that could be moved left and right.
The goal of the agent was to collect objects that moved from the top of the screen
to the bottom based on their shape. As with the multiple choice task, SPA was
able to perform significantly better than a naive approach that attended to all
features. It also performed better than an approach that selected a random subset of
features to attend to. This provides evidence that SPA can improve the efficiency of
learning on complex RL problems that require temporal dependencies. In addition,
it demonstrates that SPA is not dependent on a specific Deep RL algorithm as long
as the algorithm uses a form of value approximation.
Interestingly, in order to successfully apply SPA to the 2D object collection
game the attention vector was only updated every 1000 time-steps rather than on
every time step. This was necessary because it allowed the Deep RL algorithm time
to respond to the change in attention and attempt to learn a useful function of the
currently attended features. This is akin to a person learning based on a single
hypothesis for a fixed amount of time before deciding whether to change to another
hypothesis or not. This may explain why attentional inertia is prevalent in children
and adults (Anderson et al., 1987; Burns and Anderson, 1993; Richards and An-
derson, 2004; Longman et al., 2014), as the brain requires time to evaluate a given
hypothesis before deciding whether to switch attention. Future work should system-
atically explore this apparent trade-off between the potential benefits of switching
to a new hypothesis and the time needed to sufficiently evaluate a hypothesis.
Part of the reason for the design of the object collection game was that it allowed
for the rewarded shape to be easily changed during learning. This change can
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be manipulated to correspond to a change in the reward function or state space.
We found that SPA was significantly better equipped to deal with such changes
compared to other naive approaches that either attended to all or a random subset
of features. In particular, SPA showed an extremely fast recovery in response to
a change in state space. This is often considered an extremely hard problem as
deep neural networks typically fail catastrophically when the input distribution is
changed (Lake et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the small drop in performance and rapid
recovery to asymptotic levels suggests that SPA was able to transfer much of the
knowledge that it had acquired before the change in state space. These results
further support the findings of the multiple choice task, which demonstrated SPA’s
improved ability to deal with changes in the environment.
We propose that the ability of SPA to focus on a subset of features based on
the current task is beneficial for several reasons. Firstly, it helps to reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem, which reduces the impact of noisy features and the
complexity of the function that needs to be learnt. This improves generalization
because the learned function does not fit spurious features and therefore ignores
any changes to them. This benefit of dimensionality reduction can even be seen in
the case of SPARANDOM , which out-performed SPAALL on the object collection
game. SPA takes this one step further however, by providing targeted dimension-
ality reduction rather than selecting a random subset of features. Furthermore, the
selective attention of SPA helps to reduce interference by guiding learning onto
different sets of features based on the task at hand. This results in the learning
of different sub-networks that can be quickly identified based on the current task.
This greatly improves the capacity of the Deep RL algorithm to represent different
functions and to switch between them in the face of changes to the environment.
Selective attention in SPA is implemented using a particle filter that captures
the influences of both bottom-up and top-down attention. Previous work has already
shown that particle filters may represent a viable computational account of selective
attention during learning based on their ability to fit eye-tracking data (Radulescu
et al.). Here we extend this work to show how they can be interfaced with Deep
RL principles in order to learn which features to attend to just from raw pixel
values and external reward signals. One of the primary benefits of using a particle
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filter to implement selective attention is that it relies on sampling to produce an
approximate value of a hidden variable. This is important because the potential
number of feature combinations that need to be evaluated for a given task can be
extremely large. In our case there were 2512 potential feature combinations and so
it would be computationally infeasible to evaluate all of them. However, by using
only 250 particles we were still able to converge to a satisfactory solution thanks to
the iterative re-sampling procedure of the particle filter. Future work should explore
how the number of particles in SPA affects its ability to find the best combination
of features and therefore its asymptotic performance on tasks.
The approximate inference of the particle filter in SPA is guided by bottom-up
attention, which introduces a bias towards the most active features. This introduces
a prior over the hypothesis space, favouring hypotheses with relatively few features.
This is consistent with findings that people tend to make decisions based on individ-
ual features before reasoning about objects that involve more complex combinations
of features (Farashahi et al., 2017; Choung et al., 2017). Similarly, people find it
harder to perform classification tasks as the number of relevant dimensions increases
(Shepard et al., 1961). The bottom-up attention captured in the movement step of
the particle filter therefore seems to introduce a biologically plausible bias over the
hypothesis space.
Top-down attention is captured during the observation step of the particle fil-
ter. This process involves evaluating different hypotheses based on their ability to
predict reward (Mackintosh, 1975). Interestingly it has been proposed that such a
mechanism may occur in corticostriatal circuitry (Radulescu et al., 2019). Different
pools of neurons in the PFC may represent different hypotheses about the structure
of the current RL task. These pools then compete via mutual lateral inhibition
and this competition is biased via connections to the striatum that favour pools
which lead to reward. This process parallels the observation step of SPA, whereby
hypotheses that are more predictive of reward are more likely to be re-sampled and
out-compete other hypotheses. The specific mechanism aside, the phenomenon of
representing and testing multiple hypotheses during RL appears to be prevalent in
human populations (Wilson and Niv, 2012).
The effectiveness of SPA will naturally depend on the nature of the features or
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representations that it is attending too. In the human brain it has been proposed
that the usefulness of selective visual feature attention decreases as you move back
through the visual stream (Lindsay and Miller, 2018; Baluch and Itti, 2011). This is
because features present later in the visual stream consist of higher-order represen-
tations that are increasingly abstract. For example one of the object categories in
the multiple choice task was faces, which are known to be represented later on in the
visual stream of the brain (Grill-Spector et al., 2018). Having such a representation
makes the multiple choice task easy for the brain because it only has to attend to
one feature rather than a collection of low level features. This also reduces the need
to consider lots of complicated hypotheses. Future work should test whether SPA
displays similar behaviour by testing whether its performance decreases as attention
is applied to earlier convolutional layers.
For both the multiple choice task and the object collection game, the weights
of VGG-16 were frozen so that no further learning occurred in the network. This
decision was made to reflect the fact that learning in the visual stream is slow and
so the brain needs to pick from pre-existing representations. If the brain had to
rely on learning new sensory representations for every task then learning would
be extremely slow and the learning of one task would over-write the learning of a
previous task. By using attentional mechanisms on pre-existing representations, the
brain can greatly increase the speed of learning and learn different sub-networks
depending on the task at hand, which reduces interference between tasks. However,
gradual learning does still occur in the visual stream and is thought to underlie the
gradual change from novice to expert on perceptual categorization tasks (Schyns
et al., 1998). From the perspective of SPA, allowing gradual learning in VGG-16
would lead to the emergence of new features for the particle filter to attend to and
for the Deep RL algorithm to utilise. As the learning would be slow and occur over
several tasks, these new features would generalize over the tasks being repeatedly
performed by the agent. Future work should therefore explore whether allowing
slow incremental learning in VGG-16 would improve the performance of SPA over
a continuous sequence of different tasks.
While no learning occurred in VGG-16 during our simulations, we did use net-
work weights that were the result of extensive pre-training. Importantly, the data
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that was used to pre-train VGG-16 involved images that were not used for the multi-
ple choice task and the object collection game. In theory, using the original Imagenet
dataset that it was trained on may have lead to better results in the multiple choice
task. This is because VGG-16 will have already been trained to produce feature
values that distinguish between the object categories in Imagenet, making it easier
for SPA to attend to discriminating sets of features. This hypothesis is supported
by our analysis of the features produced by VGG-16 during the multiple choice task.
For the combination of image categories that SPA performed best on, the vectors
of mean feature values were further apart in Euclidean space compared to the com-
bination of image categories that SPA performed worst on. This suggests that the
more dissimilar the feature values are between the different image categories, the
easier it is for SPA to discriminate between them and quickly change its focus of
attention.
This dependence of SPA on the properties of the underlying representations that
it attends to opens up several interesting avenues of future research. In particular,
it would be interesting to explore whether the use of disentangled representations
(Higgins et al., 2016, 2018) could further improve performance. Independent factors
of variation may be easier to attend to because the informative features are sepa-
rate from each other and so only simple hypotheses are required to solve the task
at hand rather than complex combinations of features. Another major benefit of
disentangled representations would be that the resulting attention vector would be
more interpretable as each attended feature has a natural interpretation; e.g., colour
or shape.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have presented a novel method for performing selective visual
feature attention in a Deep-RL agent. Our approach, termed Selective Particle
Attention (SPA), uses a particle filter to identify useful pre-existing features based
on the task at hand. These features are then passed on to a Deep-RL algorithm to
perform action selection. The particle filter incorporates bottom-up and top-down
influences into the selective attention process via the movement and observation
198
steps respectively. The movement step serves to introduce a prior over the features
that are being considered so that attention is biased towards the most active features
given the current input. In comparison, the movement step biases attention towards
combinations of features that are most predictive of reward. Crucially these two
interacting processes help to reduce the dimensionality of the learning problem in
a targeted manner. This not only speeds up the efficiency of learning but also
improves the agent’s ability to deal with changes in the environment. Future work
should explore how the nature of pre-existing representations affects the attention
mechanism of SPA. The depth of the representation, the data used to produce
them and their degree of disentanglement are all variables that may impact upon
the performance of SPA.
The work in this chapter again highlights the importance of considering the brain
as a multitude of different learning systems all interacting to support efficient RL.
In particular, it supports the proposal to divide the neocortex into the PFC and
sensory cortices so that phenomena such as selective attention can be captured.
Importantly, SPA only describes one benefit of this division and it is likely that
many other benefits also exist. For example we saw in Chapter 5 that attentional
signals from the PFC to the hippocampus may be responsible for concept formation
and that the PFC may implement a meta-learning algorithm with the striatum. It is
therefore likely that all of these process work together to help support efficient RL.
This is a similar conclusion to Chapter 3, which explored how the division between
the neocortex and the hippocampus is important for efficient RL.
In the next chapter we will move away from using computational approaches
to investigate the underlying computations that support efficient RL in the brain.
Instead, we shall turn to an empirical investigation of how external factors in the
environment can affect the efficiency of RL. In particular, we shall focus on how
the degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences can influence
the transfer of information between related experiences. To achieve this we get
human participants to play 2D video games that can vary in terms of perceptual
surface features but that all share the same underlying rules. This allows us to vary
the perceptual similarity between consecutive games while ensuring that they are
related. We discuss the results of this work in light of the analogy between the brain
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and Deep RL that we have built thus far. Our hope is that this empirical work
will help to constrain computational accounts of transfer in the brain and therefore
deepen our understanding of efficient RL.
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Chapter 7
The Effect of Perceptual
Similarity on Transfer in Humans
Overview
In this chapter we present novel empirical work exploring how the degree of percep-
tual similarity between consecutive experiences affects transfer. We therefore switch
from focusing on the internal computations that support efficient Reinforcement
Learning (RL) to the external factors that influence it. We conduct three experi-
ments that test participants’ ability to transfer relational rules between problems.
Importantly, for each experiment the perceptual features between consecutive prob-
lems are varied to different extents but the relational rules are preserved to allow for
transfer. In Experiment 1 (Section 7.2) we investigate the effect of perceptual simi-
larity on transfer in a simple match-to-sample task. In Experiment 2 (Section 7.3)
we use a similar experimental design but apply it to a more naturalistic setting; a 2D
video game. Finally, in Experiment 3 (Section 7.4) we repeat Experiment 2 but tell
the participants the rules of the games before-hand. Our results demonstrate that
(1) participants can perform ‘zero-shot’ learning by transferring the relational rules,
(2) participants can also perform ‘one-shot’ learning by transferring task structure,
and (3) participants are better at using explicit knowledge for transfer when the
degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences is high. We hope
that these results can be used to help constrain theories of transfer in the brain and
improve the ability of Deep RL approaches to model transfer in the brain.
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7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have used Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory to ex-
plore how different learning systems in the brain and their interactions contribute
to efficient Reinforcement Learning (RL). These internal computations represent
fundamental mechanisms for rapid learning and transfer in the human brain. How-
ever, they do not operate in isolation and are naturally affected by external factors
present in the environment. For example, the ability to transfer knowledge between
experiences or tasks is likely to interact with variables such as the number of related
previous experiences and the time between these experiences. This chapter focuses
on one specific variable; the perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences.
In contrast to previous chapters, this investigation will use human adults as subjects
and rely on the methods of experimental psychology.
Consecutive experiences can have varying degrees of perceptual similarity and
different bodies of literature (discussed in detail below) produce conflicting predic-
tions about whether high or low perceptual similarity should benefit transfer. An
answer to this question may help us to further understand the internal computa-
tions underlying transfer by providing empirical constraints on potential theories
and computational models. The rest of this section will outline the conflicting pre-
dictions made by different bodies of literature about how the degree of perceptual
similarity between experiences should affect transfer.
7.1.1 Analogy: The Relational Shift and Progressive Align-
ment
The problem of transfer in Reinforcement Learning (RL) can be framed as an anal-
ogy problem, whereby one needs to match the current environment to a previous
environment(s) and use the inferred similarities between them to guide decisions.
With this in mind, the the literature on analogical reasoning makes a prediction
about how perceptual similarity should interact with the ability to transfer. The
theory of ‘progressive alignment’, proposed by Gentner and Markman (1994), sug-
gests that solving analogical problems with a high degree of perceptual similarity
should facilitate the solving of harder analogical problems with a low degree of
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perceptual similarity. This occurs because problems with a high degree of percep-
tual similarity allow for easier more concrete abstractions, which then increase the
probability of being able to form harder abstractions between problems with low
perceptual similarity. These abstractions between experiences are critical because
they allow people to generalise to new experiences and become less dependent on
perceptual features.
A wealth of empirical evidence has been put forth to support progressive align-
ment. One such study by Kotovsky and Gentner (1996) presented arrays of shape,s
such as three circles or three triangles, to 4-year-old children. These arrays could
vary along different dimensions, for example each shape could increase in size or
saturation within an array. This meant that arrays could either match according to
low order, perceptual commonalities e.g. circles increasing in size and triangles in-
creasing in size, or they could match according to higher order, abstract similarities
across dimensions e.g. circles increasing in size and circles increasing in saturation.
For the task, the children were shown one array and then asked to choose a subse-
quent matching array without any feedback from their previous choice. Kotovsky
and Gentner (1996) found that children could solve the low order matches when the
arrays were presented randomly but not the high order matches. However, when
they were presented in order, starting with low order matches and moving to high
order matches, the children had improved performance on the high order matches.
These findings demonstrate how gradually dissimilar past experiences can help to
iteratively improve a child’s ability to learn abstractions for transfer.
Another example of progressive alignment and how perceptual similarity affects
transfer comes from a study by Gentner et al. (2007). In this study children were
shown a picture of an alien and were told that the alien had a body part with a novel
name e.g. ‘a dibble’. The children were then shown other aliens and were asked
which one also had that body part. Two versions of this task existed, one where
the options were perceptually similar to the exemplar and one where they were
perceptually dissimilar. Interestingly, children performed better on the perceptually
dissimilar version when they were first presented the perceptual similar version even
though feedback was not given. This is a direct example of how comparing high
similarity experiences can improve a child’s ability to transfer knowledge to low
203
similarity experiences.
These studies show that consecutive experiences with high perceptual similarity
improve children’s ability to form abstractions and perform transfer. However the
degree of perceptual similarity between experiences lies on a continuum rather than
at the two extremes. It is therefore likely that for a given individual there is an
ideal degree of perceptual similarity for transfer, whereby the differences between
experiences allow for a high degree of abstraction but are not so different that
no abstraction can be formed. If the perceptual similarity is too high then the
abstraction may be weak and lead to an over-reliance on misleading perceptual
commonalities. Equally if the perceptual similarity is too low then the abstraction
may be too difficult to acquire. Where this optimum degree of perceptual similarity
lies will likely depend on a range of factors including the age of the person and the
nature of the abstraction itself.
It is worth noting that progressive alignment not only appears to operate over
short time-scales (e.g. during a psychology experiment) but also operates over long
time-scales. Gentner and Hoyos (2017) have proposed that progressive alignment
also underlies development as people gradually rely less and less on perceptual simi-
larities and instead focus on abstract relational information to guide their behaviour.
This phenomena has been termed the ‘relational shift’ and has been well charac-
terised during child development (Gentner, 1988; Richland et al., 2006). Importantly
this shift from perceptual reasoning to abstract relational reasoning appears to be
domain specific (Gentner and Rattermann, 1991), suggesting that it is indeed past
experiences in a particular domain that drives these changes rather than some gen-
eral processing change.
7.1.2 Concept Learning and Category Structure
While the analogy literature predicts that past experiences with high perceptual sim-
ilarity should bootstrap the ability to transfer to experiences with low perceptual
similarity, other bodies of literature disagree with this prediction. In particular, the
concept learning literature provides conflicting predictions about how the degree of
perceptual similarity between experiences should affect transfer. Several studies have
highlighted how randomly presenting exemplars from different conceptual categories
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can improve the transfer of knowledge, as measured by classification performance on
novel exemplars (Kornell and Bjork, 2008; Rohrer et al., 2014). These findings sug-
gest that minimising the perceptual similarities between exemplars should facilitate
transfer with respect to the task of classification. Interestingly these findings are not
unanimous; several other studies on concept learning have found evidence for im-
proved acquisition of conceptual knowledge when exemplars have been presented in
a blocked manner; i.e. when exemplars are blocked in a way that maximises percep-
tual similarity (Kurtz and Hovland, 1956; Whitman and Garner, 1963; Goldstone,
1996).
Work by Carvalho and Goldstone (2014b) has tried to reconcile these oppos-
ing results by investigating how perceptual similarity within and between categories
affects whether random or blocked category learning is beneficial for concept learn-
ing. Carvalho and Goldstone (2014b) presented participants with both random and
blocked learning protocols but one group was given categories with high within-
and between-category similarity while another group was given categories with low
within- and between-category similarity. The results of the study showed that ran-
domly organised exemplars lead to improved generalisation in the high similarity
group whereas blocked exemplars lead to improved generalisation in the low simi-
larity group. Carvalho and Goldstone (2014b) hypothesised that these results were
due to the fact that random exemplars help participants to attend to the differences
between categories because different categories are presented in quick succession.
This is particularly important in the high similarity case because the differences
are hard to detect and are more informative than the similarities. In comparison,
blocked exemplars help participants to attend to the similarities within a category
because exemplars from the same category are presented in quick succession. This
is useful in the low similarity case because the similarities are hard to detect and
are more informative than the differences. It therefore appears that perceptual sim-
ilarity is a key factor that affects whether people attend to similarities or differences
between experiences and this interacts with whether similarities or differences are
useful for the task at hand.
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7.1.3 Insights From Deep Reinforcement Learning Approaches
Throughout this thesis we have used an analogy between the brain and Deep Rein-
forcement Learning (RL) to understand how humans perform efficient RL through
rapid learning and transfer. With this in mind, what does this analogy predict about
the impact of perceptual similarity on transfer? The answer to this question lies in
the way that Deep RL models are trained.
Deep RL methods rely on the use of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to approx-
imate a value function and/or a policy. These DNNs are sensitive to the order in
which the input data is presented because they are typically trained using stochas-
tic gradient descent. If inputs are spuriously correlated then the parameters of the
network will be updated to reflect these correlations, which ultimately leads to local
over-fitting. To combat this problem DNNs are trained in an interleaved fashion
with the input data being presented in a random order. Indeed, classic Deep RL
approaches, such as the Deep Q-Network (DQN) (Mnih et al., 2015), train a DNN
by randomly sampling from a memory buffer of past state transitions. This helps to
address the fact that the input to these methods is a constant stream of temporally
correlated perceptual observations. Interestingly, this has been tentatively com-
pared to biological ‘replay’ whereby the hippocampus randomly reinstates activity
patterns from past experiences (see Section 3.4.1).
This demonstrates that classic Deep RL methods rely on training mechanisms
that reduce the degree of perceptual similarity between training examples so that the
network generalises well. These training examples could represent state transitions
within a single task (e.g. a level of an Atari video game) or state transitions from
different tasks (e.g. different levels of an Atari game). Either way, the DNN will
attempt to fit the underlying similarities between the training examples and so the
fewer spurious perceptual similarities the better the transfer.
More recent work in Deep RL, which attempts to address rapid learning and
transfer, also predicts that reducing the perceptual similarity between experiences
will benefit transfer. For example, one recent and encouraging approach to modelling
transfer is that of meta-learning (see Section 5.2.1) (Wang et al., 2016). A key
component of meta-learning is the use of an outer-RL algorithm to improve the
generalisation of an inner-RL algorithm. Importantly this process requires that tasks
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are sampled from a pool of tasks in a random manner. As with DQN, this random
sampling reduces spurious correlations between tasks and ultimately prevents over-
fitting, only this time it explicitly focuses on the correlations between tasks.
If Deep RL approaches appear to favour low perceptual similarity between ex-
periences then what does this mean for our predictions about the brain? If we
assume, as has been the case throughout this thesis, that DNNs are a useful model
of the neocortex and semantic memory, then cortical learning should also benefit
from consecutive experiences with low degrees of perceptual similarity. However, as
we have highlighted through the computational work in this thesis, the neocortical
learning system does not work alone and relies on the complementary properties of
other learning systems such as the hippocampus. Indeed, just as DQN relies on ran-
domly sampling from a memory buffer, the neocortex may rely on replay from the
hippocampus. If this is the case, then Deep RL may instead predict that the degree
of perceptual similarity between experiences should make little difference to trans-
fer ability because the brain has compensatory mechanisms to account for spurious
correlations in the perceptual input. That said, empirical research into biological
replay has suggested that it occurs offline, such as during periods of rest or sleep. As
a result, replay is likely unable to address the issue of highly correlated perceptual
input during tasks that do not afford offline processing and that occur over short
time scales.
Aside for the influence of other learning systems, it appears that the nature of
the representations learnt by DNNs may also reduce their reliance on randomised
training data. In particular, it has been suggested that Deep RL approaches that
use disentangled representations (see Section 3.2.3) may be less reliant on inter-
leaved training. The main premise behind disentangled representations is that each
output unit of a DNN encodes a cardinal dimension that humans use to categories
or recognise an object; e.g. colour, shape or rotation. As a result, if the abstraction
being learnt involves a single cardinal dimension, then transfer should be less depen-
dent on interleaved training because there is less interference from other dimensions.
In comparison if the representations are entangled or the abstraction being learnt
involves multiple cardinal dimensions then interference will occur and perceptual
similarity should be reduced in order to negate the effect of spurious correlations.
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From the perspective of the brain it has been well documented that the learning of
verbalisable rules along cardinal dimensions recruits different learning systems com-
pared to the learning of statistical rules that require integration across dimensions
(e.g., Ashby and Maddox, 2005). It is therefore likely that the affect of perceptual
similarity on transfer depends on whether the abstraction is a simple verbalisable
rule or a non-verbalisable statistical rule and the degree of entanglement in the
representations.
Evidence for this interaction has come from a recent study by (Flesch et al.,
2018). In this study, Deep RL models and participants were faced with two simple
RL tasks that involved categorising images of trees based on their ‘branchiness’ and
‘leaffiness’. Each task was identified by a different background scene. The tasks
were presented in either an interleaved or blocked manner and each task had its
own abstraction or rule that dictated whether reward was obtained or not. Two
different sets of rules were used; one set was cardinal and operated along a single
dimension (either ‘branchiness’ or ‘leaffiness’) and the other set was diagonal in that
it integrated across the two dimensions. Test/transfer performance was assessed
using a set of interleaved test trials involving novel tree stimuli.
In the case of the human participants, when the rules were cardinal, people
performed better at test if they had received the blocked training condition. This
benefit of blocked training was even greater if the person had a strong prior bias to
categorise the tree stimuli based on their ‘branchiness’ and ‘leafiness’. This suggests
that the blocked design (1) helped participants to factorise the problem into the two
cardinal rules and (2) was most beneficial when people represented the problem in a
disentangled manner along the cardinal dimensions. Interestingly, even if the rules
were diagonal (i.e. they required integration over the two dimensions), participants
appeared to show improved learning of the decision boundary in the blocked condi-
tion despite similar overall test performance compared to the interleaved condition.
These findings demonstrate that grouping experiences by perceptual similarity can
confer transfer benefits within the context of an RL problem. In addition, this ben-
efit is particularly prominent when the rule or abstraction being learnt is cardinal
and verbalisable.
With respect to the Deep RL models, Flesch et al. (2018) first explored how the
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performance of a standard Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN) performed
on the tasks. As expected the DCNN demonstrated ceiling performance under the
interleaved training regime regardless of whether the rules were cardinal or diagonal.
However, under the blocked regime the DCNN suffered and could only remember the
last task that it was trained on. These results are a clear demonstration of how en-
tangled representations favour interleaved and perceptually dissimilar exemplars in
order to generalise and transfer successfully. Flesch et al. (2018) then explored how
a DCNN with disentangled representations performed on the two training regimes.
In this case, the disentangled DCNN still showed diminished performance on the
blocked training regime but performance was significantly better than the DCNN
with entangled representations. This demonstrates that disentangled representa-
tions can alleviate some of the dependency of neural network models on interleaved
training.
Taken together, the findings of Flesch et al. (2018) help to highlight the intricate
interactions between representations, types of rule and grouping of experiences based
on perceptual similarity. In particular, maximising perceptual similarity appears to
have a genuine benefit for human learning, at least in the case of task switching
and the categorisation of novel stimuli. In contrast, blocked training appears to be
detrimental to learning in neural networks, although some of this can be alleviated
through the use of disentangled representations.
In summary, the training of DNNs in Deep RL systems generally predict that low
perceptual similarity between experiences should promote transfer. The influence of
other learning systems and the use of disentangled representations can potentially
reduce the reliance of DNNs on interleaved training. However, even with these
alterations, there is no Deep RL system that predicts that transfer should benefit
from experiences with a high degree of perceptual similarity. This appears to be at
odds with the theory of progressive alignment and also the results of Flesch et al.
(2018), who reported improved transfer after blocked training on two RL tasks. The
rest of this chapter explores this issue in a series of 3 studies with human adults.
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7.1.4 Overview of Human Experiments
The purpose of the present chapter is to explore the effect of perceptual similarity be-
tween experiences on transfer in humans. Critically, we explore this in a naturalistic
Reinforcement Learning (RL) environment, which involves both sequential decision
making and motor control. To achieve this, we designed video games that could dif-
fer in terms of perceptual similarity but used the same verbalisable relational rules.
We then generated sequences of these games with high or low perceptual similar-
ity between consecutive games and investigated which sequence improved transfer
performance in human participants.
As we saw in the previous section, much of the existing literature has focused
largely on the effects of interleaved vs. blocked training. A blocked regime in-
duces high levels of perceptual similarity between experiences whereas an interleaved
regime induces low levels of perceptual similarity. However, these training regimes
generally involve distinguishing between categories (Kornell and Bjork, 2008; Rohrer
et al., 2014; Goldstone, 1996; Kurtz and Hovland, 1956; Whitman and Garner, 1963),
or in the case of Flesch et al. (2018), between tasks. In the present study, rather than
focusing on discriminating between concepts or tasks, we instead focus on learning a
single concept or task. In other words, all of the games presented to the participants
are related and relevant for learning a meaningful strategy. This is akin to learning a
single conceptual category rather than learning to discriminate between several cate-
gories. We are therefore investigating how the degree of perceptual similarity within
a category or a set of related tasks can affect transfer performance. In addition, our
task involves playing active video games which, compared to classic concept learn-
ing and classification tasks, is a big step in the direction of naturalistic behaviour
involving motor control and real-time sequential decision making. We believe that
it is important to take this step away from the simple presentation of exemplars
and singe decisions, in order to see if the aforementioned findings generalise to more
naturalistic decision-making problems.
Despite these differences between our experimental paradigm and the literature
reviewed in the previous section, these studies still make several interesting pre-
dictions about whether consecutive games with high or low perceptual similarity
should promote transfer. The theory of progressive alignment predicts that consec-
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utive games with high perceptual similarity should help to bootstrap learning and
therefore improve transfer to more dissimilar games later on. However, as previously
mentioned there is likely to be a ‘sweet spot’ of perceptual similarity, whereby con-
secutive games are similar enough to form abstractions over but different enough to
maximise the degree of abstraction. In comparison, the work of Carvalho and Gold-
stone (2014b) suggests that high perceptual similarity between consecutive games
should encourage people to focus on the similarities between them. In our case,
this predicts that consecutive games with high perceptual similarity should improve
transfer because all the games are related and so highlighting the similarities will
help to identify the consistent underlying rules.
In terms of the analogy between Deep RL and the brain, we have already seen
that the training of DNNs is generally reliant on interleaved training, which min-
imises spurious correlations in the input. This suggests that consecutive games with
low perceptual similarity should help participants to avoid learning strategies that
involve spurious perceptual features and therefore promote transfer. Some Deep RL
approaches predict that other mechanisms, such as replay or disentangled represen-
tations, may help to alleviate this reliance on interleaved training. If true, then
these mechanisms predict that there should be no difference between the high or
low perceptual similarity conditions. Either way, the analogy between Deep RL and
the brain suggests that there should be no benefit of the high perceptual similarity
condition over the low perceptual similarity condition.
One interesting property of our experimental paradigm is that the video games
use underlying rules that are verbalisable and therefore involve cardinal dimensions.
This is important because the work of Flesch et al. (2018) suggests that verbalisable
rules benefit from blocked training when the task involves learning to switch between
tasks. If this generalises to the learning of a set of related tasks then it suggests
that organising the games so that the perceptual similarity is maximised, as is the
case in a blocked training regime, should provide a transfer benefit to participants.
Presumably this is because it will help the participants to focus on the cardinal
dimensions that constitute the underlying rules.
With these conflicting predictions in mind, we ran three different experiments to
investigate the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer performance. Experiment
211
1 tests the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer in an impoverished match-to-
sample task that is more typical of classic psychology experiments. Experiment 2
uses the same stimuli and relational rules as Experiment 1, but uses them in a 2D
video game, which represents a more naturalistic setting. Experiment 3 is the same
as Experiment 2, but the participants are told the rules of the game before-hand
so that we can obtain a measure of ceiling performance given that the participants
already know what they need to transfer.
7.2 Experiment 1
For the first experiment we wanted to check: (1) whether participants were actually
able to learn the types of relational rules that we planned to use in the video games,
and (2) whether the degree of perceptual similarity had an effect in simple static
settings. In order to answer these questions, we designed a simple match-to-sample
task that used the relational rules we planned to use in the video games. In the task,
participants were presented with a central object and they had to choose one of the
objects on either the left or the right. The correct choice was based on one of three
possible dimensions; colour, shape and texture. Experiment 1 therefore removes
many of the more complicated aspects of learning associated with video games and
allows participants to concentrate on learning the relational rules for transfer.
7.2.1 Methods
Match-to-Sample Task
The match-to-sample task was implemented using Unity Game Engine to allow for
online web hosting. Participants were presented with a simple screen with three
basic shapes on it (Figure 7.1). The central object was the reference object and
participants needed to use this object to decide whether to select the left or right
object. The central object had a colour, texture and shape associated with it and
only one of the left or right objects matched on each of these attributes. This ensured
that participants could always select an object based on either a colour, texture or
shape match.
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Figure 7.1: Example screenshot of the match-to-sample task for Experiment 1. Par-
ticipants had to use the central object to decide whether to click on the left or right
object. Depending on the underlying rule of the trial, the correct choice may depend
on matching the colour, texture or shape of the central object
The correct choice between the left and right objects was dictated by a relational
rule that corresponded to an attribute of the central object (i.e. its colour, texture or
shape). For instance, if the rule was texture based then the correct answer was the
object that had the same texture as the central object. These relational rules were
chosen because they can potentially be applied to a wide range of different perceptual
configurations. Choosing the correct object scored 1 point and participants made a
choice by clicking on either the left or right object in the lower half of the screen.
For each trial there was a 5 second time limit, after which the participant would
score 0 points. If the time limit was reached then participants received no feedback,
otherwise they were shown the number of points scored for their choice.
In order to explore the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer, we designed a
principled method for generating sequences of questions that represented either high
or low perceptual similarity conditions. The shapes and textures of the three objects
for the first question were randomly selected from a set of possible training values
(Figure 7.2). Consecutive questions were then constructed by randomly selecting an
object and randomly changing either its shape, colour or texture. Different sequences
of questions were generated by setting the seed of a random generator to 10 differ-
ent values. Sequences of questions generated in this manner represented the high
perceptual similarity condition because consecutive games were highly correlated in
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terms of surface features. In comparison, the low perceptual similarity condition
was generated by taking the high perceptual similarity sequence of questions and
randomly shuffling them. This served to reduce the correlations in perceptual sim-
ilarity between consecutive questions. Importantly, this methodology ensured that
participants were exposed to exactly the same questions over the course of learning
regardless of whether they received the high or low perceptual similarity condition.
The only thing that differed between a participant trained on the high or low per-
ceptual similarity conditions was the order of the questions. Upon completing the
sequence of questions, participants were given a final test question that was the same
regardless of whether they had been in the high or low perceptual similarity condi-
tion. The final test question used the same relational rule as the training questions
but involved a random perceptual configuration that neither group of participants
had seen before (Figure 7.2). The final test question therefore provided a fair way




Figure 7.2: Table showing the shapes, patterns and colours that were sampled from
in order to construct the training questions and the novel test questions.
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Experimental Procedure
Participants were recruited using the online platform ‘Prolific Academic’ and were
rewarded £5 for participation. To enrol on the study participants had to be aged 18-
36, have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and be fluent in English. In total 80
participants were recruited (Male=46, Female=34). They were randomly assigned
to either the high or low perceptual similarity conditions. Participants completed
5 blocks of 20 trials with the final trial of each block being a novel test trial. For
each block a relational rule was chosen at random (repetitions were allowed) to
dictate which object the participant should choose in order to score a point. There
were three possible relational rules: same texture, same shape and same colour. At





Figure 7.3: Screenshots of the free classification task given to participants before
the match-to-sample task. (A) Participants were shown a prototypical object called
a ‘hoppler’ and where asked to select other objects they believed to be a hoppler.
Participants could select objects by clicking on them at which point they would be
labelled as a hoppler. (B) Participants were given a second chance to identify more
hopplers, their choices from the first round were locked in place at this point.
Before starting the task participants performed a free classification task (Figure
7.3). The purpose of this task was to evaluate each participants’ prior bias to the
three feature dimensions. Each participant was presented with the same example
object and were told that the object was a ‘hoppler’. They were also presented
with an array of other objects and were asked to select ones that they also believed
to be ‘hopplers’. The other objects covered every combination of three different
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colours, textures and shapes, with the hopplers colour, texture and shape included
in the permutation. After selecting other objects that they believed to be hopplers,
participants were asked a second time to select hopplers from the remaining objects.
This second round was used to assess how each participant ordered the importance
of each of the three features.
Upon completing the free classification task, participants were led through an
example match-to-sample trial so that they understood what was required (Figure
7.4). Participants were then given a final set of instructions before beginning the
task.
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Figure 7.4: Screenshots from the example match-to-sample trial that participants
were walked through. The final screenshot shows the instructions given to partici-
pants immediately before starting the match-to-sample task. Participants were re-
minded of design of the experiment as well as the task they had to perform.
7.2.2 Results
Overall Performance
Figure 7.5 shows the performance of the participants over the course of the task
collapsed across training conditions. In general participants only required the first
question in each block to infer the appropriate rule and subsequently perform above
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chance. The final level of each block was completely novel and tested the transfer
ability of participants. In every block, participants performed above chance on
the final level. This suggests that the participants were able to easily acquire the
relational rules from the first trial and use them in novel situations to select the best
action.












Figure 7.5: Average performance of participants over the course of the task. Dashed
line represents chance and shaded regions represent different blocks. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 7.6 shows the performance of the participants on the last training trial and
the test trial for each block of the task. To investigate whether there was a change
in performance between the last training trial and the test trial we performed a
McNemar test on the change in scores. We found that participants demonstrated
a ‘cost of transfer’. More specifically, participants demonstrated a significant drop
in performance from the last training trial to the test trial when collapsing across
all blocks (χ2(1, N=400)=14.0, p<.001). At the level of individual blocks, there
was a significant drop in performance for the first (χ2(1, N=80)=2.0, p=0.013)
and last (χ2(1, N=80)=1.0, p=0.001) blocks, but not the middle blocks (block 2:
χ2(1, N=80)=1.0, p=0.125, block 3: χ2(1, N=80)=6.0, p=1.000, block 4: χ2(1,
N=80)=4.0, p=0.118).
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Figure 7.6: Cost of transfer for each training block as well as overall. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals and stars represent significant differences.
Effect of Perceptual Similarity During Training on Test Performance
Figure 7.7 shows the performance of participants over the course of the task but
split by whether participants received the low- or high-perceptual similarity training
regime. Figure 7.8 shows just the test performance of the participants based on
which training regime they received (see Appendix A, Figures A.1 and A.2 for count
data). To explore whether there was an effect of training regime on test performance
we performed a chi-squared test between the test scores for the two training regimes.
We saw no difference between the two regimes with respect to test performance,
suggesting that the degree of perceptual similarity between successive trials had no
effect on participants’ ability to acquire the relational rules and apply them to novel
trials (Overall: χ2(1, N=400)=0.2, p=0.640, block 1: χ2(1, N=80)=0.2, p=0.689,
block 2: χ2(1, N=80)=0.2, p=0.623, block 3: χ2(1, N=80)=0.2, p=0.623, block 4:
χ2(1, N=80)=0.0, p=0.980, block 5: χ2(1, N=80)=1.4, p=0.233).
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Figure 7.7: Average performance of participants over the course of the task split by
perceptual similarity. Dashed line represents chance and shaded regions represent
different blocks. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.














Figure 7.8: Test performance for each training block as well as overall, split by per-
ceptual similarity. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals and stars represent
significant differences.
Effect of Rule Dimension
Figure 7.5 averages across all relational rules and so one possibility is that partici-
pants’ transfer ability may be different depending on the relational rule. Figure 7.9
shows the performance of participants over the course of the task averaged across
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all blocks, split by relational rule. Figure 7.10 shows just the test performance aver-
aged over all blocks for each relational rule (see Appendix A, Figure A.3 for count
data). To investigate whether there was a difference in test performance based on
the relational rule we performed a chi-squared test between the test scores for each
relational rule. We saw no differences in test performance across the different rela-
tional rules suggesting that participants could use them in novel trials equally well
(χ2(2, N=400)=2.7, p=0.260).















Figure 7.9: Average block performance of participants separated by the relational















Figure 7.10: Test performance averaged over all training blocks for each relational
rule. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals and stars represent significant
differences.
Interaction Between Perceptual Similarity During Training and Rule Di-
mension
The final possibility we explored was whether there was an interaction between
the type of relational rule and the degree of perceptual similarity during training.
Figure 7.11 shows the performance of participants over the course of the task aver-
aged across all blocks but split by relational rule and perceptual similarity. Figure
7.12 shows just the test performance of participants averaged over all blocks, again
split by relational rule and perceptual similarity (see Appendix A, Figure A.4 for
count data). To test whether there was an interaction we performed a separate chi-
squared test for each relational rule between the test scores of each training regime.
We saw no evidence for an interaction between the type of relational rule and the
degree of perceptual similarity during training in terms of test performance (Colour:






Figure 7.11: Average block performance of participants split by perceptual similar-
ity. Each panel refers to a different relational rule governing the block: (A) Same

















Figure 7.12: Test performance averaged over all training blocks for each relational
rule and split by perceptual similarity. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
and stars represent significant differences
Effect of a Priori Attention
Figure 7.13 shows the results of the free-classification task. Participants were most
likely to choose objects that had the same shape as the target object (e.g., pentagon),
followed by the same texture (e.g., Texture 2) and finally the same colour (e.g., Red).
These results suggest that a priori participants categorise the stimuli primarily based













































Figure 7.13: Results of the free classification task. The x-axis represents the char-
acteristics of the chosen objects while the y-axis represents the number of objects
chosen with a particular characteristic summed over all participants. Blue denotes
total counts, red denotes the counts for the first round of classification and green
denotes the counts for the second round of classification.
We wanted to investigate whether increased a priori attention to a specific di-
mension corresponded to improved performance on test trials involving that dimen-
sion. We therefore performed three separate logistic regressions (Table 7.1). The
dependent variables were the test scores (0 or 1) for each rule type (same colour,
same shape and same texture) and the independent variables were the training con-
dition and the number of matches across each dimension in the free-classification
task. In each of the logistic regressions, none of the dimension matches were sig-
nificant predictors of test performance. We therefore found no evidence for the
hypothesis that increased a priori attention to a dimension lead to better transfer
of rules involving that dimension at test.
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Table 7.1: Logistic regression analysis of test scores. Each column is a separate logis-
tic regression using only the test scores from blocks using a specific rule. Values not




Shape Blocks Colour Blocks Texture Blocks
Training Regime −0.60 0.13 0.88
(−1.99, 0.79) (−0.77, 1.03) (−0.20, 1.96)
No. Shape Matches 0.13 0.11 −0.27
(−0.11, 0.36) (−0.09, 0.31) (−0.60, 0.06)
No. Colour Matches −0.37 −0.12 0.68
(−1.12, 0.38) (−0.78, 0.53) (−0.43, 1.80)
No. Texture Matches 0.11 0.19 −0.29
(−0.36, 0.57) (−0.13, 0.50) (−0.70, 0.11)
Constant 2.39∗ 0.60 2.44∗∗
(0.40, 4.38) (−0.67, 1.87) (0.61, 4.28)
Observations (N) 1(97), 0(10) 1(124), 0(24) 1(123), 0(22)
Log Likelihood −32.03 −63.83 −57.46
Akaike Inf. Crit. 74.06 137.66 124.93
Pseudo-R2 0.80 0.61 0.65
1 - Pearson’s χ2 0.67 0.47 0.07
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
7.2.3 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to explore whether participants could acquire
relational rules and use them for transfer in a setting that is typical of behavioural
psychology experiments. We found that when presented in the form of a match-to-
sample task, participants could indeed rapidly infer the underlying relational rules
and use them on trials involving objects they had never seen before. This suggests
that both the stimuli and relational rules used in Experiment 1 can support flexible
transfer.
These results also demonstrate the ability of participants to rapidly adapt their
strategy in the face of changing task demands. Participants were able to quickly
react to changes in the underlying rule after only a few trials in a block. One
interpretation of this is that participants were able to dynamically switch their
attention to different stimulus dimensions (i.e. shape, colour or texture) at the
227
start of each block. This is exactly the kind of behaviour that Selective Particle
Attention (SPA) attempts to capture in Chapter 6. In particular, SPA predicts that
participants should select the appropriate dimension at the start of each block by
evaluating how accurately they predict reward.
While participants did exhibit transfer, an overall cost of transfer was also ob-
served, particularly in the first and last blocks of the task. The cost of transfer in
the first block may be due to the fact that the participants needed time to famil-
iarise themselves with the general requirements of the task. Equally, participants
had no prior expectation that they would experience a highly novel test trial on the
final level of the block. The cost of transfer in the final block is surprising given the
absence of a cost in the middle blocks of the task. One explanation for this may be
that participant’s engagement with the task decreased as time went on. However,
this seems unlikely as the training score for the final block was as high as in all
previous blocks.
Comparison of performance in the low- vs high-perceptual similarity conditions
indicated no difference in transfer performance between the two conditions, either
when averaged or split across relational rules. One possible explanation for this
is that participants were performing at ceiling for the task in both conditions. A
harder task may therefore help to uncover the training benefits of one condition
over the other. With this in mind, in the next experiment we explore the effect of
perceptual similarity on transfer in a more naturalistic setting.
7.3 Experiment 2
Having demonstrated in Experiment 1 that participants are able to acquire and use
the relational rules for transfer, we designed a more complex and naturalistic video
game that incorporated the same relational rules. Participants in Experiment 1
performed close to ceiling regardless of whether the training consisted of high- or
low-perceptual similarity. This suggests that the task was too easy and participants
could transfer the relational rules irrespective of training regime. We therefore took
the stimuli from Experiment 1 and used them in a simple 2D video game. We
hypothesised that the increased difficulty of the games, compared to the match-to-
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sample task, would remove the ceiling effect and reveal any differences between the
low- and high-perceptual similarity conditions.
7.3.1 Methods
Games
All of the tasks in Experiment 2 were conducted using custom-made 2D video games
implemented in Unity game engine. Each game consisted of a simple 2D environment
with moving 2D objects. Participants were able to control one of the 2D objects
using the arrow keys on a keyboard. The arrow key direction corresponded to the
direction of movement of the player object and this allowed for 9 possible movement
combinations (left, right, up, down, left-up, right-up, left-down, right-down, no
input). Movement of the player object was additive using velocity vectors. For
example, if the player object was moving directly across the screen from left to
right then a press/selection of the left arrow would add a small leftward vector
to the player object’s current rightward movement vector. This would cause the
player’s object to move to the right at a slower rate. Subsequent presses/selections
of the left arrow key would keep adding a leftward vector until the object started
to move leftward. Importantly, choosing to press no arrow key (no input) does not
stop the player object but leaves its current velocity vector unchanged and so the
player object will continue on its current trajectory until an arrow key is pressed.
Participants were told to use the arrow keys for the study but were not told about
the correspondence between the arrow key direction on the keyboard and their effect
on the 2D screen.
As with Experiment 1 we wanted the video games to utilise relational rules
that allowed for different perceptual configurations while maintaining the same task
structure. With this in mind, the video game consisted of four objects; the player
controlled object, two moving objects with constant velocity and a static goal object.
The goal of the game was to score as many points as possible on a single trial. In
order to score a point the player had to collide with the static goal object. The goal
object was randomly positioned along the edge of the screen and would disappear
after the player-controlled object collided with it. To make the goal object re-appear
for collection, the player-controlled object had to collide with the moving object that
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was the same texture as itself. Conversely, if the player-controlled object collided
with the moving object that was a different texture then the game would end and
a new trial would start after a time-out period. The key characteristic of these
rules is that they are flexible and abstract enough to allow for games of varying
perceptual similarity while ensuring the rules remain constant. One can vary the
shapes, colours and textures of the objects so long as one of the moving objects has
the same texture as the player object. These rules represent a substrate for transfer
because they provide high-level information about how to act optimally in the 2D
world, regardless of the current perceptual instance of the game. A summary of the
fundamental rules governing the video games can be seen in Figures 7.14 and 7.15,
and a screenshot from an example game can be seen in Figure 7.16. We chose to
use the texture rule over the shape and colour rules from Experiment 1 because the
texture rule appeared to show the clearest trend towards a difference between high
and low perceptual similarity training (Figure 7.11).
Figure 7.14: (A) Flow chart describing the rule that governs the scoring of points.
(B) Diagram of how the rule looks while playing the game. If the player collides
with the static object then the player scores a point. The player object is the red
circle and the static object is the green hexagon.
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Figure 7.15: (A) Flow chart describing the rule that governs the ending of a trial
and the generation of a static object. (B) If the player collides with a moving object
and they are different textures then the trial ends. (C) If the player collides with a
moving object and they are the same texture then a static object is generated. The
player object is the red circle, the moving object is the white triangle and the static
object is the green hexagon.
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Figure 7.16: Example screenshot of the video games for Experiment 2. Score, time
remaining on the level, and health were all shown at the top of the screen. The player
controlled one of the moving objects. Moving objects left a short trail indicating where
they had recently been.
The high and low perceptual similarity conditions were generated in the same
way as in Experiment 1 using 10 different random seed values. The high similarity
condition was generated by randomly changing one feature of a randomly chosen
object between successive games. The only constraint on this was that the player
texture always had to match one of the moving objects’ textures. This ensured that
all game rules were present for each game and consecutive games could differ by
no more than two features (e.g. if the player texture was changed then a moving
object texture was also changed to ensure all rules remained present). Again the low
perceptual similarity condition was generated by randomly shuffling the sequence of
games associated with the high perceptual similarity condition. In addition to the
high and low perceptual similarity conditions, we also included a third condition
for Experiment 2. In this condition all the object features were randomised be-
tween consecutive levels, while ensuring all the rules were satisfied. As a result, this
condition does not control for the same training levels as the other two conditions.
The purpose of this condition was to test whether some of the proposed benefits of
perceptually dissimilar experiences are due to the increased variety of experiences
rather than the actual temporal sequence. We refer to this third condition as the
random condition. As before, all conditions finished with a final test level, which
used perceptually novel features to obtain a true measure of transfer ability.
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Figure 7.17 contains all the shapes, textures and colours used for generating the
game trajectories. Example trajectories for each of the conditions can be seen in
Figure 7.18. All participants completed 20 games in total with the first 19 being
specific to the training condition and the last one being the novel test level (see
Appendix C for the results of a shortened version with only 10 games). The duration
of the 19 training games was 30 seconds and the duration of the test game was 120
seconds. The rationale for a short training game duration was to increase participant
engagement by shortening the overall experiment duration. The rationale for a





Figure 7.17: Table showing the shapes, textures and colours that were sampled from





Figure 7.18: Depiction of the different training conditions. The y-axis represents
the object and the x-axis represents the level number. The final level represents the
perceptually novel test level. (A) High-perceptual similarity condition. On any two
consecutive levels only the shape, texture or colour of one object was changed. If
the player object’s or goal-generating object’s texture changed then both needed to
be changed to ensure that there was always a texture match. (B) Low-perceptual
similarity condition. The high-perceptual similarity condition was randomly shuffled
to decrease perceptual similarity but control for the games experienced. (C) Random
condition. All object features were randomised between games to minimise perceptual
similarity and provide additional variance compared to the other two conditions.
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Experimental Procedure
Three hundred participants were recruited (Male=182, Female=117, Undisclosed=1)
using the online platform ‘Prolific Academic’ and were rewarded £5 for participa-
tion. To enrol on the study participants had to be aged 18-30, be fluent in English
and be using a desktop computer. Participants were split into three groups; one
receiving a high-degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive levels, one re-
ceiving a low-degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive levels, and one
receiving completely random levels. Participants were removed from the analysis if
the number of key presses they made for any game was 0. This led to 95 participants
in the high-degree of perceptual similarity group, 100 participants in the low-degree
of perceptual similarity group and 99 participants in the random group.
Before starting the games participants were given the same free-classification
task as in Experiment 1. Participants were also told that the games were related
and that they would need to use the training games in order to score as many points
as possible on the final test game. The rationale for this was that spontaneous
transfer can be difficult (Kurtz and Honke, 2020) and so we wanted to remove the
added difficulty of identifying that the games were related. Example screenshots of
the instructions given to the participants can be seen in Figure 7.19.
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Figure 7.19: (A) Example screenshot of the instructions given to participants before
playing the training games. (B) Example screenshot of the instructions given to
participants before playing the test game. Participants were made aware of the fact
that the games were related and that the first 19 were informative with respect to the
final game
Participants were also given a task before and after the experiment to control
for any improvement in using the keyboard controls. The rationale for this was
that part of the improvement in performance over the course of the experiment
may be due to participants becoming more familiar with using the arrow keys to
control the player object. By accounting for this improvement, we hope that any
performance differences observed can be attributed to the transfer of knowledge
rather than to motor control improvements. A screenshot of the motor control task
given to participants can be seen in Figure 7.20. The task involved controlling a
white circle in order to collect a series of blue rectangles. The controls for the white
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circle worked in the same way as in the main games. The time taken to collect all
the blue rectangles was taken as a proxy for the participant’s competence in using
the arrow keys to control the player object.
Figure 7.20: Example screenshot of the motor control task given to participants both
before and after the main games. The goal of the task was to use the white circle
to collect 5 blue squares. The blue squares appeared sequentially so that once one
square was collected the next one would appear. Both the number of squares collected
and the time elapsed were shown at the top of the screen.
7.3.2 Results
Free-Classification Task
The results of the free-classification task can be seen in Figure 7.21. We observed
the same pattern as in Experiment 1, with participants favouring matches based on















































Figure 7.21: Results of the free classification task. The x-axis represents the char-
acteristics of the chosen objects while the y-axis represents the number of objects
chosen with a particular characteristic summed over all participants. Blue denotes
total counts, red denotes the counts for the first round of classification and green
denotes the counts for the second round of classification.
Training Performance
For our analysis of the games we chose to focus on the score achieved on the first trial
of each level and the total score achieved on each level. The score on the first trial
of a level is an indication of a participant’s ability to correctly infer which object to
avoid and which one to interact with. The score on the first trial therefore provides
a measure of a participants ability to transfer knowledge without feedback. In
comparison, the total score on a level incorporates a participant’s ability to transfer
knowledge with the use of feedback. For example, participants can use the results
of the first trial to infer which object to avoid and which one to interact with, a
strategy that may lead to a poor first score but a good total score.
Figure 7.22 shows the training trajectories for the three training regimes. All
regimes showed a rapid increase in performance during the early levels, with perfor-
mance plateauing off towards the end of training. Figure 7.23 shows the first and to-
tal scores summed over all the training levels for each training regime (see Appendix
B, Figures B.1 and B.2 for histograms). The results of a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum
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test indicated that there was a significant difference between the regimes in terms of
the sum of first scores over training (χ2(2, N=294)=12.5, p=0.002) but not the sum
of total scores over training (χ2(2, N=294)=3.6, p=0.165). Pairwise Wilcoxon rank
sum tests with bonferroni corrections revealed that in the case of the sum of first
scores over training, the random condition was significantly lower than both the high-
perceptual similarity condition (p=0.010) and the low-perceptual similarity condi-
tion (p=0.005). There was no significant difference between the high-perceptual
similarity condition and the low-perceptual similarity condition (p=1.000). In the
case of the sum of total scores over training there were no significant differences (low
vs. high: p=1.00, low vs. random: p=0.360, high vs. random: p=0.250).
A B
Figure 7.22: Scores for each level over the whole training trajectory for high-
perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A) First
trial scores (B) Total scores. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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A B
Figure 7.23: Scores summed over all training levels for high-perceptual similarity,
low-perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A) First trial scores. (B) Total
scores. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Test Performance
As in Experiment 1, the key measure of overall transfer performance was the score
on the final test level. Figure 7.24 shows the first and total scores for the final
test level for all training regimes (see Appendix B, Figures B.3 and B.4 for his-
tograms). To test for an effect of perceptual similarity during training on test scores
we performed a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test between the test scores for each of
the training regimes. For both the first (χ2(2, N=294)=1.7, p=0.426) and total
(χ2(2, N=294)=2.2, p=0.336) test scores we found no significant differences. This
lack of differences between the different training regimes suggests that the degree of




Figure 7.24: Scores on the final test game for high-perceptual similarity, low-
perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A) Score achieved on the first trial
of the final game (B) Total score achieved on the final game. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
In order to further explore which variables contributed to performance on the
final test game and therefore transfer ability we also ran a regression analysis (Table
7.2). The first scores and total scores on the final test game were used as dependent
variables in separate regression models, and the training regime, the self-reported
video game experience, the number of texture matches during the free classification
task, the performance on the first motor control task and the difference in perfor-
mance between the first and second motor control tasks were included as independent
variables. The self reported video game experience was included as an independent
variable in order to control for participants’ differing levels of video game experience.
The number of texture matches in the free classification task were included to test
the hypothesis that a priori attention to texture would improve the participants
ability to identify the rule and transfer it to novel levels. The performance on the
first motor control task and the difference between the two motor control tasks were
included as independent variables to control for participants’ competence with using
the controls and any improvements they made in using the controls over the course
of the experiment.
Table 7.2 shows the results of these regression analyses. Across both regression
models neither the training regime nor the number of texture matches were signif-
icant predictors of performance on the final test game. In comparison, the time
241
taken on the first motor task and the difference between the second and first motor
tasks were significant predictors of test performance. More specifically, faster times
on the first motor task led to better transfer performance. Similarly, the larger
the improvement between the first and second motor tasks the better the transfer
performance. This suggests that the participants’ familiarity with the controls and
their subsequent improvement in using these controls is a good predictor of transfer
performance on the final test game.
Table 7.2: Regression analysis of test scores. Each column is a separate regression
using either the first or total score on the test level. Values not in brackets represent
beta coefficients. Values in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.
Dependent variable:
First Score Total Score
(1) (2)
Experience 0.47∗ 0.21
(0.01, 0.93) (−0.16, 0.57)
High-Perceptual Similarity −0.06 −1.75
(−2.96, 2.83) (−4.04, 0.54)
Random 1.51 −2.16
(−1.33, 4.35) (−4.42, 0.09)
Motor Task 1 −1.17∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗
(−1.86, −0.48) (−1.68, −0.58)
Motor Task 2 - Motor Task 1 −1.12∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗
(−1.83, −0.42) (−1.57, −0.45)
No. Texture Matches −0.04 0.17
(−0.66, 0.58) (−0.33, 0.66)
Constant 28.64∗∗∗ 41.01∗∗∗
(13.99, 43.30) (29.38, 52.63)
Observations 294 294
R2 0.08 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.09
Residual Std. Error (df = 287) 10.18 8.08
F Statistic (df = 6; 287) 4.40∗∗∗ 5.74∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Cost of Transfer
Aside from transfer performance, we also wanted to check whether there was a
difference in the cost of transfer between training regimes (Figure 7.25). In order to
explore this, we tested whether the change in performance between the last training
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level and the test level was significantly different between the training regimes using
a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. For both the first (χ2(2, N=294)=5.4, p=0.069)
and total (χ2(2, N=294)=1.7, p=0.432) test scores we found no significant difference
between the training regimes with respect to the cost of transfer.
A B
Figure 7.25: Change in scores from the last training level to the final test level
for the high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions.
(A) Change in first scores. (B) Change in total scores. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Object Interactions
To further understand what the participants were learning over the course of the
task we looked at which objects the participants interacted with over the course of
the experiment. Figure 7.26 shows the proportion of participants that interacted
with a particular object for each level. We analysed all object interactions using
chi-squared tests. Interactions with the goal objects were excluded in order to focus
on participants’ ability to infer the underlying texture rule, which is dependent on





Figure 7.26: The proportion of interaction types during learning. (A) The propor-
tion of first interaction types for all participants. An interaction is defined as a
collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was first interacted
with (excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates the level number
(blue is first training level and yellow is final test level). (B) Same as A but for
second interaction types. (C) The difference between the first and second interaction
types.
If participants successfully discovered the underlying relational rule and trans-
ferred it between levels then their first interaction should be with the goal-generating
object. Over the course of training, the number of first interactions with the goal-
generating object significantly increased when comparing the first training level to
the final test level (χ2(1, N=588)=35.3, p<0.001). In comparison, the number of
first interactions with the game-over object decreased from the first training level to
the final test level (χ2(1, N=588)=55.3, p<0.001). This suggests that participants
were indeed learning which object to interact with first; i.e. that of the same tex-
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ture as the player object. Further analyses of the final test level showed that the
number of goal-generating first interactions was significantly larger than the number
of game-ending first interactions (χ2(1, N=588)=177.3.0, p<0.001). This suggests
that the majority of participants were able to use the underlying texture rule to
infer which object to first interact with on the final test level.
Interestingly, the difference between goal-generating and game-ending interac-
tions was even more exaggerated for the second interaction of each level. This effect
was mainly driven by an increased aversion to the game-over object on the second in-
teraction. In particular, on the final test level the number of goal-generating second
interactions was significantly larger than the number of goal-generating first inter-
actions (χ2(1, N=588)=9.9, p=0.002). Similarly the number of game-over second
interactions was significantly lower than the number of game-over first interactions
(χ2(1, N=588)=23.1, p<0.001). This suggests that some participants may be em-
ploying a ‘one-shot’ strategy, whereby they use the first interaction to infer which
subsequent objects to interact with. Such a strategy would not require any under-
standing of the underlying relational texture rule, only that one object is always
goal-generating and one object is always game-ending.
Figure 7.27 also demonstrates the proportion of different object interactions but
split based on training regime. Interestingly, from visual inspection it appeared
that in the random condition participants were more likely to first interact with the
game-ending object and then interact with no other objects. This suggests that the
random condition potentially reduced exploratory behaviour during training and






Figure 7.27: The proportion of interaction types during learning split by training
regime. (A) The proportion of first interaction types for all participants. An inter-
action is defined as a collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object
that was first interacted with (excluding the goal object) for each level of the exper-
iment (1-20). The colour represents the training regime. (B) Same as A but for
second interaction types. (C) The difference between the first and second interaction
types.
Figure 7.28 shows the proportion of interaction types on just the test level for the
different training regimes. The results of a chi-squared test revealed no significant
difference between training regimes for both the first (χ2(4, N=294)=5.4, p=0.252)
and second (χ2(4, N=294)=3.8, p=0.439) interaction types. This is consistent with
the lack of significant differences in test score between the different training regimes





Figure 7.28: The number of interaction types for the final test level. (A) The
number of first interaction types summed over all participants. An interaction is
defined as a collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was
first interacted with (excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates
the training regime. (B) Same as A but for second interaction types. (C) The
difference between A and B.
7.3.3 Discussion
In Experiment 2 we explored how the degree of perceptual similarity between con-
secutive 2D video games affected transfer performance. The 2D video games all
shared the same underlying relational rule, which allowed the perceptual features of
the games to vary while maintaining the same task structure. Participants received
19 training levels followed by a final test level, which involved completely novel per-
ceptual features 1. In total, we explored the effect of three different training regimes.
1See Appendix C for the results of a shortened version with only 9 training levels. Our overall
results remained the same, with the perceptual similarity between consecutive games having no
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In the high-perceptual similarity condition consecutive games differed by a single
feature; an object was chosen at random and either the colour, texture or shape
was changed. In the low-perceptual similarity condition the training games from
the high-perceptual similarity condition were taken and shuffled, which decreased
the perceptual similarity between successive games but kept the training games con-
stant. Finally, in the random condition, all the features of the objects were chosen
at random for each training game. This not only lead to low-perceptual similarity
between consecutive games but also greatly increased the amount of information
available during training.
Analysis of the training scores across the groups indicated that participants in
the random group scored significantly worse on the first trial of each level. This
suggests that the increased randomness in the random condition made it harder for
participants to transfer strategies between levels that enabled them to do ‘zero-shot’
transfer i.e. infer the best policy without the need for feedback. Interestingly when
looking at the total score for each level during training there were no significant
differences between training regimes. One possible explanation for this is that par-
ticipants in the random condition were able to recover from their deficit in first score
by using ‘one-shot’ strategies to achieve a good total score.
Our key measure of transfer ability was performance on the final test level,
which involved completely novel features. Analysis of these test scores indicated
no significant differences between training regimes. This suggests that the training
benefit of the high- or low- perceptual similarity condition over the random condition
was not present at test. One potential explanation for this is that any beneficial
strategies that were being used in the high or low perceptual similarity conditions
during training were just exploiting the spurious correlations present in the training
games. Such strategies could not be utilised in the test game because it involved
completely novel perceptual features and so the underlying relational rule was critical
for inferring which object to interact with on the first trial.
The results of the regression analysis further highlighted that there were no
differences between training regimes with respect to test performance. Indeed, the
main predictors of test performance appeared to be participants’ familiarity with
effect on transfer ability.
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the controls before the games began, and also their subsequent improvement in
using these controls. This highlights that a substantial source of difficulty in the
games was controlling the player object. We also tested the hypothesis that prior
attention to texture in a free-classification task would improve participants’ ability
to identify the underlying relational texture rule and therefore improve transfer
performance. However we also found that the number of texture matches made in
the free-classification task was not a significant predictor of performance on the test
level.
To try to understand participants’ decisions during the task, and the strategies
that they were using, we analysed which objects they interacted with on each level.
More specifically, we looked at their first and second interactions on each level (not
including the goal object). This analysis gave us an insight into whether participants
were performing ‘zero-shot’ or ‘one-shot’ transfer. For example, if participants un-
derstood the underlying relational rule then they could infer which object to interact
with on the test level without the need for feedback (‘zero-shot’). In comparison if
participants understood that there was always one object that generated a goal and
one object that ended the game, then they could use the first trial to infer which
is which and then perform optimally (‘one-shot’ transfer). This approach shares
many similarities with Harlow (1949)’s work on meta-learning, whereby primates
would learn from a single trial which object contained a food item and then use this
information to perform optimally.
Across all training regimes, the frequency with which participants correctly first
interacted with the goal-generating object increased over the course of training. This
corresponded to a decrease in the number of game-ending first interactions. This
provides evidence that participants were indeed learning how to perform ‘zero-shot’
transfer across training games. When looking at second interactions, the number
of interactions with the goal-generating object was even larger and the number
of interactions with the game-ending object was even lower compared to the first
interactions. This suggests that participants were also employing ‘one-shot’ learning
strategies to gain points during training. Investigation of object interactions during
training for individual training regimes revealed that participants in the random
condition appeared to be worse at differentiating between the goal-generating and
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game-ending objects in their first interaction. As a result they were then less likely
to interact with another object after their first interaction. This suggests that the
increased differences between consecutive games in the random condition may have
reduced the level of exploration of the participants. This is consistent with the
significantly worse first training scores reported in the random condition.
Analyses of first and second interactions on the final test level revealed that
participants were able to transfer both ‘zero-shot’ and ‘one-shot’ strategies to a
completely novel game. Across all groups the first interaction type was most likely
to be the goal-generating object indicating that participants were able to use the
underlying relational texture rule to infer which object to interact with. Similarly,
the second interaction type was even more likely to be the goal-generating object
suggesting that participants could use the result of the first interaction to further
infer which object to interact with. We found no evidence for differences in object
interactions between the three training regimes. This further supports the idea that
any benefit of the high- or low-perceptual similarity conditions over the random
condition during training did not hold when a truly novel game was presented.
In the next experiment we obtain a measure of ceiling performance by telling the
participants the rules of the games beforehand. This helps us to understand how
participants perform on the games given perfect knowledge of what they need to
transfer.
7.4 Experiment 3
In Experiment 2 we saw evidence of ‘zero-shot’ and ‘one-shot’ transfer but with no
differences in test level performance between the different training regimes. One
explanation, as in Experiment 1, for why there were no differences between the
training regimes was that participants were performing at near ceiling. This raised
the question of how participants would perform on the task if they were told the
rules of the game before-hand; i.e. if they had perfect knowledge of the games. In
addition, it is unclear how knowledge of the game translates into transfer perfor-
mance and whether the training regime can aid the use of explicit knowledge for
transfer. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to explore these questions and so we
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repeated Experiment 2 but told the participants the rules of the games before-hand.
We therefore refer to Experiment 3 as the control condition and Experiment 2 as
the non-control condition.
7.4.1 Methods
Both the games and experimental procedure were the same as Experiment 2. The
only difference was that participants were told the rules of the game before starting
the training levels. Figure 7.29 shows a screenshot of how the rules were presented to
the participants. In total 156 participants were recruited for the control condition
(Male=98, Female=56, Undisclosed=2). As before, participants had to be aged
18-30, be fluent in English and be using a desktop computer. Participants were
removed from the analysis if they had zero key presses on any of the levels. As a
result there were 55 participants in the high-degree of perceptual similarity group,
42 participants in the low-degree of perceptual similarity group and 47 participants
in the random group.
Figure 7.29: Screenshot of how the game rules were presented to the participants
before they started playing the games.
7.4.2 Results
Training Performance
Figure 7.30 shows the scores over training for the control condition split by training
regime. As before, across all training regimes there was a marked increase in per-
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formance early on followed by a steady improvement for the remainder of training.
Figure 7.31 shows the first and total scores summed over all the training levels for
the control condition (see Appendix D, Figures D.1 and D.2 for histograms). The re-
sults of a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test indicated that the summed first scores over
training were significantly different between training regimes (χ2(2, N=144)=7.9,
p=0.019) but that the summed total scores were not (χ2(2, N=144)=5.9, p=0.053).
Pairwise comparisons using Wilcoxon rank sum tests with bonferroni corrections
revealed that for both first scores (p=0.011) and total scores (p=0.048) the random
condition was significantly lower than the high-perceptual similarity condition. No
other pairwise differences were found between the different training regimes (first
scores: low vs high: p=0.639, low vs. random: p=0.671, total scores: low vs. high:
p=0.719, low vs. random: p=0.791).
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Figure 7.30: Scores for the control condition over the whole training trajectory for
high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A)




Figure 7.31: Scores for the control condition summed over all training levels for
high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A)
First trial scores. (B) Total scores. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 7.32 shows the scores over training for both the control and non-control
conditions. Similarly, 7.33 shows scores summed over training for both the con-
trol and non-control conditions. The results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test between
the control and non-control conditions revealed that participants scored signifi-
cantly higher first scores for each training regime when they were told the rules
beforehand, except for the low-perceptual similarity regime (low-perceptual similar-
ity: W=2519.5, p=0.061, high-perceptual similarity: W=3691.5, p<0.001, random:
W=3064.5, p=0.002). In terms of total scores, performance was significantly higher
for each training regime when they were told the rules beforehand (low-perceptual




Figure 7.32: Scores for both the control and non-control conditions over the whole
training trajectory for high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and ran-
dom conditions. Transparent lines represent the control condition and solid lines
represent the non-control condition. (A) First trial scores. (B) Total scores. Error







Figure 7.33: Scores for the control and non-control conditions summed over all
training levels for high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random
conditions. Transparent bars represent the control condition and solid bars represent
the non-control condition. (A) First trial scores. (B) Total scores. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Test Performance
Figure 7.34 shows the first and total scores for the final test game in the control
condition (see Appendix D, Figures D.3 and D.4 for histograms). The results of a
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test indicated that both the first scores (χ2(2, N=144)=7.1,
p=0.029) and the total scores (χ2(2, N=144)=10.8, p=0.005) on the final game
were significantly different between training regimes. Pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum
tests with bonferroni corrections showed that in the case of the total scores, the
high-perceptual similarity group was significantly higher than the random group
(p=0.0025). All other pairwise comparisons were non-significant (first scores: low
vs. high: p=0.068, low vs. random: p=1.000, high vs. random: p=0.079, total
scores: low vs. high: p=0.627, low vs. random: p=0.278)
*
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Figure 7.34: Scores for the control condition on the final test game for high-perceptual
similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions. (A) Score achieved on
the first trial of the final game (B) Total score achieved on the final game. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
As in the non-control condition, we used the results on the test level to perform
a regression analysis to control for self-reported video game experience, familiarity
with the controls and improvements in using the controls over the course of the
experiment. Table 7.3 shows the results of the regression analysis. In line with the
non-control condition, we saw that the performance on the first motor control task,
and the improvement between the first and second motor control tasks, were both
significant predictors of the first and total score on the test level. However, unlike
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in the non-control condition, we saw that the high-perceptual similarity group alone
was a significant predictor of test level performance. The coefficients were positive
indicating that participants receiving the high-perceptual similarity training regime
were likely to perform better on the test level than if they received the low-similarity
training regime, controlling for all other variables.
Table 7.3: Regression analysis of test scores. Each column is a separate regression
using either the first or total score on the test level. Values not in brackets represent
beta coefficients. Values in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.
Dependent variable:
First Score Total Score
(1) (2)
Experience 0.41 0.47∗
(−0.25, 1.07) (0.09, 0.86)
High-Perceptual Similarity 6.74∗∗ 3.10∗
(2.66, 10.83) (0.74, 5.47)
Random 2.99 −0.16
(−1.32, 7.29) (−2.66, 2.33)
Motor Task 1 −2.14∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
(−3.11, −1.17) (−1.67, −0.55)
Motor Task 2 - Motor Task 1 −2.09∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗
(−3.12, −1.06) (−1.66, −0.46)
No. Texture Matches −0.44 0.43
(−1.32, 0.43) (−0.07, 0.94)
Constant 47.71∗∗∗ 37.72∗∗∗
(27.35, 68.08) (25.94, 49.51)
Observations 144 144
R2 0.26 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.27
Residual Std. Error (df = 137) 10.13 5.86
F Statistic (df = 6; 137) 7.82∗∗∗ 10.01∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Figure 7.35 shows the first and total scores for the final test level for both the
control and non-control conditions. Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicated that in the
high-perceptual similarity training regime the first score (W=3497, p<0.001) and
the total score (W=3628.5, p<0.001) was significantly higher in the control condi-
tion compared to the non-control condition. No significant differences were found
between the control and non-control conditions for the other training regimes (first
scores: low: W=2113.5, p=0.953, random: W=2271.0, p=0.817, total scores: low:
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Figure 7.35: Scores for the control and non-control conditions on the final test
game for high-perceptual similarity, low-perceptual similarity and random conditions.
Transparent bars represent the control condition and solid bars represent the non-
control condition. (A) Score achieved on the first trial of the final game (B) Total
score achieved on the final game. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
7.4.2.1 Object Interactions
Finally, we looked at the different object interactions the participants made in the
control condition using a series of chi-squared tests. Figure 7.36 shows the pro-
portion of interaction types over the course of the experiment collapsed across all
training regimes. As in the non-control condition, the proportion of goal-generating
first interactions was larger on the final test level compared to the first training level
(χ2(1, N=288)=17.9, p<0.001) and the proportion of game-over first interactions
was lower (χ2 (1, N=288)=16.2, p<0.001). The proportion of goal-generating first
interactions on the final test level was significantly larger than the proportion of
game-over first interactions (χ2(1, N=288)=141.8, p<0.001). This again suggests
that the vast majority of participants were able to perform ‘zero-shot’ transfer by
using the underlying relational rule to infer which object to interact with on the final
test level. However, unlike in the non-control condition, on the test level the pro-
portion of goal-generating and game-over second interactions was not significantly
different from the proportion of goal-generating and game-over first interactions
(goal-generating interactions: χ2(1, N=288)=0.1, p=0.741, game-over interactions:
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χ2(1, N=288)=0.3, p=0.584). This suggests that in the control condition partic-





Figure 7.36: The number of interaction types during learning. (A) The proportion
of first interaction types for all participants. An interaction is defined as a collision
with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was first interacted with
(excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates the level number (blue
is first training level and yellow is final test level). (B) Same as A but for second
interaction types. (C) The difference between the first and second interaction types.
Figure 7.37 shows the same as Figure 7.36 but spilt by training regime. Figure
7.38 shows just the test level object interactions split by training regime. The results
of a chi-squared test revealed that on the test level there were no significant differ-
ences between the training regimes in terms of first (χ2(4, N=144)=5.2, p=0.271)





Figure 7.37: The proportion of interaction types during learning split by training
regime. (A) The proportion of first interaction types for all participants. An inter-
action is defined as a collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object
that was first interacted with (excluding the goal object) for each level of the exper-
iment (1-20). The colour represents the training regime. (B) Same as A but for






Figure 7.38: The number of interaction types for the final test level. (A) The number
of first interaction types summed over all participants. An interaction is defined as a
collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was first interacted
with (excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates the experience
group. (B) Same as A but for second interaction types. (C) The difference between
A and B.
7.4.3 Discussion
In Experiment 3 we repeated Experiment 2 but told the participants the rules of
the games before-hand, which resulted in a control and non-control condition respec-
tively. The purpose of this was (1) to explore how people performed with perfect
knowledge of the games and (2) to investigate whether the degree of perceptual sim-
ilarity between consecutive games had an impact on people’s ability to use explicit
knowledge for transfer.
With respect to training performance in the control condition, the results were
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similar to non-control condition in that participants in the random group performed
significantly worse than those in the high-perceptual similarity group. This sug-
gests that even if participants have knowledge of the underlying games rules, the
large variation in perceptual features between games and the increased combina-
tion of features increases the difficulty of learning. Indeed, this may explain why
in the non-control condition we saw no difference between training regimes. If the
key factor affecting transfer is the degree of perceptual similarity and novelty of
the features then all regimes saw a completely novel test level and so transfer was
equally impacted. As expected when comparing training performance between the
non-control and control conditions, participants predominantly performed better if
they were told the rules before-hand. This indicates that participants were able to
understand the rules and utilise them during training to speed up learning.
In the non-control condition we saw no differences between training regimes on
the final test level. In contrast, there was a significant effect of training regime on
test performance in the control condition. In particular, participants in the high-
perceptual similarity condition appeared to perform better than those in the other
two training regimes. This suggests that the training regime may interact with
the use of explicit knowledge for transfer. Why might high-perceptual similarity
training allow for better use of explicit knowledge for transfer? One possibility is
that consecutive games with a high-degree of perceptual similarity makes it easier for
participants to integrate their explicit knowledge with the feedback they are getting
from the games. Our hypothesis is that if perceptual features are changing gradually
between successive games then it makes it easier to test the explicit knowledge
provided. In comparison, if many perceptual features are changing between games
then it takes time to process the new features and align them with the explicit
knowledge provided.
When comparing test performance between the control and non-control condi-
tions, performance was only better in the control condition for the high-perceptual
similarity training regime. This suggests that ceiling performance (i.e. average
performance given knowledge of the rules) is not the same for the different training
regimes. More specifically, performance on the test level for both the low-perceptual
similarity and random conditions was the same regardless of whether the partici-
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pants were told the rules of the games beforehand or not. This suggests that for these
two training regimes the participants in the non-control condition were performing
as well as if you had told them the rules before-hand. Explicitly telling participants
the rules of the games only seemed to have a positive impact on performance when
consecutive games had a high-degree of perceptual similarity.
Analysis of the object interactions in the control condition showed that partici-
pants learnt how to perform ‘zero-shot’ transfer over the course of the experiment.
In addition, further analyses of the final test level indicated that unlike in the non-
control condition, participants in general did not appear to rely on ‘one-shot’ transfer
techniques. This makes sense given that participants were provided with the rules of
the game, which allowed for better performance than ‘one-shot’ transfer techniques.
Analyses of the object interactions on the final test level in the control condition
did not reveal any significant differences between the different training regimes. If
participants in the high-perceptual similarity group were indeed better at using the
explicit knowledge for transfer then you would expect to see more goal-generating
first interactions and less game-over first interactions compared to the other train-
ing regimes. While no significant effect was observed, a trend could be observed
in this direction with the high-perceptual similarity group having the highest pro-
portion of goal-generating first interactions and the lowest proportion of game-over
interactions.
7.5 General Discussion
How people acquire knowledge and transfer it to novel situations is still an open
question. Many believe that it relies upon the acquisition of relational knowledge
that is independent of specific perceptual features (Gentner, 1988; Wilson et al.,
1985; Cook and Wasserman, 2007; Torrey, 2009; Holyoak, 2012). One factor that
is known to impact the ability to transfer knowledge to novel situations is the or-
dering of training examples (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Gentner et al., 2007;
Carvalho and Goldstone, 2014a,b; Rohrer et al., 2014; Kornell and Bjork, 2008).
More specifically, the degree of perceptual similarity between training examples ap-
pears to have an affect on how people perform on a novel test example. In the field of
262
analogy, a high-degree of perceptual similarity between examples has been proposed
to improve the acquisition of knowledge for transfer (Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996;
Gentner et al., 2007). In comparison, in the field of concept learning, a low-degree of
perceptual similarity has been proposed to improve the acquisition of knowledge for
transfer (Rohrer et al., 2014; Kornell and Bjork, 2008). The experimental design of
analogy and concept learning tasks have several differences. For example, analogy
tasks typically involve aligning one domain with another based on the underlying
relational structure whereas concept learning tasks typically involve discriminating
between concepts based on perceptual features. Transfer in these cases may there-
fore involve different cognitive processes that are differentially affected by the degree
of perceptual similarity between consecutive examples. Understanding how the de-
gree of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences affects transfer in these
tasks is important because it can elucidate the mechanisms via which knowledge is
being acquired and applied. In addition, it can inform constraints on computational
models of transfer.
In this chapter we investigated how the degree of perceptual similarity between
experiences affects transfer from a Reinforcement Learning (RL) perspective. Feed-
back from tasks in the analogy and concept learning literature may engage RL
machinery but they are far from naturalistic. Naturalistic RL tasks involve sequen-
tial decision making and motor control. We therefore aimed to investigate how
the degree of perceptual similarity between experiences affects transfer in a more
naturalistic RL setting using simple 2D video games. The video games consisted
of several 2D objects that could vary in terms of shape, colour and texture. One
object was controlled by the player, one was critical for scoring points and the other
two dictated whether the game ended or more point scoring objects were generated.
The perceptual features of the objects were allowed to vary between games but the
same underlying relational rule was present in all of the games; colliding with the
object that had the same texture as the one you controlled generated an object that
could be collected to score a point. High-perceptual similarity games were produced
by changing one feature at a time between games whereas low-perceptual similarity
games were produced by shuffling the order of the high-perceptual similarity games.
This allowed for differing degrees of perceptual similarity between consecutive games
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but controlled for the individual games experienced during training. A third condi-
tion was also explored where the features of the games were randomised on each level
to minimise perceptual similarity and provide additional variation in the perceptual
features. At the end of all conditions a final test game was administered, which
involved a completely novel set of perceptual features and served as a measure of
transfer performance.
Before investigating the effects of perceptual similarity on transfer in the 2D
video games, we first checked that the underlying relational rules could be used to
perform transfer in a simpler setting (Experiment 1). Stimuli from the 2D video
games were used in a match-to-sample task, with the degree of perceptual similarity
being manipulated in the same way as the full 2D video games. We found that
participants could easily acquire the relational rules and apply them to novel test
examples, with no differences between high-perceptual similarity and low-perceptual
similarity conditions. While no differences between the two training regimes were
observed we hypothesised that this may be due to the simple nature of the task.
Having confirmed that the relational rule could be acquired and used for transfer
we moved on to the more naturalistic 2D video games (Experiment 2).
In Experiment 2 we observed differences during training between the different
training regimes. The random group demonstrated decreased training performance
compared to the other two training regimes. This suggests that the low perceptual
similarity between the levels and the large degree of variation in the perceptual
features made it harder for participants to learn point-scoring strategies. One in-
terpretation of this is that in the case of the low- and high-perceptual similarity
training regimes there was some degree of progressive alignment occurring (Ko-
tovsky and Gentner, 1996; Gentner et al., 2007). The reduced variation in features
and greater perceptual similarity in these two conditions meant that it was easier
for participants to align the games and score more points during training. In con-
trast, the random condition potentially introduced too many differences between
the games, which made it harder for participants to align them. From looking at
the object interactions made by participants, it appears that the increased difficulty
of the random condition made participants less likely to explore during the training
games. Participants in the random condition were more likely to have a negative
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first interaction and to refrain from interacting with a second object. This suggests
that the degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive games may have af-
fected the explore-exploit trade-off that is characteristic of RL tasks (Sutton and
Barto, 1998).
Despite there being differences during training between the different training
regimes, we observed no differences on the final test level. This suggest that the
degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive games had no effect on partic-
ipants’ ability to transfer the underlying relational rules. Therefore, while some
evidence of progressive alignment may have existed during training, it appeared to
have no benefit on the novel test level. One potential explanation for this is that
the difference between the last training level and the perceptually novel test level
was too large for participants to align. Indeed, progressive alignment predicts that
there is a ‘sweet spot’ for alignment, whereby experiences are dissimilar enough to
create a useful abstraction but similar enough to identify the similarities between
them. One interesting point to note is that the degree of perceptual similarity in
each of the conditions stayed relatively stable over learning. This is slightly at odds
with the theory of progressive alignment, which suggests that experiences should get
gradually dissimilar over learning so that easier abstractions bootstrap the learning
of more complex abstractions. Future work should therefore include a training con-
dition where the level of perceptual dissimilarity gradually increases over the course
of training, which is consistent with the theory of progressive alignment.
In addition to progressive alignment, the literature on analogical reasoning also
describes a phenomenon known as the ‘relational shift’ (Gentner and Hoyos, 2017).
The relational shift states that children learn to focus on relational content rather
than surface features over the course of development. This has some interesting
implications for our results because our video games rely on relational rules. It
is possible that we saw no differences between training regimes because we tested
adult participants who already have the ability to focus on relational information. In
comparison, testing on children may unveil differences between the training regimes
because they are still in the process of learning how to focus on relational informa-
tion. We hypothesize that this critical period in development could be substantially
more susceptible to the effect of perceptual similarity on the ability to identify re-
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lational knowledge for transfer.
With respect to the concept learning literature, our test results showed that the
random training regime did not confer any benefit on the novel test game. This
indicates that the predictions from the concept learning literature may not apply to
our naturalistic RL task. For example, Carvalho and Goldstone (2014b)’s hypoth-
esis that high-perceptual similarity promotes individuals to look at the similarities
between exemplars, predicts that the structured training regime should help partic-
ipants to discover the underlying similarities between the games. However we saw
no evidence of this effect on the novel test game. One potential explanation for this
contradictory finding is that the concept learning paradigms performed by (Carvalho
and Goldstone, 2014b) relied on categorising different objects based on perceptual
features. In comparison, our 2D video games do not rely on the identification of spe-
cific perceptual features but instead rely on the identification of a relational rule that
is independent of specific perceptual features. This is perhaps more representative
of analogical reasoning tasks, which also rely on the use of relational information.
What do the results of Experiment 2 tell us about the analogy between Deep RL
and the brain? The lack of differences between training conditions on the final test
level raises several different hypotheses about the internal computations underlying
efficient RL in the brain. Throughout this thesis we have argued that the Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) used in Deep RL approaches mimic the properties of semantic
memory and the neocortex. During the training of DNNs, the input data is often
randomised to reduce spurious correlations that could lead to over-fitting. Classic
Deep RL approaches therefore predict that a high degree of perceptual similarity
should lead to the best training performance but the worse test performance be-
cause the network will over-fit to perceptual similarities between consecutive games.
Interestingly, part of this prediction appeared to be true in our results. More specif-
ically, the high- and low-perceptual similarity conditions performed significantly
better than the random group during training but this benefit did not apply to the
novel test game. This suggests that whatever strategies were being transferred dur-
ing training in these two conditions were sub-optimal and likely exploited spurious
similarities in perceptual features, as predicted by DNNs.
While the training results appear to be consistent with the predictions made
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by Deep RL systems and the over-fitting of DNNs, the test results do not. Over-
fitting in DNNs is typically associated with poor test performance and good training
performance. DNNs would therefore predict that the test performance should be
worse in the high perceptual similarity condition, however we saw no significant
differences between the training conditions. One simplistic interpretation of these
null results is that DNNs are a poor model of semantic memory in humans, and
that the training of DNNs is fundamentally different to how humans learn during
the task.
While it is easy to jump to the conclusion that DNNs are a poor model of
semantic memory, there are many other reasons why this discrepancy may exist.
Firstly, in order for DNNs to strongly overfit to spurious correlations in the input
data they need to perform enough spurious weight updates. This means that the
DNN would need to be trained for long enough on each level that its weights would
move to a different part of the parameter space based on the training condition. As
a result, if the levels are short enough then the DNN may not have enough time
to fit the spurious correlations because the input data is changing too quickly. The
weights will therefore stay in the same region of the parameter space regardless of
the training condition. Future work should therefore explore whether increasing the
time spent on each level leads to a benefit of low perceptual similarity training at
test, as would be predicted by the over-fitting behaviour of DNNs.
One of the main themes of this thesis has been the need to consider multiple
learning systems interacting with each other in order to understand the efficiency
of RL in the brain. This suggests that an alternative reason for why we do not
see the effects predicted by DNNs is that other learning systems are involved that
compensate for the over-fitting. In particular, Deep RL systems typically avoid
the problem of over-fitting to temporal correlations by relying on a hippocampal
learning system. This system stores past experiences and randomly samples from
them for training. This process mimics that of biological ‘replay’ and suggests that
replay might be the reason why we did not see an effect of perceptual similarity on
transfer performance in our experiments. In essence, the brain may be using the
hippocampus to break up any correlations in the input so that the overall effect is the
same regardless of whether the training involves high or low perceptual similarity.
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In addition to the influence of other learning systems, it has been suggested that
disentangled representations may help to alleviate DNNs reliance on interleaved
training. It is largely believed that the brain represents information in a distributed
fashion, a property that it shares with Deep-RL models. These distributed repre-
sentations can either be disentangled (a single unit represents a cardinal dimension)
or entangled (a cardinal dimension is represented as a pattern across several units).
If a task requires learning based on a single cardinal dimension then disentangled
representations do not suffer from interference whereas entangled representations
do. Entangled representations therefore favour training on low-perceptual similarity
examples in order to reduce the level of interference whereas disentangled repre-
sentations are indifferent to the degree of perceptual similarity. If a task requires
learning over multiple cardinal dimensions then both disentangled and entangled
representations suffer from interference and both should favour low-perceptual sim-
ilarity training. The fact that we saw no effect of perceptual similarity on transfer
performance may suggest that the knowledge being learnt may be acting on a single
cardinal dimension that is represented in a disentangled manner.
A final explanation for why we saw no effect of perceptual similarity at test is
that the participants in our experiments were not relying on semantic learning at
all. Indeed, in this thesis we have argued that classical DNNs are best used to
represent sensory cortices that learn slowly over many experiences. However, the
duration of our experimental task was around 20 minutes, which is potentially too
short to engage semantic learning. Our results also remained the same when we tried
a shortened version of the task that consisted of only 10 levels and lasted around 10
minutes (see Appendix C). Over these short time-scales, learning in other systems
such as working memory in the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) may be more responsible
for the effects seen in the experiments (see Section 8.4.6 for further discussion). This
would also be in line with the idea that the temporal order of exemplars in concept
learning appears to effect attentional processes (Carvalho and Goldstone, 2014b),
which are associated with the PFC.
One Deep-RL model that has been proposed to model transfer learning in humans
is Meta-RL (see Section 5.2.1). Meta-RL works by using one RL algorithm to
train another RL algorithm to become better at learning on a set of related tasks.
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This form of learning known as meta-learning can lead to ‘one-shot’ transfer as the
second RL algorithm improves at using feedback from novel environments until it
only requires one piece of feedback to infer a suitable policy. Interestingly we saw
evidence of such behaviour in Experiment 2 whereby participants were increasingly
likely to behave optimally on the second interaction compared to the first interaction
on the novel test level. This suggests that meta-learning in RL is indeed a powerful
tool and allows for the transfer of strategies to novel environments. This being said,
a key component of Meta-RL is the random selection of tasks from a collection of
related tasks for training. As with standard DNNs, this helps to reduce spurious
correlations between training updates. However, as already discussed, we saw no
negative effect of high perceptual similarity training on test performance. This
suggests that the training regime for Meta-RL may be unrealistic in its current
format.
Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2 with one crucial difference: partic-
ipants were told the rules of the games before training. The results of this experi-
ment revealed that the performance of the low-perceptual similarity and the random
groups on the final test level were the same as Experiment 2. On the other hand,
the high-perceptual similarity group performed significantly better in Experiment
3 compared to Experiment 2. This is surprising because it suggests that in the
low-perceptual similarity and random groups, the participants were performing at
ceiling in Experiment 2. In contrast, the ceiling of the high-perceptual similarity
group appears to be higher than the other groups. One possibility is that given
enough training levels all other conditions would eventually reach the level of per-
formance demonstrated by the high-perceptual similarity group that were told the
rules before-hand.
We propose that these results can be explained by the fact that even when
participants are provided with the rules of the game they still have to align those
rules with the game-play itself. When consecutive games have a high-degree of
perceptual similarity the games remain more consistent making it easier to project
the rules onto consecutive games as many of the objects are the same as before.
In comparison, when the degree of perceptual similarity is low it takes more time
to identify how the objects relate to the rules when faced with a new level. As
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a results participants that have already been told the rules in the high-degree of
perceptual similarity condition learn to align the rules with the game-play quicker
and so are better placed to transfer their knowledge when a novel test game is
presented. It appears that knowledge of the game rules is not enough for perfect
transfer, participants also have to practice using them before they can be utilised
for transfer, and this practice is influenced by the degree of perceptual similarity
between games.
The fact that we did see a benefit of high perceptual similarity training when
participants were told the rules of the game before-hand has interesting implications
for Deep RL models of human RL. Currently, it is still an open question how explicit
instructions in written form can be provided to Deep RL systems. However, our
results suggest that future work in this direction should account for the fact that a
period of learning is still required after the explicit instructions have been provided.
In addition, this learning period should be sensitive to the degree of perceptual
similarity between experiences and that this ultimately will have an effect on transfer
performance.
In the final chapter of this thesis we will discuss the general implications of the
work we have conducted throughout the thesis. We hope that this will help to distill
the contributions we have made to our understanding of efficient RL in both humans
and machines. We will also highlight key limitations of the work and promising areas
for future research. With respect to the work conducted in this chapter, Sections
8.4.5 and 8.4.6 are particularly relevant as they discuss the difficulties of defining





In this chapter we discuss the results of our work and their broader implications for
the research community. We start by re-iterating the goal of this thesis (Section
8.1) and summarise the key computational (Section 8.2) and empirical (Section
8.3) findings of our work with respect to this goal. We then move on to discuss
the limitations of the approaches used, and highlight promising avenues of future
research that could address these limitations (Section 8.4). This is followed by a
discussion of some of the practical lessons that have been learnt over the course of
this thesis (Section 8.5) and our concluding remarks (Section 8.6).
8.1 Goal of The Thesis
Humans demonstrate rapid learning and inference in novel situations throughout
their life. Often these situations involve sparse reward signals and are thought
to engage Reinforcement Learning (RL) mechanisms in the brain, which transform
perceptual input into action. Recent advances in Deep RL have opened up promising
avenues for modelling this transformation; however, it appears to lack the efficiency
and flexibility of human learning and behaviour. The purpose of this thesis was
to build an analogy between the brain and Deep RL in order to understand this
discrepancy and investigate the internal computations that support efficient RL in
the brain and the external factors that influence them. To achieve this we used a
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combination of both computational modelling and empirical approaches.
8.2 Summary of Computational Findings
Chapters 3-6 of this thesis investigated the computational properties of different
learning systems in the brain and how they contribute to fast and efficient RL.
Central to this investigation was Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory,
which we used to organise past literature and inform our own research. CLS the-
ory posits that the brain consists of two key learning systems: the neocortex and
the hippocampus. These two systems have complementary properties in that the
neocortex slowly learns over-lapping representations while the hippocampus rapidly
learns pattern-separated representations. In Chapter 4 we proposed a novel algo-
rithm called Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL), which utilised
these complementary properties to improve the performance, stability, efficiency
and flexibility of well known Deep RL algorithms. Central to the performance of
CTDL were two key properties: (1) both the neocortical and hippocampal learn-
ing system directly contributed to action selection, and (2) the errors produced by
the neocortical learning system were used to guide the learning of the hippocampal
learning system. Importantly, CTDL predicts that the hippocampus should be bi-
ased towards storing experiences that the neocortex is poor at evaluating and that
the hippocampus is most beneficial when the task involves rare but highly salient
events.
While CLS theory makes a dissociation between the neocortex and the hip-
pocampus, many sub-divisions exist within these two learning systems. In Chapter
5 we proposed that the sub-division between the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) and
sensory cortices may be critical for fast and efficient RL. The PFC has long been
associated with executive control and a growing body of research suggests that it
has an important influence during RL. One particular function of the PFC is se-
lective feature-based attention, which is thought to guide RL towards important
features based on the task at hand. This is thought to improve the efficiency of
RL in the brain by reducing the dimensionality of state representations. With this
in mind, in Chapter 6 we proposed a novel algorithm called Selective Particle At-
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tention (SPA), which imbued a Deep RL agent with the ability to perform visual
feature-based attention. SPA used a particle filter to model the PFC and incor-
porated both bottom-up and top-down attention to guide feature selection. Our
results showed that SPA greatly improved the performance, flexibility and efficiency
of Deep RL algorithms. Crucially, SPA was able to quickly and dynamically change
the features being attended to based on the task at hand. This not only reduced the
dimensionality of the problem but also flexibly re-purposed existing representations
without the need to learn new ones end-to-end. From a biological perspective, SPA
demonstrates that selective feature attention may be a viable mechanism for flexibly
re-purposing existing representations in sensory cortices for efficient RL.
In the case of both CTDL and SPA, the proposed algorithms highlight the im-
portance of considering the brain as a group of interacting learning systems each
with their own set of computational properties. It appears unlikely that a single
learning system can support the kinds of flexible behaviour shown by humans. It is
therefore critical that we try to understand important demarcations between learn-
ing systems in the brain and what their distinct computational properties are. Here
we highlight the slow learning of over-lapping representations in the neocortex, the
fast learning of pattern separated representations in the hippocampus, and the dy-
namic, top-down attention of the PFC as key computational properties. We also
emphasise the importance of the interactions between these different learning sys-
tems. In particular, we propose that the errors generated by the neocortex are used
to bias the content of the hippocampus and error signals generated by the PFC are
used to re-purpose representations in sensory cortices. These are just a selection of
the many possible interactions between these learning systems and it is likely that
a plethora of different interactions are required to fully capture the complexity of
human RL.
8.3 Summary of Empirical Findings
Chapter 7 moved away from the internal computations supporting efficient RL in
the brain and instead focused on the effect of external factors in the environment.
The investigation of external factors is important because it helps to constrain com-
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putational theories by making predictions about when RL in the brain should be
more or less efficient. While many external factors may influence RL in the brain,
we chose to focus on how the degree of perceptual similarity between successive
experiences affects the ability to transfer knowledge between situations.
The ability to transfer knowledge between situations is critical for efficient RL be-
cause it allows humans to evaluate new states and actions using knowledge learnt in
previous situations. Several theories make competing predictions about how trans-
fer should be affected by the perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences.
In order to address these conflicts we designed a 2D video game that consisted of a
set of underlying relational rules. These relational rules allowed the perceptual fea-
tures of the game to vary between levels while maintaining the same task structure
across all levels. A key benefit of using this 2D video game was that it allowed us to
explore the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer in a more naturalistic setting
compared to previous work. The game involved making sequential decisions and
performing fine motor control in a complex environment, which are characteristics
that are often lacking in typical experimental psychology tasks.
Participants were split into three experimental conditions; high perceptual simi-
larity, low perceptual similarity and random. The high perceptual similarity condi-
tion was generated by changing a single feature (colour, shape or texture) of a single
object between consecutive levels. The low perceptual similarity condition was then
generated by randomly shuffling the sequence of levels generated by the high percep-
tual similarity condition, which reduced the degree of perceptual similarity between
consecutive levels. This method meant that the participants were exposed to the
same levels in each condition but experienced them in a different order. Finally, in
the random condition, the features of each object were randomised on every level.
This led to an even lower degree of perceptual similarity between levels and a greater
variety of levels compared to the high and low perceptual similarity conditions. Af-
ter training on these conditions, all participants were given the same entirely novel
test level to assess their ability to perform transfer.
Our results provided no evidence for an effect of perceptual similarity on the
ability to perform transfer. The performance of participants on the final test level
was the same regardless of the condition they were assigned to for training. Across
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all conditions we saw evidence of both ‘zero-shot’ and ‘one-shot’ transfer suggesting
participants transferred a range of strategies between games. Our primary hypoth-
esis for why we did not see any differences in transfer ability between the training
conditions was that the task was too easy and participants were performing at ceil-
ing. If this were the case then the benefits of one training condition over another
may not become apparent.
In order to test this possibility, we repeated the experiment again but told the
participants the rules of the game before training began. The rationale for this was
that it would give us a measure of ceiling performance as participants would have
perfect knowledge of the underlying rules that they needed to transfer. Interestingly,
participants performed significantly better in the high-perceptual similarity condi-
tion compared to the other training conditions. These results suggest that the degree
of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences may have an effect on the
utilisation of explicit knowledge for transfer. Even when provided with the knowl-
edge required for transfer, participants still need to map that knowledge onto the
perceptual input provided by the games. This process appears to be facilitated by
a high degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive levels. The performance
of the participants in the high perceptual similarity condition was also significantly
higher than the performance of the corresponding participants who were not told
the rules of the game. This indicates that the lack of differences in the previous
experiment were not due to ceiling effects.
8.4 Limitations and Future Work
This section covers some of the limitations of the approaches used in this thesis.
It also highlights promising avenues of future research that may be able to address
some of these limitations.
8.4.1 Transfer vs. Rapid Learning
Throughout this thesis we have attributed efficient RL in the brain to two main
processes: (1) the transfer of past knowledge and (2) the rapid learning of new
information. These processes are often hard to distinguish between, as learning is
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naturally influenced by existing knowledge and existing knowledge is produced via
previous learning. Both of the algorithms proposed in this thesis, Complementary
Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) and Selective Particle Attention (SPA), at-
tempt to explore the mechanisms needed for efficient RL in the brain. At their
heart both algorithms improve the ability of Deep RL systems to rapidly learn from
reward signals. CTDL achieves rapid learning by utilising a model of the hippocam-
pus that uses a large learning rate. In contrast SPA achieves rapid learning by using
a model of the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) that uses approximate Bayesian inference.
While these rapid learning mechanisms are explicit in both CTDL and SPA, what
evidence is there for them also having the ability to transfer past knowledge to the
current task?
In the case of both CTDL and SPA we explored the effect of changes in the
reward function on performance. Transfer in this case is ultimately dependent on
feedback in the form of a reward signal. The agents are unaware of any changes
to the environment until Reward Prediction Errors (RPEs) are generated. RPEs
are a crucial component of both CTDL and SPA as they are used to update both
the hippocampal and PFC learning systems respectively. Both CTDL and SPA
demonstrated evidence of transfer in these reward revaluation experiments. For
example, in the case of both CTDL and SPA, changes to the reward function did
not reduce the agents to the same level of performance as when learning first started
and both algorithms were able to quickly recover. This suggests that at least some
of the knowledge learnt by the algorithms was re-used when the reward function
changed.
How might this transfer be occurring in CTDL and SPA? In the case of CTDL,
the Self-Organizing Map (SOM) was able to quickly encode changes to the envi-
ronment based on the RPE produced by the Deep Neural Network (DNN). We hy-
pothesise that this may have helped to protect the knowledge stored in the DNN by
re-adjusting the content of the SOM to account for new areas of weakness. In com-
parison, the Deep Q Network (DQN) appeared to fail catastrophically and demon-
strated evidence of negative transfer, whereby learning on the previous task actually
hindered learning of the new task. In the case of SPA, the selective attention mech-
anism naturally implements a form of transfer because it dynamically selects from
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existing features based on their ability to predict reward. Changes in the reward
function will therefore lead to the transfer of new down-stream features. In addi-
tion to down-stream features, SPA also transfers up-stream knowledge stored in the
Deep RL network. The features selected by the particle filter depend on the func-
tion being approximated by the Deep RL network. As a result, when the reward
function changes, the particle filter will attempt to find the best combination of
features for transferring the already learnt knowledge in the Deep RL network. This
may explain why the attention vector weights were different in the multiple choice
task each time a particular image category was set as the target. The attention
vector weights do not stay the same for a particular image category because it has
to re-adjust to changes in the knowledge of the Deep RL component produced by
other image categories being set as the target.
Changes to the reward function are responsible for feedback-driven transfer, how-
ever we are often faced with novel situations where the environment changes and
reward feedback is not available. For example, we may have to decide whether to
take a new job offer or not without the hindsight of taking similar job offers before.
This kind of ‘zero-shot’ transfer relies exclusively on inference mechanisms rather
than efficient learning mechanisms. The problem of ‘zero-shot’ transfer is a hard
one and it relies on the successful transfer of knowledge between situations without
the use of feedback. Changes to the state space provides the opportunity for ‘zero-
shot’ transfer. When an agent is faced with a change in state space, they can use
their knowledge of previous state spaces’ to infer the best actions without having
experienced a reward in the new state space. While humans appear to be able to
deal with changes in state space regularly, classic Deep RL algorithms appear to
lack such an ability. It is for this reason that DQN had to be re-trained on each
video game because it could not handle the changes in images between games. We
explored the effect of a change in state space on the performance of SPA using the
object collection game in Chapter 5. SPA demonstrated impressive performance,
with performance only dropping to intermediate levels and rapidly recovering to
previous levels of performance. However this is still likely to be due to reward-based
feedback over several episodes rather than ‘zero-shot’ transfer. To get a measure of
‘zero-shot’ transfer in this case we would need to analyse the accuracy of SPA’s first
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initial decision before any reward-based feedback is given (i.e. how long does it take
to achieve the first point?).
This raises the question of what mechanisms support ‘zero-shot’ transfer in the
brain? In Chapter 3, we saw how disentangled representations could support transfer
when the state space changed to represent a visual scene that the agent had never
seen before. By directing learning on to individual factors of variation, the knowledge
learnt is invariant to changes in the other factors and therefore supports ‘zero-shot’
transfer. In Chapter 3 we also saw how relational representations formed in the
hippocampus can be used to form novel inferences about experiences or transitions
that have never been experienced before. In the case of both disentangled and
relational representations, the representations learnt are more invariant to changes
in the state space and so support action selection even in unseen state spaces. This
notion of invariance is extremely important as human concepts are highly invariant
to changes in perceptual input (e.g. we can recognise a dog from a multitude of
different angles and contexts). It is by using these concepts to parse novel scenes
that we are able to make inferences without the use of feedback. In addition, these
concepts are likely to support efficient model-based RL and planning as we can make
predictions about their behaviour over time. We therefore believe that matching
the concepts learnt by humans and the representations learnt by Deep RL systems
represents a promising avenue for achieving ‘zero-shot’ transfer. Whether this can
be achieved using innate inductive biases or large amounts of rich perceptual data
remains unclear. In reality it is likely that a combination of these two approaches is
necessary and that different forms of transfer will require different mixes of the two.
For example, innate spatial invariance in convolutional neural networks has greatly
improved their ability to generalize, as has the creation of large natural image data
sets for training.
8.4.2 Efficient Reinforcement Learning as a Combination of
Mechanisms
In Chapters 3 and 5 we reviewed several avenues of research that attempted to un-
derstand the computations responsible for the efficiency of human Reinforcement
Learning (RL). These chapters highlighted how several interacting phenomena are
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likely to underlie the complex and intelligent behaviour of humans in novel situa-
tions. Unfortunately, the fact that many interacting mechanisms are likely to be
responsible for efficient RL raises several difficult questions.
Firstly, there is the problem of distilling the fundamental computational proper-
ties of each learning system based on the different theoretical approaches highlighted
in this thesis. In some cases it seems relatively straightforward to combine the ap-
proaches reviewed in Chapters 3 and 5. For example, in Chapter 3 we saw that the
hippocampus may be responsible for learning both relational and successor repre-
sentations. In this case the two phenomena seem to rely on the same computational
property; namely the ability to form predictive representations. It therefore seems
plausible that such a property could sustain both mechanisms or that the successor
representation is just an instantiation of a cognitive map. Similarly, in Chapter
5 we saw how the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) appears to be responsible for selec-
tive attention and concept formation. Again, in both these cases there is a shared
computational property; namely the production of attentional signals that act on
features of the input. These shared computational properties are appealing because
they allow us to simplify the key mechanisms in each learning system and reconcile
different avenues of research. However, while these approaches appear simple to rec-
oncile there are many which do not. For example, we saw in Chapter 5 that the PFC
may be responsible for meta-learning as well as producing attentional signals. Do
these mechanisms rely on fundamentally different properties of the PFC or do they
share a similar underlying mechanism? Future work must explore further which of
the approaches outlined in this thesis share the same underlying mechanisms and
which ones are computationally distinct. This will help to improve our understand-
ing of the fundamental computational properties of each learning system and how
they support efficient RL.
Even with the fundamental computational properties of each learning system
identified, it remains a challenging task to understand how they depend on each
other to produce efficient RL. For example, the neocortex provides input to the
hippocampus and so the content of episodic memory is dependent on the content
of semantic memory. This means that approaches such as Complementary Tem-
poral Difference Learning (CTDL) in Chapter 4, are reliant upon research trying
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to understand how Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can more faithfully represent
semantic memory; e.g. through the use of disentangled representations or the re-
duction of catastrophic forgetting. Indeed, it may be that the true potential of such
mechanisms can only be realised once other mechanisms have been elucidated. For
instance, an understanding of how the PFC and the hippocampus produce concep-
tual representations may improve the efficiency of models that investigate predictive
representations in the hippocampus. This is because conceptual representations al-
low for inferences that generalise to unseen perceptual instances. Future work will
therefore need to investigate how different computational mechanisms depend on
each other and how advancements in our understanding of one mechanism might
affect the utility of other mechanisms. If some computational mechanisms are depen-
dent on others then this suggests that a hierarchy exists, whereby some mechanisms
contribute more to the efficiency of RL than others. Identifying the mechanisms at
the top of the hierarchy would therefore offer the biggest step towards reconciling
the efficiency of Deep RL with human RL.
8.4.3 Further Demarcation of Learning Systems in the Brain
In this thesis we have argued that in order to understand the efficiency of human RL,
one must consider the brain as a collection of learning systems working together.
More specifically, in Chapters 3 and 4 we started by focusing on the striatum,
neocortex and hippocampus as key learning systems for efficient RL. In Chapters 5
and 6 we then argued that the neocortex should be divided into sensory cortices and
the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) in order to explain phenomena such as meta-learning,
concept formation and selective attention. This therefore raises the question of
whether further divisions of sensory cortices should be made in order to capture
efficient RL.
The neocortex has long been divided based on functional significance. For exam-
ple, regions of the neocortex are often labelled based on the perceptual modality that
they appear to process. However, these divisions are only approximate and increas-
ing evidence suggests that they are overlapping. For example, multimodal signals
are often reported in areas commonly associated with a single modality (Schroeder
et al., 2001; Kayser et al., 2007; Bizley et al., 2007; Bizley and King, 2008). In ad-
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dition, patients who lose the ability to perceive a particular modality demonstrate
processing of other modalities in the region associated with the lost modality. For
example, blind human patients and rodents have demonstrated event-related poten-
tials in visual cortex produced by auditory stimuli (Alho et al., 1993; Piche et al.,
2007). Conversely, deaf human patients have shown activation in auditory cortex in
response to visual stimuli (Finney et al., 2001). Furthermore, deaf cats appear to
have superior visual localization and motion detection abilities, which subsequently
disappear when their auditory cortex is deactivated (Lomber et al., 2010). These
findings suggest that sensory processing areas in the neocortex are actually highly
similar and may just differ based on the inputs that they receive (Westermann et al.,
2007). In line with this hypothesis, it has been suggested that the neocortex relies
on discrete units of computation known as cortical columns, which share a stereo-
typical connectivity profile (Douglas et al., 1989; Amorim Da Costa and Martin,
2010; DeFelipe et al., 2012; Lodato and Arlotta, 2015). These columns are thought
to carry out the same canonical neural computations and learning rules regardless
of their location in the neocortex (Miller, 2016).
We therefore believe there is merit in considering sensory cortices as a whole, as
we have done in this thesis, rather than further dividing them into separate learning
systems. Indeed, the main assumption of this thesis is that sensory cortical areas
share similarities with Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in that they slowly learn
overlapping representations over many experiences. The aforementioned findings
support this idea of a general representation learning mechanism across perceptual
modalities. Furthermore, DNNs have been found to produce similar representations
to different sensory cortical areas, such as visual (Güçlü and van Gerven, 2015;
Yamins and DiCarlo, 2016) and auditory (Kell et al., 2018) cortex, based on the
modality that they are trained on. Future work should therefore explore multi-
sensory processing and whether multi-sensory inputs to DNNs can lead to the kind
of functional specification seen in the brain.
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8.4.4 Issues With Comparing Deep Reinforcement Learning
to Human Learning
This thesis has relied on an analogy between Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL)
and human RL to understand how humans are able to efficiently respond to novel
environments. In Chapters 4 and 6 we proposed two novel algorithms that used
mechanisms inspired by the brain to improve the efficiency of Deep RL systems. We
took this as evidence that these mechanisms may be responsible for the efficiency of
human RL. However, further empirical evidence is needed to support these claims
in the form of behavioural and neural evidence. Unfortunately, directly comparing
the learning of Deep RL systems to human RL can be difficult for several reasons.
Firstly, by the very nature of studying transfer, Deep RL systems do not start
a task with access to the same knowledge as human participants. Indeed, Deep RL
systems are often trained on a task with no prior knowledge at all and even if they
have been pre-trained, they lack the mechanisms to effectively use that knowledge;
the very phenomenon we are trying to study. This means that Deep RL systems
display very different learning trajectories to humans and this makes comparing
metrics such as learning curves uninformative. Classical computational models of
RL typically hand-code knowledge or task structure into the state representation of
the model to circumvent this problem. However, the purpose of Deep RL is to try
and learn state representations from raw perceptual input and so this negates the
primary benefit of Deep RL.
The fact that Deep RL systems learn their own state representations raises an-
other problem with comparing the learning curves between Deep RL systems and
human RL. The nature and content of the learnt representations has a huge impact
upon the behaviour of the overall Deep RL system. This means that until a Deep
RL system is capable of learning representations that are the same as those in the
human brain the behaviour of that system will be different to that of a human. This
is an issue when other components of the system may faithfully mirror mechanisms
found in the brain. For example the efficiency of Selective Particle Attention (SPA)
in Chapter 6 is still notably lower than that of human learning. However this may
simply be due to the nature of the representations the particle filter is acting on and
not to do with the proposed attention mechanism. This problem is closely related
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to the one outlined in section 8.4.2 where the effectiveness of a mechanism is likely
dependent on other mechanisms, which may still require further research.
Despite these difficulties of directly comparing the learning profiles of Deep RL
systems to human RL, both CTDL and SPA make concrete predictions that can be
tested empirically. For example, CTDL makes the explicit prediction that episodic
memory content should be biased by reward prediction errors generated by seman-
tic memory. This could be tested by recording mid-brain dopamine neurons during
a reward-based task that relies upon semantic knowledge, followed by an episodic
memory test to check whether items from the reward-based task were best remem-
bered when they were associated with large reward prediction errors. Predictions
can also work in the opposite direction, with predictions from the brain being used
to validate Deep RL algorithms. For example, in the brain the strength of top-down
attention appears to get weaker as you move back through the visual stream, sup-
posedly because it is less useful in earlier regions (Lindsay and Miller, 2018; Baluch
and Itti, 2011). This can be tested in SPA by moving the position of the atten-
tion layer to earlier parts of the Deep Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN) and
exploring the effect this has on performance. Therefore while direct comparisons
between the learning profiles of Deep RL and human RL appears futile, qualitative
predictions about the underlying mechanisms can still be used to produce valuable
empirical evidence.
It is worth noting that in order to test such predictions, a high level of inter-
disciplinary expertise is required. Researchers need to be able to develop Deep RL
algorithms, conduct well designed behavioural experiments and perform complex
neural recordings and analysis. Collaboration is therefore critical if the analogy be-
tween Deep RL and human RL is to be taken further and the mechanisms underlying
efficient RL in the brain are to be elucidated.
8.4.5 The Notion of Perceptual Similarity
One limitation of the empirical work in this thesis is the notion of ‘perceptual sim-
ilarity’. Throughout all experiments we have defined similarity as the number of
object features that differ between two levels of a 2D video game. This definition is
intuitive because it is quantitative and each feature represents a cardinal property
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of an object e.g. colour, shape and texture. It is therefore easy to understand and
seems to reflect how we reason about similarity in the real world. Nevertheless, there
are a large number of alternative definitions of perceptual similarity. For example,
a mathematical definition could be the Euclidean distance between the vectors of
pixels produced by two different levels. Equally, a neuroscience definition could be
the similarity of neural responses in primary visual cortex between two different lev-
els. This serves to highlight the issue of exploring the effect of perceptual similarity
between consecutive experiences on transfer; how do we define what is perceptually
similar?
One potential way to circumvent this problem is to have people subjectively rate
the perceptual similarity of items before they are used for training. For example, one
could show participants screen-shots of the different games they are going to play and
have them organise the screenshots into a line based on similarity. Items next to each
other would then be deemed similar based on that participants perception. A similar
approach was used in Flesch et al. (2018), whereby the authors asked participants to
organise stimuli into a 2D grid before they were used in a Reinforcement Learning
(RL) task. This helped the authors to infer the dimensions along which participants
categorised the stimuli before the RL task began.
This approach would eliminate the need to pre-define the concept of perceptual
similarity as the participants would do it implicitly. It would also account for any
individual differences in judgements of perceptual similarity. The results of the free-
classification task in our experiments highlight why this might be important. Not
all of the feature dimensions were treated equally in the task and some participants
chose to weight features differently when deciding whether objects belonged to the
same category or not. Therefore some participants may rate the similarity between
two levels differently depending on the feature that has changed. If each participant
arranged the levels based on similarity before-hand, then these individual differences
would be accounted for.
8.4.6 Learning in Naturalistic Tasks
One of the attributes that made our experiments novel was the naturalistic nature
of the task. Video games involve complex sequential decision making and dynamic
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motor control, which are important elements of everyday behaviour. In comparison,
classic behavioural paradigms such as match-to-sample tasks typically involve indi-
vidual decisions and little to no motor learning. However this increase in complexity
comes at a cost, as the behavioural output will contain a mix of different cognitive
processes that can hide or negate the effects one is trying to investigate.
For example, we tried to account for the influence of motor learning by including
a test for motor capabilities before and after the main video game. The improve-
ment in performance on these motor tests was a strong predictor of performance
on the final test level of the video game. This suggests that motor learning was
a large contributor to our measure of transfer performance. It also demonstrates
that learning the underlying relational rules of the video game is not the only learn-
ing problem faced by the participants. Indeed, it is possible that learning to use
the controls takes priority over the learning of the underlying relational rules for
many participants. Furthermore, the variation in participants’ familiarity with the
controls may have introduced noise into our measure of transfer performance and
therefore decreased statistical power. Participants with a poor grasp of the controls
may have had knowledge of the relational rules for transfer but were unable to con-
trol the object sufficiently to utilise them on the final test level. Future work should
therefore explicitly test participants’ knowledge of the rules after training by asking
them to describe what they thought the rules were.
In addition to motor learning, the use of a naturalistic task also opened the
door for a greater number of strategies or policies. This is evident from the fact
that participants appeared to demonstrate signs of both ‘zero-shot’ and ‘one-shot’
learning on the final test game. Indeed, many other strategies may have existed
such as ‘scoring a single point and avoiding all other objects’. Which strategy a
participant ultimately used may have depended on a range of factors other than
just the perceptual similarity between games. For example, it requires a degree
of exploration to realise that more than one point can be scored on a level. If
some participants viewed the cost of an exploratory interaction as lower than other
participants then they may have been more likely to employ a ‘one-shot’ strategy.
Future work should therefore aim to constrain the games further so that only one
strategy is present. For instance, the final test level could consist of a single trial
285
so that a ‘one-shot’ strategy is unavailable. The effect of perceptual similarity on
transfer ability could then be investigated with respect to a ‘zero-shot’ strategy
rather than a mixture of strategies.
Another complexity with exploring behaviour on more naturalistic tasks is the
increase in cognitive resources required to complete them. With increased task
demands comes the need for the allocation of cognitive resources. As we have seen,
this process is often referred to as ‘attention’ and is commonly prescribed to the
Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) (Miller and Cohen, 2001). The recruitment of attentional
processes can greatly increase the complexity of behavioural analysis because it can
be unclear what elements of the task participants have processed and incorporated
into their decisions. For example, in our games participants may have chosen to
focus on the motor controls for the first few training games rather than on the
perceptual features of the objects. This is an issue because it means that the degree
of perceptual similarity between training games is lost for those games. In addition,
participants with high performance on the first motor control task may have had
to allocate fewer cognitive resources to using the controls compared to those with
poor motor control performance. As a result, they may have had more cognitive
resources to focus on the perceptual features of objects and learn the underlying
relational rules for transfer. This may explain why some participants were able to
learn a ‘zero-shot’ strategy, while others learnt a less cognitively demanding ‘one-
shot’ strategy. Future work should therefore try to understand what elements of the
task participants are focusing on over the course of training and how this is effected
by cognitive load. This will require the use of additional techniques such as the
combination of eye-tracking and computational modelling (see Leong et al., 2017).
8.5 Lessons For The Future
Throughout the course of this thesis many practical lessons have been learnt that
will be useful for future research endeavors. This section outlines some of these
lessons in the hope that others can also learn from them.
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8.5.1 Starting With Simple Problems
From the perspective of computational modelling, one of the key lessons has been
the importance of prototyping ideas using simple problems. By starting with simple
problems, such as the Grid Worlds in Chapter 4 or the multiple choice task in
Chapter 6, one gains several benefits over starting with complex tasks, such as
video games. The first benefit is that the computational cost of running simulations
is greatly reduced, which invariably means that simulations take less time to run.
This is particularly pertinent in the domain of Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL)
where, as we have seen in this thesis, approaches require large amounts of data to
converge to a solution. Ultimately, research is an iterative process and so reduced
computational cost helps to improve research efficiency. For example, given a set
amount of time and computational resources, reduced computational cost allows
one to explore more architectural ideas, parameter settings, random seeds and task
variations. In addition to reduced computational cost, simpler tasks are also less
costly to design and implement from a human perspective. This reduced human
cost also greatly improves the efficiency of the iterative research process. That said,
the increasing prevalence of open source software containing more complex tasks
(e.g. OpenAI Gym, Brockman et al., 2016) is helping to negate this human cost
by providing a simple Application Programming Interface (API) for researchers.
Reduced computational and human costs aside, simpler tasks also have the added
benefit of being more interpretable than complex tasks. By reducing the complex-
ity of the task, the number of possible strategies that can be learnt in order to
solve the problem are reduced. In the case of RL, this makes it easier to under-
stand the final policy learnt by the agent and allows for the investigation of specific
behaviours. In addition, simple tasks often involve low-dimensional state represen-
tations, which are significantly easier to interpret. For example, in the case of the
Grid Worlds in Chapter 4 the state representation was the position of the agent
in a 2-dimensional grid. This meant that we could visually inspect the states en-
coded by the Self-Organising Map (SOM) because they corresponded to positions
in space. Importantly, this helped us to understand how the SOM encode viola-
tions of the generalizations made by the Deep Neural Network (DNN). Similarly,
with the multiple choice task in Chapter 6, we could analyse the features produced
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by individual images and investigate how the properties of those features affected
the performance of the agent. This would have been much more difficult in the
subsequent video games because they involved complex sequences of images.
Experimental psychology tasks also take advantage of the increased interpretabil-
ity of simple task designs. This is important because the results of computational
studies can be compared to their experimental counterparts when simple tasks are
used. For example, by using grid worlds in Chapter 4 we could compare the posi-
tions encoded by the SOM to those encoded by the hippocampus of rodents during
maze tasks. Similarly, we know that for the multiple choice task in Chapter 6, our
aim was to capture the kind of ‘one-shot’ learning demonstrated by humans and an-
imals in similar tasks (see for example Experiment 1 in Chapter 7). In comparison,
the behaviour of humans and animals on more complex tasks, such as the cart-pole
task in Chapter 4 or the object collection game in Chapter 6, is much more poorly
characterised and so the target behaviour is less clear. Indeed, the results of Exper-
iments 2 and 3 in Chapter 7 serve to show the wide range of strategies that humans
can learn in more complex and naturalistic tasks.
Another benefit of starting with simple problems is that it also allows for simpler
computational models. This is particularly true for Deep RL where one of the biggest
challenges is learning useful state representations. By using a simple task, the state
representation can be provided in a more direct form such as the x and y position in
a Grid World, as opposed to a more complex form such as the pixel values of a frame
from a video game. By reducing the complexity of the state representation, one can
focus on aspects of the approach other than representation learning. For example,
in the case of Complementary Temporal Difference Learning (CTDL) in Chapter 4,
we wanted to focus on the interactions between the DNN and the SOM. By using
tasks that provided useful low-dimensional state representations we could feed the
states directly to the SOM. However, for more complex tasks such as using raw
pixels as input, the SOM would require latent representations to deal with the high-
dimensionality of the input. We were therefore able to circumvent this representation
problem and instead highlighted it as a key avenue for future research.
While these benefits of simple tasks all help to identify interesting computational
ideas, the ability to scale up to complex tasks is still of importance for understanding
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intelligence. This is particularly true in the domain of Deep RL, which primarily con-
cerns itself with mapping high-dimensional and continuous states to actions based
on reward feedback. It can then therefore be argued that simple tasks with simple
state representations fail to address the main benefit of a Deep RL approach. Nev-
ertheless, even if a computational idea does not scale up to a more complex task the
results can still be highly informative. For example, in the case of SPA in Chapter 6,
initial tests suggested that the approach would not scale up to the object collection
game. However by comparing the multiple choice task to the object collection game
we were able to identify that several time steps were needed to efficiently evaluate
a particular hypothesis. As a result, we updated the attention vector periodically
and this turned out to be critical for scaling up SPA to the object collection game.
This not only taught us something about the nature of our approach but the results
of the simpler multiple choice task also gave us the conviction to persevere with our
approach.
8.5.2 The Intersection between Artificial Intelligence and
Cognitive Science
By forming an analogy between Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the brain,
this thesis has operated at the intersection between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
cognitive science. While an extremely rewarding inter-disciplinary approach, it has
become apparent that these two fields tend to have fundamentally different goals.
In particular, research in AI often puts more emphasis on state-of-the-art perfor-
mance whereas cognitive science focuses on understanding the processes underlying
performance. From an AI perspective, this can often lead to using cognitive sci-
ence as an inspiration for new ideas but then adding non-cognitive components to
further improve performance. Within cognitive science, this is often referred to as
over-engineering, whereby design decisions are made with the sole purpose of solving
the problem at hand. For example, it can be tempting to hand-code heuristics into
a model or provide the model with information that a human learner may not have
access to in order to improve performance. While these interventions may lead to
better results they can be detrimental to the models ability to tell us something
about cognition. Fundamentally, the aim of this thesis was to provide insights into
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cognition and so over-engineering was an issue that needed to be avoided.
One obvious remedy to the issue of over-engineering is to ask yourself for each
design decision whether a cognitive analogue exists in the brain. However, some
decisions are not always this clear cut because our knowledge of cognition is im-
perfect and so practical assumptions have to be made. When this is the case, one
solution is to assess the computational model on a range of tasks with different
properties. If over-engineering has occurred, then the approach is likely to perform
well on one task but poorly on others. Indeed, cognitive science is often interested
in computational principles that are domain-general rather than hyper-specialised
to a specific task. For example, in Chapter 4, we assessed CTDL on tasks that
ranged from fine motor control (Cart-Pole) to spatial navigation (Grid Worlds), and
that involved a combination of discrete and continuous state and action spaces. The
fact that CTDL performed well on this range of tasks without the need for archi-
tectural changes suggests that the amount of over-engineering was small and that it
represents a domain-general mechanism. That said, some variation in performance
on different tasks can be informative. For instance, the fact that CTDL showed
reduced benefits on the Cart-Pole task was useful for understanding that the SOM
was most beneficial for tasks that involved rare, highly salient events.
The risk of over-engineering can also occur during the selection of hyper-parameter
values. More specifically, a high sensitivity to hyper-parameters values can often be
a sign of over-engineering, especially if the values have to be re-tuned for each task.
That said, sometimes the tuning of hyper-parameter values can also be informa-
tive. For example, in the case of CTDL in Chapter 4, an informal parameter search
assigned a high learning rate to the updating of values stored in the SOM. This
was interesting because it highlighted the functional importance of fast learning in
a hippocampal learning system.
Despite cognitive science appearing to be restricted by biological plausibility
and less concerned with state-of-the-art performance, we believe that the field of AI
should take more inspiration from a cognitive science approach. The investigation
of domain-general principles that underlie general intelligence is a fundamental goal
of AI research and an over-emphasis on state-of-the-art results on specific tasks is a
potential barrier to this goal. With a more cognitive science approach, the AI field
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can reward research that does not claim state-of-the-art results but instead focuses
on detailing fundamental mechanisms underlying intelligence. This may mean using
simpler tasks for increased interpretability (see the previous section), or removing
specific components of a model (e.g. Chapter 4) in order to more concretely under-
stand its behaviour. In the long-term this will lead to greater innovation and open
more research avenues than simply tuning models to perform better on a single task
by a few percentage points. Our hope is that the work in this thesis stands as a
testament to this and demonstrates that both AI and cognitive science researchers
can benefit from such research. While neither CTDL nor SPA claim state-of-the-art
results on the tasks that they are evaluated on, they do describe domain general
principles that both tell us something about cognition and simultaneously improve
upon canonical AI approaches. Unfortunately, presenting such work to an inter-
disciplinary audience can often be difficult as it relies on AI techniques, which are
not always widely accepted in cognitive science, and does not claim state-of-the-art
results, which is a revered property in current AI research.
8.5.3 The Importance of Developmental Studies
Throughout this thesis we have focused on the ability of humans to perform effi-
cient Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically with a focus on adult performance on
tasks that operate over short time-scales. However, the importance of considering
infant development when trying to understand efficient RL in adults has become
increasingly apparent over the course of this thesis. We believe more work needs
to be done to reconcile Deep RL with developmental psychology and that infants
represent ideal subjects for investigating efficient RL for a multitude of reasons.
One of the largest differences between adults and infants is that infants enter a
task with much less prior knowledge compared to adults. This is important because
it means that infants are less likely to transfer knowledge from outside of the task
setting. This makes it easier to control for the knowledge that is being transferred
because one can be more confident that it is from the task itself. For example, trying
to understand what is being transferred between different video games is difficult in
adults when they already transfer vast amounts of knowledge from outside of the
video games (Dubey et al., 2018).
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The fact that infants have less prior knowledge also makes them more compara-
ble to Deep RL algorithms, which also start off with limited prior knowledge. For
example, Deep RL algorithms that use Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DC-
NNs) to learn policies based on raw pixel inputs are effectively learning to ‘see’ for
the first time. This is one of the first tasks faced by a new born infant. Indeed, this
is why in Chapter 6, we focus on trying to learn a task based on a set of pre-learned
visual features, as we believe this more faithfully replicates the problem faced by an
adult learner when presented with a new task.
Another benefit of young children’s reduced prior knowledge is that it makes
them useful for understanding whether a behaviour is learnt or innate. This is par-
ticularly important for Deep RL because it has often been criticised for lacking the
necessary developmental ‘start-up software’ to be data efficient (Lake et al., 2017).
For example, it has been proposed that children have the ability to reason about
basic physics from a young age. However, it is still under debate how much either
innate wiring in the brain or learning after birth contributes to this ability. Under-
standing their contributions is vital for Deep RL because it can guide researchers
towards approaches that either have intuitive physics built in or that learn it form
interactions with the world in a similar way to infants. The ability to perform intu-
itive physics in a Deep RL system is of high importance because it is likely to be a
crucial component of model-based RL.
The development of infants also highlights the importance of considering different
time-scales during the study of RL. Most research on Deep RL concerns itself with
performing a task that in the real world would be performed for a matter of minutes
or hours. However, very little work in Deep RL concerns itself with trying to capture
how behaviours emerge over the course of many years. There are obviously inherent
difficulties in modelling such a long-term process as the complexity of experiences
increases dramatically. However, one notable example of how RL models have been
used to model developmental processes is in the emergence of eye-gaze following
(Triesch et al., 2006; Blakeman and Mareschal, 2017). This skill is supposed to
emerge in infants over several months and helps adults to indicate objects of interest
in the environment. This helps the infant to learn about its environment and is a
pre-cursor to more complex forms of communication such as pointing and request
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behaviour. Crucially, RL models have been proposed that are able to explain the
natural emergence of eye-gaze following through learning, which suggests that it is
not an innate ability. This highlights the importance of developmental RL work
because humans develop complex skills in a compound and ordered way such that
learning bootstraps further learning. Research into curriculum learning is beginning
to touch on this topic and will be extremely informative for understanding how
knowledge is consolidated and transferred between experiences.
Deep RL aside, the results of the empirical work in this thesis also highlight the
importance of considering cognitive development. Ultimately the video games we
explored involved learning and exploiting relational information. Critically, it has
been suggested that the ability to reason about relations develops during childhood
and that it bootstraps further relational learning (Gentner and Hoyos, 2017). This
is important because it suggests that maybe the perceptual similarity between our
video games may have had more of an effect on children. This is because their
ability to reason about relations is less established and may be more susceptible to
environmental factors.
8.5.4 Proposing a New Experimental Paradigm
The empirical work in this thesis involved the proposal of a new experimental
paradigm for exploring the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer. The novel
task involved a series of video games that reflected several hallmarks of naturalistic
behaviour: continuous sequential decision-making and fine motor control. The pro-
cess of proposing a new experimental paradigm as opposed to using a well-established
paradigm has provided several important lessons.
Firstly, it has provided an appreciation for the number of free parameters in an
experimental design that can potentially influence the effect of interest. For exam-
ple, the number of video games, the duration of each video game, the nature of
the instructions provided, the number of different object features and the amount
of monetary reward (etc.) could all have an impact on how the training regime
affects transfer performance. Typically, in well established experimental paradigms,
the values of such variables are standardised based on previous studies so that re-
searchers know the expected effects. Furthermore, they also have a rough estimate
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of the effect size. In our case, we had very little idea of the expected effects of
perceptual similarity on transfer ability, which made it difficult to perform a power
analysis in order to calculate the necessary number of participants.
Another source of uncertainty in proposing a new experimental paradigm is from
the lack of directly relevant past literature. Well established paradigms have a host
of past data that can be used to form predictions about a proposed manipulation. In
contrast, the relevant past literature for our study spanned many different domains
from category learning to analogical reasoning. This made it difficult to formulate
strong predictions and meant that we had to take a more exploratory approach.
Nevertheless, it is these differences from the past literature that make the proposed
experimental paradigm of interest to researchers. There is therefore a fine balance to
be made between the degree of novelty and the strength of the foundations provided
by past research.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
The focus of this thesis has been on understanding how rapid learning and the trans-
fer of past knowledge can improve the efficiency of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in
the brain. To help inform this investigation we have used Deep RL as an analogy
to the brain. This has allowed us to explore the key computational properties of
different learning systems in the brain that support efficient RL. In particular, we
have taken inspiration from Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory and
highlighted four learning systems that we believe to be particularly important for
efficient RL; sensory cortices, the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC), the hippocampus and
the striatum. Upon reviewing recent work involving these different learning sys-
tems, we proposed two novel Deep RL algorithms that aim to capture two of the
key mechanisms needed for efficient RL in the brain: episodic memory and selective
attention.
In addition to this computational work, we also explored how the degree of
perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences can affect people’s ability to
transfer knowledge. We used a 2D video game as our experimental paradigm because
it consists of many of the properties found in everyday tasks: sequential decision
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making and fine motor control. We found that the degree of perceptual similarity
between consecutive experiences had no effect on an adult’s ability to perform trans-
fer. However, when participants were told the rules of the game before-hand, those
who were trained on consecutive levels with a high degree of perceptual similarity
demonstrated improved transfer. This suggests that perceptual similarity has an
impact on the ability of adults to utilise explicit knowledge for transfer.
We believe that these empirical findings can be used to constrain computational
theories of transfer and inform the analogy between the brain and Deep RL. For
example, the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) used in Deep RL are susceptible to
spurious perceptual similarities in their input during training. This predicts that
the low perceptual similarity condition should improve transfer in the 2D video
game because it reduces the correlations between perceptual features. The lack of
an effect of perceptual similarity on transfer when participants were not told the
rules of the game therefore highlights how the learning of DNNs differs from that
of human learning. Conversely, many of the participants demonstrated evidence of
‘one-shot’ learning as predicted by a Deep RL model of the PFC known as meta-RL.
The fact that participants were better at transfer in the high perceptual similarity
condition when they were told the rules of the games before-hand also has inter-
esting implications for the analogy between the brain and Deep RL. In particular,
it highlights that any mechanism for explicitly providing information to Deep RL
models should account for the fact that transfer performance improves when the
degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive experiences is high.
We hope that the analogy between the brain and Deep RL outlined in this thesis
can serve as a basis for further research into efficient RL. In order to reconcile the
differences in efficiency between the brain and Deep RL, we emphasise the need for
Deep RL approaches that include learning systems that represent the key computa-
tional properties of the hippocampus and the PFC. Future work should also address
our empirical findings, as humans appear to be able to circumvent, or even utilise,




AC Attention at Choice.
ACL Attention at Choice and Learning.
AI Artificial Intelligence.
AL Attention at Learning.
ANNs Artificial Neural Networks.
CLS Complementary Learning Systems.
CTDL Complementary Temporal Difference Learn-
ing.
DA Dopamine.
DARLA DisentAngled Representation Learning Agent.
DBNs Deep Belief Networks.
DCNN Deep Convolutional Neural Network.
DNNs Deep Neural Networks.
DQN Deep Q-Network.
fMRI functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging.
LEC Lateral Entorhinal Cortex.
LSTM Long Short-Term Memory.
MEC Medial Entorhinal Cortex.
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Ólafsdóttir, H. F., Barry, C., Saleem, A. B., Hassabis, D., and Spiers, H. J. (2015).
Hippocampal place cells construct reward related sequences through unexplored
space. Elife, 4:e06063.
O’Reilly, R. C. (1996). Biologically plausible error-driven learning using local acti-
vation differences: The generalized recirculation algorithm. Neural computation,
8(5):895–938.
O’Reilly, R. C. and Norman, K. A. (2002). Hippocampal and neocortical contribu-
tions to memory: Advances in the complementary learning systems framework.
Trends in cognitive sciences, 6(12):505–510.
O’Reilly, R. C. and Rudy, J. W. (2000). Computational principles of learning in the
neocortex and hippocampus. Hippocampus, 10(4):389–397.
316
O’Doherty, J. P., Lee, S. W., and McNamee, D. (2015). The structure of
reinforcement-learning mechanisms in the human brain. Current Opinion in Be-
havioral Sciences, 1:94–100.
O’Neill, J., Boccara, C., Stella, F., Schönenberger, P., and Csicsvari, J. (2017).
Superficial layers of the medial entorhinal cortex replay independently of the hip-
pocampus. Science, 355(6321):184–188.
Padoa-Schioppa, C. and Assad, J. A. (2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex
encode economic value. Nature, 441(7090):223–226.
Paneri, S. and Gregoriou, G. G. (2017). Top-down control of visual attention by the
prefrontal cortex. functional specialization and long-range interactions. Frontiers
in neuroscience, 11:545.
Pearce, J. M. and Hall, G. (1980). A model for pavlovian learning: variations in
the effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological
review, 87(6):532.
Pearce, J. M. and Mackintosh, N. J. (2010). Two theories of attention: A review
and a possible integration. Attention and associative learning: From brain to
behaviour, pages 11–39.
Pennartz, C., Ito, R., Verschure, P., Battaglia, F., and Robbins, T. (2011). The
hippocampal–striatal axis in learning, prediction and goal-directed behavior.
Trends in neurosciences, 34(10):548–559.
Peterson, G. B. (2004). A day of great illumination: Bf skinner’s discovery of
shaping. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 82(3):317–328.
Philiastides, M. G., Biele, G., and Heekeren, H. R. (2010). A mechanistic account
of value computation in the human brain. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 107(20):9430–9435.
Piche, M., Chabot, N., Bronchti, G., Miceli, D., Lepore, F., and Guillemot, J.-P.
(2007). Auditory responses in the visual cortex of neonatally enucleated rats.
Neuroscience, 145(3):1144–1156.
317
Place, R., Farovik, A., Brockmann, M., and Eichenbaum, H. (2016). Bidirectional
prefrontal-hippocampal interactions support context-guided memory. Nature neu-
roscience, 19(8):992–994.
Plappert, M., Houthooft, R., Dhariwal, P., Sidor, S., Chen, R. Y., Chen, X., As-
four, T., Abbeel, P., and Andrychowicz, M. (2017). Parameter space noise for
exploration. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.01905.
Plunkett, K., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Bates, E., Elman, J. L., and Johnson, M. H.
(1997). Connectionism and developmental psychology. Journal of Child Psychol-
ogy and Psychiatry, 38(1):53–80.
Poggio, T., Fahle, M., and Edelman, S. (1992). Fast perceptual learning in visual
hyperacuity. Science, 256(5059):1018–1021.
Preston, A. R. and Eichenbaum, H. (2013). Interplay of hippocampus and prefrontal
cortex in memory. Current Biology, 23(17):R764–R773.
Pritzel, A., Uria, B., Srinivasan, S., Puigdomenech, A., Vinyals, O., Hassabis, D.,
Wierstra, D., and Blundell, C. (2017). Neural episodic control. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1703.01988.
Quartz, S. R. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1997). The neural basis of cognitive development:
A constructivist manifesto. Behavioral and brain sciences, 20(4):537–556.
Quillan, M. R. (1966). Semantic memory. Technical report, BOLT BERANEK AND
NEWMAN INC CAMBRIDGE MA.
Radulescu, A., Niv, Y., and Ballard, I. (2019). Holistic reinforcement learning: the
role of structure and attention. Trends in cognitive sciences.
Radulescu, A., Niv, Y., and Daw, N. D. A particle filtering account of selective
attention during learning.
Ragozzino, M. E., Kim, J., Hassert, D., Minniti, N., and Kiang, C. (2003). The con-
tribution of the rat prelimbic-infralimbic areas to different forms of task switching.
Behavioral neuroscience, 117(5):1054.
318
Rescorla, R. A. (1972). A theory of pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the ef-
fectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. Current research and theory,
pages 64–99.
Rescorla, R. A. and Lolordo, V. M. (1965). Inhibition of avoidance behavior. Journal
of comparative and physiological psychology, 59(3):406.
Reynolds, G. S. (1961). Attention in the pigeon. Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, 4(3):203.
Reynolds, J. H. and Heeger, D. J. (2009). The normalization model of attention.
Neuron, 61(2):168–185.
Rezende, D. J., Mohamed, S., and Wierstra, D. (2014). Stochastic backpropa-
gation and approximate inference in deep generative models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1401.4082.
Rich, E. L. and Shapiro, M. L. (2007). Prelimbic/infralimbic inactivation impairs
memory for multiple task switches, but not flexible selection of familiar tasks.
Journal of Neuroscience, 27(17):4747–4755.
Richards, J. E. and Anderson, D. R. (2004). Attentional inertia in children’s ex-
tended looking at television. In Advances in child development and behavior,
volume 32, pages 163–212. Elsevier.
Richland, L. E., Morrison, R. G., and Holyoak, K. J. (2006). Children’s develop-
ment of analogical reasoning: Insights from scene analogy problems. Journal of
experimental child psychology, 94(3):249–273.
Ritter, S., Wang, J. X., Kurth-Nelson, Z., and Botvinick, M. (2018). Episodic control
as meta-reinforcement learning. bioRxiv, page 360537.
Robinson, T. M. (1987). Heraclitus: fragments. University of Toronto Press.
Roesch, M. R., Singh, T., Brown, P. L., Mullins, S. E., and Schoenbaum, G. (2009).
rats deciding between differently delayed or sized rewards. Journal of Neuro-
science, 29(42):13365–13376.
319
Rohrer, D., Dedrick, R. F., and Burgess, K. (2014). The benefit of interleaved
mathematics practice is not limited to superficially similar kinds of problems.
Psychonomic bulletin & review, 21(5):1323–1330.
Rolls, E. T. (2007). An attractor network in the hippocampus: theory and neuro-
physiology. Learning & memory, 14(11):714–731.
Rosen, Z. B., Cheung, S., and Siegelbaum, S. A. (2015). Midbrain dopamine
neurons bidirectionally regulate CA3-CA1 synaptic drive. Nature Neuroscience,
18(12):1763–1771.
Rosenthal, O., Fusi, S., and Hochstein, S. (2001). Forming classes by stimulus
frequency: Behavior and theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
98(7):4265–4270.
Rossi, A. F. and Paradiso, M. A. (1995). Feature-specific effects of selective visual
attention. Vision research, 35(5):621–634.
Rouhani, N., Norman, K. A., and Niv, Y. (2018). Dissociable effects of surprising
rewards on learning and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory and Cognition, 44(9):1430–1443.
Rushworth, M. F. and Behrens, T. E. (2008). Choice, uncertainty and value in
prefrontal and cingulate cortex. Nature neuroscience, 11(4):389.
Sacramento, J., Costa, R. P., Bengio, Y., and Senn, W. (2018). Dendritic cortical
microcircuits approximate the backpropagation algorithm. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pages 8721–8732.
Saenz, M., Buracas, G. T., and Boynton, G. M. (2002). Global effects of feature-
based attention in human visual cortex. Nature neuroscience, 5(7):631–632.
Sara, S. J. (2000). Retrieval and Reconsolidation : Toward a Neurobiology of Re-
membering. Learning & Memory, 7(2):73–84.
Sarel, A., Finkelstein, A., Las, L., and Ulanovsky, N. (2017). Vectorial representation
of spatial goals in the hippocampus of bats. Science, 355(6321):176–180.
320
Scellier, B. and Bengio, Y. (2017). Equilibrium propagation: Bridging the gap
between energy-based models and backpropagation. Frontiers in computational
neuroscience, 11:24.
Schlichting, M. L. and Preston, A. R. (2016). Hippocampal–medial prefrontal circuit
supports memory updating during learning and post-encoding rest. Neurobiology
of learning and memory, 134:91–106.
Schmidhuber, J. (2015). Deep learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural
networks, 61:85–117.
Schrimpf, M., Kubilius, J., Hong, H., Majaj, N. J., Rajalingham, R., Issa, E. B.,
Kar, K., Bashivan, P., Prescott-Roy, J., Schmidt, K., et al. (2018). Brain-score:
Which artificial neural network for object recognition is most brain-like? BioRxiv,
page 407007.
Schroeder, C. E., Lindsley, R. W., Specht, C., Marcovici, A., Smiley, J. F., and
Javitt, D. C. (2001). Somatosensory input to auditory association cortex in the
macaque monkey. Journal of neurophysiology, 85(3):1322–1327.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. Journal of
neurophysiology, 80(1):1–27.
Schultz, W. (2016). Dopamine Reward Prediction Error Coding. Dialogues in Clin-
ical Neuroscience, 18(1):23–32.
Schultz, W., Apicella, P., Scarnati, E., and Ljungberg, T. (1992). Neuronal Activity
in Monkey Ventral Striatum Related to the Expectation of Reward. Journal of
Neuroscience, 12(12):4595–4610.
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., and Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction
and reward. Science, 275(5306):1593–1599.
Schyns, P. G., Goldstone, R. L., and Thibaut, J.-P. (1998). The development of
features in object concepts. Behavioral and brain Sciences, 21(1):1–17.
Scoville, W. B. and Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent memory after bilateral hip-
pocampal lesions. Journal of neurology, neurosurgery, and psychiatry, 20(1):11.
321
Seo, H. and Lee, D. (2008). Cortical mechanisms for reinforcement learning in
competitive games. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 363(1511):3845–3857.
Seo, M., Lee, E., and Averbeck, B. B. (2012). Action selection and action value in
frontal-striatal circuits. Neuron, 74(5):947–960.
Setlow, B., Schoenbaum, G., and Gallagher, M. (2003). Neural encoding in ventral
striatum during olfactory discrimination learning. Neuron, 38(4):625–636.
Sharpe, M. J., Chang, C. Y., Liu, M. A., Batchelor, H. M., Mueller, L. E., Jones,
J. L., Niv, Y., and Schoenbaum, G. (2017). Dopamine transients are sufficient
and necessary for acquisition of model-based associations. Nature Neuroscience,
20(5):735–742.
Shepard, R. N., Hovland, C. I., and Jenkins, H. M. (1961). Learning and memoriza-
tion of classifications. Psychological monographs: General and applied, 75(13):1.
Shin, H., Lee, J. K., Kim, J., and Kim, J. (2017). Continual learning with deep
generative replay. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
2990–2999.
Shohamy, D. and Adcock, R. A. (2010). Dopamine and adaptive memory. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 14(10):464–472.
Simonyan, K. and Zisserman, A. (2014). Very deep convolutional networks for large-
scale image recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556.
Skaggs, W. E. and McNaughton, B. L. (1996). Replay of neuronal firing se-
quences in rat hippocampus during sleep following spatial experience. Science,
271(5257):1870–1873.
Skinner, B. F. (1935). Two types of conditioned reflex and a pseudo type. The
Journal of General Psychology, 12(1):66–77.
Sorokin, I., Seleznev, A., Pavlov, M., Fedorov, A., and Ignateva, A. (2015). Deep
attention recurrent q-network. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.01693.
Spelke, E. S. (1990). Principles of object perception. Cognitive science, 14(1):29–56.
322
Stachenfeld, K. L., Botvinick, M., and Gershman, S. J. (2014). Design principles
of the hippocampal cognitive map. In Advances in neural information processing
systems, pages 2528–2536.
Stachenfeld, K. L., Botvinick, M. M., and Gershman, S. J. (2017). The hippocampus
as a predictive map. Nature neuroscience, 20(11):1643.
Sutton, R. S. and Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
Sutton, R. S. and Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
MIT press.
Takahashi, Y. K., Batchelor, H. M., Liu, B., Khanna, A., Morales, M., and Schoen-
baum, G. (2017). Dopamine neurons respond to errors in the prediction of sensory
features of expected rewards. Neuron, 95(6):1395–1405.
Taube, J. S., Muller, R. U., and Ranck, J. B. (1990). Head-direction cells recorded
from the postsubiculum in freely moving rats. i. description and quantitative anal-
ysis. Journal of Neuroscience, 10(2):420–435.
Testolin, A., Stoianov, I., and Zorzi, M. (2017). Letter perception emerges from
unsupervised deep learning and recycling of natural image features. Nature human
behaviour, 1(9):657–664.
Testolin, A. and Zorzi, M. (2016). Probabilistic models and generative neural net-
works: Towards an unified framework for modeling normal and impaired neu-
rocognitive functions. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 10:73.
Thierry, A.-m., Gioanni, Y., Degenetais, E., and Glowinski, J. (2000). Hippocampo-
Prefrontal Cortex Pathway : Anatomical and Electrophysiological Characteristics.
Hippocampus, 10(4):411–419.
Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies.
Tobler, P. N., Dickinson, A., and Schultz, W. (2003). Coding of predicted reward
omission by dopamine neurons in a conditioned inhibition paradigm. Journal of
Neuroscience, 23(32):10402–10410.
323
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological review,
55(4):189.
Torrey, L. (2009). Relational transfer in reinforcement learning. Technical report,
University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Computer Sciences.
Treue, S. (2003). Visual attention: the where, what, how and why of saliency.
Current opinion in neurobiology, 13(4):428–432.
Treue, S. and Trujillo, J. C. M. (1999). Feature-based attention influences motion
processing gain in macaque visual cortex. Nature, 399(6736):575–579.
Triesch, J., Teuscher, C., Deák, G. O., and Carlson, E. (2006). Gaze following: Why
(not) learn it? Developmental science, 9(2):125–147.
Tse, D., Takeuchi, T., Kakeyama, M., Kajii, Y., Okuno, H., Tohyama, C., Bito,
H., and Morris, R. G. (2011). Schema-dependent gene activation and memory
encoding in neocortex. Science, 333(6044):891–895.
van de Ven, G. M., Siegelmann, H. T., and Tolias, A. S. (2020). Brain-inspired replay
for continual learning with artificial neural networks. Nature communications,
11(1):1–14.
van de Ven, G. M. and Tolias, A. S. (2018). Generative replay with feedback connec-
tions as a general strategy for continual learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.10635.
Van Otterlo, M. (2005). A survey of reinforcement learning in relational domains.
Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT) University of Twente,
Tech. Rep.
Vila-Ballo, A., Mas-Herrero, E., Ripolles, P., Simo, M., Miro, J., Cucurell, D.,
Lopez-Barroso, D., Juncadella, M., Marco-Pallares, J., Falip, M., and Rodriguez-
Fornells, A. (2017). Unraveling the Role of the Hippocampus in Reversal Learning.
Journal of Neuroscience, 37(28):6686–6697.
Wang, J. X., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Kumaran, D., Tirumala, D., Soyer, H., Leibo, J. Z.,
Hassabis, D., and Botvinick, M. (2018). Prefrontal cortex as a meta-reinforcement
learning system. Nature neuroscience, 21(6):860–868.
324
Wang, J. X., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Tirumala, D., Soyer, H., Leibo, J. Z., Munos, R.,
Blundell, C., Kumaran, D., and Botvinick, M. (2016). Learning to reinforcement
learn. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.05763.
Waxman, S. R. (1998). Early expectations and the shaping role of language. Psy-
chology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, page 249.
Waxman, S. R. and Booth, A. E. (2000). Principles that are invoked in the acqui-
sition of words, but not facts. Cognition, 77(2):B33–B43.
Westermann, G., Mareschal, D., Johnson, M. H., Sirois, S., Spratling, M. W., and
Thomas, M. S. (2007). Neuroconstructivism. Developmental science, 10(1):75–83.
Wharton, C. M., Holyoak, K. J., Downing, P. E., Lange, T. E., Wickens, T. D.,
and Melz, E. R. (1994). Below the surface: Analogical similarity and retrieval
competition in reminding. Cognitive Psychology, 26(1):64–101.
Whitman, J. R. and Garner, W. (1963). Concept learning as a function of form of
internal structure. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2(2):195–202.
Whittington, J. C. and Bogacz, R. (2017). An approximation of the error back-
propagation algorithm in a predictive coding network with local hebbian synaptic
plasticity. Neural computation, 29(5):1229–1262.
Whittington, J. C., Muller, T. H., Mark, S., Chen, G., Barry, C., Burgess, N., and
Behrens, T. E. (2019). The tolman-eichenbaum machine: Unifying space and
relational memory through generalisation in the hippocampal formation. bioRxiv,
page 770495.
Wills, T. J., Lever, C., Cacucci, F., Burgess, N., and O’Keefe, J. (2005). Attractor
dynamics in the hippocampal representation of the local environment. Science,
308(5723):873–876.
Wilson, B., Mackintosh, N. J., and Boakes, R. A. (1985). Transfer of relational rules
in matching and oddity learning by pigeons and corvids. The Quarterly Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 37(4):313–332.
325
Wilson, R. C. and Niv, Y. (2012). Inferring relevance in a changing world. Frontiers
in human neuroscience, 5:189.
Wimmer, G. E., Braun, E. K., Daw, N. D., and Shohamy, D. (2014). Episodic Mem-
ory Encoding Interferes with Reward Learning and Decreases Striatal Prediction
Errors. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34(45):14901–14912.
Wittmann, B. C., Schott, B. H., Guderian, S., Frey, J. U., Heinze, H.-j., and Düzel,
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This appendix contains supplementary data for Experiment 1 (Section 7.2). Figure
A.1 shows a histogram of the test question results split by training regime. Figure
A.2 shows the same results but for each block of training and test questions. Figure
A.3 shows a histogram of the test question results based on the underlying relational
rule for that block. Figure A.4 shows the same results but split by training regime.
High−Similarity Low−Similarity











Figure A.1: Histogram of responses to the test questions over all blocks. Each colour
represents a different training regime.
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Figure A.2: Histogram of responses to the test question for each block. Each colour
represents a different training regime.
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Figure A.3: Histogram of responses to the test questions for blocks with the same



























Figure A.4: Histogram of responses to the test questions for blocks with the same





This appendix contains supplementary data for Experiment 2 (Section 7.3). Figure
B.1 shows a histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of a level summed over
all training levels. Figure B.2 shows a histogram of the total score achieved during
training. Figure B.3 shows a histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of the























Figure B.1: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of a level summed over
all training levels. Each colour represents a different training regime. Participants























Figure B.2: Histogram of the total score achieved during training. Each colour



























Figure B.3: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of the test game. Each



























Figure B.4: Histogram of the total score achieved on the test game. Each colour





In this appendix we present the results of Experiment 2.5. The purpose of this
experiment was to investigate whether the number of training games interacted
with the effect of perceptual similarity on transfer performance. We hypothesised
that the effect of perceptual similarity during training would be more pronounced
if participants were tested earlier on during learning.
C.1 Methods
The experimental procedure was the same as Experiment 2 (Section 7.3) but we re-
duced the length of the experiment to 9 training games and 1 test game. We chose 9
training games because this allowed us to change every feature of each object once.
This was important because it helped prevent participants from forming hypotheses
based on a single perceptual feature that remained constant during training. We
chose to keep the features of the goal object constant because they carry no infor-
mation with regards to the underlying rules and we wanted to keep the number of
training games as small as possible.
In Experiment 2 all training games lasted 30 seconds and the test game lasted
120 seconds. For Experiment 2.5 we set the duration of all training and test games
to 30 seconds. In addition, we only tested the high-perceptual similarity and the
low-perceptual similarity training regimes using 50 different random seed values.
Figure C.1 shows example trajectories for each training regime. In total 200 par-
ticipants were recruited (Male=121, Female=78, Undisclosed=1) using the online
336
platform ‘Prolific Academic’ and they were rewarded £2.50 for participation. As
before, all participants had to be aged 18-30, speak fluent English and be using a
desktop computer. Participants were removed from the analysis if the number of
key presses was 0 for any of the games. Participants were randomly assigned to the
two different training regimes resulting in 103 participants in the high-perceptual
similarity condition and 94 participants in the low-perceptual similarity condition.
A
B
Figure C.1: Depiction of the different training conditions. The y-axis represents
the object and the x-axis represents the level number. The final level represents the
perceptually novel test level. (A) High-perceptual similarity condition. On any two
consecutive levels only the shape, texture or colour of one object was changed. If
the player object’s or goal-generating object’s texture changed then both needed to
be changed to ensure that there was always a texture match. (B) Low-perceptual
similarity condition. The high-perceptual similarity condition was randomly shuffled




Figure C.2 shows the training scores over the course of the experiment. Both training
regimes showed consistent increases in performance during training. Importantly,
by the final training level, performance was still increasing and had not plateaued.
A B
Figure C.2: Scores for each training level over the course of the experiment for the
high- and low-perceptual similarity conditions. (A) First trial scores. (B) Total
scores. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure C.3 shows bar charts of the first and total scores summed over training,
while Figures C.4 and C.5 show the corresponding histograms. A Kruskal-Wallis
rank sum test indicated there were no significant differences between the high- and
low-perceptual similarity conditions in terms of summed first (χ2(1, N=197)=0.1,
p=0.700) or total (χ2(1, N=197)=0.1, p=0.719) scores over training.
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A B
Figure C.3: Scores summed over all training levels for the high- and low-perceptual






















Figure C.4: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of a level summed over
all training levels. Each colour represents a different training regime. Participants


















Figure C.5: Histogram of the total score achieved during training. Each colour
represents a different training regime. Participants were not told the rules of the
games beforehand.
Test Performance
Figure C.6 shows a histogram of the first scores on the final test level for each
training regime. Similarly, figure C.7 shows a histogram of the total scores on the




















Figure C.6: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of the test game. Each




















Figure C.7: Histogram of the total score achieved on the test game. Each colour
represents a different training regime. Participants were not told the rules of the
games beforehand.
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Figure C.8 shows bar charts of the first and total scores on the final test level. A
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test between the test scores of each training regime revealed
no significant differences between them in terms of first scores (χ2(1, N=197)=0.4,
p=0.518) or total scores (χ2(1, N=197)=0.2, p=0.666). This suggests that the
degree of perceptual similarity between consecutive levels in training does not have
an effect on transfer, and that this effect is consistent even when the number of
training levels is reduced.
A B
Figure C.8: Scores on the final test game for the high- and low-perceptual similarity
conditions. (A) Score achieved on the first trial of the final game (B) Total score
achieved on the final game. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
As before, we performed two separate regression analyses with the first and total
scores on the final test level as the dependent variables and the training regime, the
self-reported video game experience, the number of texture matches during the free
classification task, the performance on the first motor control task and the difference
in performance between the first and second motor control tasks as independent
variables. Table C.1 shows the results of these regression analyses. We saw the same
pattern as in Experiment 2, with neither the training regime or number of texture
matches being significant predictors of test performance. This further suggests that
changing the number of training levels had no effect on the findings in Experiment
2.
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Table C.1: Regression analysis of test scores. Each column is a separate regression
using either the first or total score on the test level. Values not in brackets represent
beta coefficients. Values in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals.
Dependent variable:
First Score Total Score
(1) (2)
Experience 0.10 0.16∗∗
(−0.02, 0.22) (0.05, 0.26)
Low-Perceptual Similarity 0.23 0.13
(−0.41, 0.86) (−0.44, 0.71)
Motor Task 1 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(−0.48, −0.15) (−0.39, −0.09)
Motor Task 2 - Motor Task 1 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(−0.48, −0.15) (−0.39, −0.09)
No. Texture Matches 0.03 0.02
(−0.10, 0.16) (−0.10, 0.14)
Constant 7.53∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗
(3.93, 11.12) (4.03, 10.55)
Observations 197 197
R2 0.11 0.12
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.10
Residual Std. Error (df = 191) 2.24 2.03
F Statistic (df = 5; 191) 4.74∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Object Interactions
We again analysed the object interactions of participants over the course of the
experiment to investigate what they had learnt. Figure C.9 shows the proportion of
participants that interacted with a specific object for each level of the experiment.





Figure C.9: The proportion of interaction types during learning. (A) The proportion
of first interaction types for all participants. An interaction is defined as a collision
with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was first interacted with
(excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates the level number (blue
is first training level and yellow is final test level). (B) Same as A but for second
interaction types. (C) The difference between the first and second interaction types.
We first tested whether the number of goal-generating first interactions was sig-
nificantly different between the first training level and the test level. We found no
significant differences (χ2(1, N=394)=1.5, p=0.223), which suggests that partici-
pants were no better on the test level at inferring which object they first needed
to interact with than they were at the beginning of the experiment. Similarly, the
number of game-ending first interactions was not significantly different between the
first training level and the test level (χ2(1, N=394)=0.4, p=0.532). Together these
results suggest that the participants were unable to learn and transfer knowledge of
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the relational rules to the test level. That said, at test the number of goal-generating
first interactions was significantly larger than the number of game-over first inter-
actions (χ2(1, N=394)=11.2, p=0.001). This suggests that participants were better
than chance at inferring which object to interact with first and so some degree of
transfer must have occurred.
We next compared the first interactions on the test level to the second interac-
tions on the test level. From first to second interaction we found that the number
of goal-generating interactions increased (χ2(1, N=394)=10.2, p=0.001) and the
number of game-over interactions decreased (χ2(1, N=394)=34.6, p<0.001). This
suggests that a significant amount of ‘one-shot’ learning may have occurred, whereby
participants used the first interaction to infer which object was goal-generating and
which object was game-ending.
Figure C.10 shows the object interactions over the course of the experiment but
split by training regime. Figure C.11 shows the object interactions split by training
regime but for just the test level. Focusing on just the test level, we found no signif-
icant differences between the training regimes for both the first (χ2(2, N=197)=0.3,
p=0.860) and second (χ2(2, N=197)=1.8, p=0.407) interaction types. This supports
the finding that the degree of perceptual similarity during training had no effect on
the participants’ ability to perform transfer and that this is robust to a decrease in





Figure C.10: The proportion of interaction types during learning split by training
regime. (A) The proportion of first interaction types for all participants. An inter-
action is defined as a collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object
that was first interacted with (excluding the goal object) for each level of the exper-
iment (1-10). The colour represents the training regime. (B) Same as A but for






Figure C.11: The number of interaction types for the final test level. (A) The
number of first interaction types summed over all participants. An interaction is
defined as a collision with another object. The x-axis indicates the object that was
first interacted with (excluding the goal object) and the colour of the bars indicates
the training regime. (B) Same as A but for second interaction types. (C) The
difference between A and B.
C.3 Discussion
In this Experiment we investigated whether the findings of Experiment 2 were robust
to a decrease in the number of training games. We hypothesised that testing the
participants’ transfer ability early on in learning may reveal a critical period when
the degree of perceptual similarity during training has an effect on transfer ability.
We therefore repeated Experiment 2 with only 9 training levels. This meant that
the test of transfer occurred while training performance was increasing at a greater
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rate compared to Experiment 2. We found that the degree of perceptual similarity
between consecutive training games had no effect on transfer ability, as indicated
by the lack of differences between training regimes in terms of first and total test
scores. A reduction in the number of training levels therefore had no impact upon
our findings in Experiment 2.
Analysis of the object interactions revealed very limited evidence of ‘zero-shot’
transfer. More specifically, the number of goal-generating and game-over first inter-
actions were not significantly different between the first training level and the test
level. The test level may therefore have occurred before participants had time to
discover and utilise the underlying relational rules. Instead, it appears that partici-
pants relied on ‘one-shot’ strategies, as indicated by an increase in goal-generating
interactions and a decrease in game-over interactions between the first and second
interactions on the test level. This suggests that perhaps early on in learning par-
ticipants rely more on a ‘one-shot’ strategy and only subsequently do participants
discover and utilise the underlying relational rules. It also suggests that there may
be a hierarchy of strategies, whereby learning the sub-optimal strategy that one ob-
ject is always goal-generating and one is always game-ending is easier than learning
the relational rules.
One important aspect of our experimental paradigm is the need for exploration.
Participants need to explore and interact with the goal-generating and game-over
objects in order to discover that they can generate more goal objects and score more
points. By reducing the number of training games we reduce the amount of time
available for exploration, which reduces the likelihood of participants discovering
the underlying rules. Indeed, in Experiment 2, Figure 7.26, the number of ‘None’
interactions gradually decreases over the course of the experiment as participants
become increasingly aware that they can score more points. In comparison, in
Experiment 2.5, Figure C.9, the number of ‘None’ interactions remains relatively
high as participants do not have time to explore the rules of the game and instead
exploit a conservative strategy. Future iterations of the experiment should therefore
take this into account and encourage exploration. This could be done by explicitly
telling participants that more than one point can be scored by interacting with other
objects, or by starting each trial with the goal absent so that participants have to
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This appendix contains supplementary data for Experiment 3 (Section 7.4). Figure
D.1 shows a histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of a level summed over
all training levels. Figure D.2 shows a histogram of the total score achieved during
training. Figure D.3 shows a histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of
























Figure D.1: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of a level summed over
all training levels. Each colour represents a different training regime. Participants























Figure D.2: Histogram of the total score achieved during training. Each colour
























Figure D.3: Histogram of the score achieved on the first trial of the test game. Each
























Figure D.4: Histogram of the total score achieved on the test game. Each colour
represents a different training regime. Participants were told the rules of the games
beforehand.
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